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Proactive obfuscation is a new method for creating server replicas that are likely to
have fewer shared vulnerabilities. It employs semantics-preserving code trans-
formations to generate diverse executables from a single codebase and peri-
odically restarts servers with these fresh images. Periodic restarts help bound
the number of compromised replicas that a service ever concurrently runs, and
therefore proactive obfuscation makes an adversary’s job more difficult. Proac-
tive obfuscation was used in implementing two prototypes: a distributed fire-
wall based on state-machine replication and a distributed storage service based
on quorum systems. Costs intrinsic to supporting proactive obfuscation were
quantified by measuring the performance of these prototypes.
Authentication is a large cost in proactive obfuscation. And some proto-
cols used in the prototypes require transferable signed messages (for example,
using digital signatures), which can be slow to compute. To reduce authen-
tication costs, we introduce multi-verifier signatures, a new family of signature
schemes that generalizes traditional digital signatures to a secret-key setting.
Some of our multi-verifier signature schemes are faster to compute than digi-
tal signatures. Moreover, just like digital signatures, these signatures are both
transferable and secure under arbitrary (unbounded) adaptive chosen-message
attacks. Practical constructions of digital signature schemes rely on either strong
number-theoretic assumptions or are proven secure only in the random oracle
model. In contrast, we exhibit practical constructions of multi-verifier signature
schemes that are provably secure in the plain model assuming the existence of
pseudorandom functions and without assuming access to random oracles.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Independence of replica failures is crucial when using replication to imple-
ment reliable distributed services. But replicas that use the same code share
the same coding vulnerabilities and, therefore, do not fail independently when
under attack. One contribution of this dissertation is to introduce proactive obfus-
cation, a new method of restoring some measure of independence, whereby each
replica is periodically restarted using an executable generated by semantics-
preserving program obfuscation techniques. These techniques create fresh ex-
ecutables automatically through transformations applied during compilation,
loading, or at run-time. Thus, the opportunities are reduced for an adversary to
compromise too many of the replicas that constitute a service.
A program obfuscation technique relies on an obfuscator, which takes two
inputs—a program P and a secret key κ—and produces an obfuscated executable
semantically equivalent to P .1 Key κ specifies how transformations are applied
to produce the obfuscated executable from P . Each obfuscation technique de-
fends against attacks that exploit implementation details; obfuscated executa-
bles are believed more likely to crash in response to certain classes of attacks
than to fall under the control of an adversary. For example, success of a buffer
overflow attack typically will depend on stack layout details, so replicas us-
ing differently obfuscated executables based on address reordering or stack
padding are likely to crash instead of succumbing to adversary control. One
goal of obfuscation is to provide code independence: an adversary that success-
1The term “obfuscation” has a different meaning in the cryptographic literature (e.g., see
Barak et al. [4]). There, the goal of obfuscation is to prevent adversaries from learning any-
thing about a program that they could not learn from the input and output behavior of the
program. By contrast, program obfuscation techniques used in this dissertation generate mul-
tiple executables from a single original program; these executables should fail independently
under some attacks.
1
fully attacks a replica and learns the key used there for obfuscation gains no
advantage in attacking another replica.
Some approaches to replica management also support data independence: dif-
ferent replicas store different states. Data independence reduces the vulnera-
bility of replicas to attacks that depend on a replica’s state. For example, some
implementation flaws can be exercised only when a replica is in a given state—if
replicas can have different state, then an attack that exploits such an implemen-
tation flaw will not necessarily succeed at all replicas. So, proactive obfuscation
can be seen as adopting the ideas of data independence, but for attacks that
depend on a replica’s implementation details.
Obfuscation techniques include address reordering and stack padding [36,
11, 79], system call reordering [26], instruction set randomization [47, 6, 5], and
heap randomization [10]. The details of a given obfuscation technique condition
the susceptibility of its obfuscated executables to particular attacks. However,
proactive obfuscation itself does not depend on the details of a particular ob-
fuscation technique. It merely depends on using an obfuscation technique that
satisfies certain properties, and these properties are detailed below.
Many systems, including Windows Vista, Windows 7, OpenBSD, and Linux,
employ obfuscation, either by default or in easily-installed modules. And it has
recently been suggested [69] that obfuscation be used for computer monocul-
tures in order to preserve the benefits of deploying the same software on clients
while mitigating against a catastrophic response to a single attack vector; the
independence provided by obfuscation makes simultaneous failure unlikely.
In addition to independence, building a reliable distributed service often re-
quires implementing authentication—the ability of a server to determine the
original source of a message received by that server. Authenticated channels are
2
an abstraction of one simple kind of authentication. A server v that receives a
message m on an authenticated channel knows which server sent m, but v is
not guaranteed to be able to convince other servers of the origin of m. Thus,
authenticated channels provide authentication only between pairs of servers.
Many methods exist to implement authenticated channels. One conceptu-
ally simple method is to connect each pair of servers by a separate communi-
cation channel. However, this method is prohibitively expensive in all but the
smallest systems. Practical authenticated channel implementations use crypto-
graphic algorithms that produce tags for messages; these tags are checked by
the receiver of a message to authenticate the source.
Transferable authentication generalizes authenticated channels. A server v′
that receives a message m and a tag τ generated by a server v using a transfer-
able authentication scheme will know that m was sent by v and can forward m
and τ to any other server v′′ and know that v′′ will also know that m was sent by
v. Unfortunately, existing transferable authentication schemes, like digital signa-
tures [31], are expensive to compute. A second contribution of this dissertation
is to introduce multi-verifier signatures (MVS), which can be used to implement
transferable authentication and can be computed faster than digital signatures
in some contexts.
The rest of this chapter motivates and provides an overview of proactive ob-
fuscation and multi-verifier signatures. Section 1.1 describes our failure model
and reviews common approaches to replica management in light of this model.
In Section 1.2, we outline proactive obfuscation and its use in conjunction with
replica management. Section 1.3 presents an overview of authentication schemes,
and Section 1.4 describes our multi-verifier signature schemes. Section 1.5 then
describes the structure of the dissertation.
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1.1 Fault Tolerance and Attack Tolerance
Replication provides a way to implement fault-tolerant distributed services. In
analogy with fault tolerance, we say that services with resilience to attack ex-
hibit attack tolerance. A replica can be crashed, meaning it does not perform any
actions until it reboots.2 Or, a replica can be compromised, because it has malfunc-
tioned or come under control of an adversary. In the fault-tolerance literature,
this second kind of failure is often called Byzantine. But common usage in the
literature presumes Byzantine failures are independent. So, to emphasize that
attacks may cause correlated failures, we instead use the term “compromised”.
A replica that is not crashed or compromised is correct. Besides replicas, clients
of a distributed service may also be crashed, compromised, or correct.
A replicated system in this failure model has a compromise threshold that
bounds the number of compromised replicas and a crash threshold that bounds
the number of crashed replicas. The system has two goals:
• When the compromise threshold is not exceeded, any replies the system
sends to the clients are correct.
• When neither the compromise threshold nor the crash threshold is ex-
ceeded, the system produces correct replies to client requests
Since proactive obfuscation converts attacks that would compromise a replica
into crashes, all replicas might crash simultaneously. During such crashes, the
system will not respond to clients. But our implementation of proactive obfus-
cation provides a way for crashed replicas to recover without interacting with
other replicas. So, these crashes can be treated as periods of unavailability.
2Some failure models for distributed systems count a replica as faulty for the entire execution
of a protocol if the replica crashes at any time during the execution. Our model does not take this
view of failures, since all replicas eventually crash and reboot in our system, both for proactive
obfuscation and when under attack.
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We assume that adversaries do not have physical access to the replicas, since
an adversary with physical access could compromise all replicas simultaneously
by disconnecting the servers and replacing them with hardware the adversary
controls. Proactive obfuscation only addresses attacks sent to replicas in mes-
sages they receive.
Further, obfuscation, and consequently proactive obfuscation, does not de-
fend against attacks that exploit the semantics (intentional or not) of the system
interface implemented by the replicas, since obfuscation preserves the seman-
tics of this interface. For example, the system interface might allow a host exter-
nal to the system to take control of a replica; in this case, proactive obfuscation
would not prevent the adversary from performing this operation and compro-
mising a replica.
Proactive obfuscation works in conjunction with various different approaches
to replica management. Each replica management approach defines protocols
used by replicas to handle client requests as well as protocols to handle crashed
and compromised replicas. There are three common approaches to replica man-
agement.
The primary/backup approach [2] employs a single replica, called the primary,
to handle all client requests sent to the service. The service also maintains a
set of backup replicas to which the primary sends either state or the sequence of
requests the primary handles. Each backup sends a confirmation to the primary
when it has received and acted on a message received from the primary; upon
receiving confirmations from enough backups, the primary sends a response to
the client.
Backups monitor the primary. When a backup detects that the primary has
crashed, some backup takes over for the crashed primary. The state at this
5
backup must therefore be sufficiently current for continued processing of re-
quests. And the protocol used by the primary ensures that backups all normally
store the same state.
Although the primary/backup approach can tolerate replica crashes, it can-
not handle compromised replicas. For instance, a compromised primary could
undetectably insert arbitrary requests or send incorrect responses to clients. Be-
cause an adversary only needs to compromise a single replica (the primary) to
take control of the replicated system, code independence, as would be provided
by obfuscation, is not all that useful here. For this reason, we did not implement
proactive obfuscation for the primary/backup approach.
The state machine approach [48, 68] provides a way to build a reliable dis-
tributed service that implements the same interface as a program running on
a single trustworthy host. Using it, a program is described as a state machine,
which consists of state variables and deterministic3 commands that modify state
variables and may produce output. Correct replicas in the state machine ap-
proach perform the same actions and have the same state, so replicas in the
state machine approach have no data independence.
There are protocols for the state machine approach that can tolerate compro-
mised replicas by having many replicas concurrently process each client request
and then coordinate their responses to the client. Replicas in the state machine
approach must implement the same interface, since they process the same se-
quence of requests, but the replicas are not required to use the same implemen-
tation. This means that different replicas can be obfuscated differently, and we
will see that there are advantages to doing so.
Quorum systems [76, 37, 41] are yet a third approach to replica management.
3The requirement that commands be deterministic does not significantly limit use of the
state machine approach, because non-deterministic choices in a service can often be captured as
additional arguments to commands.
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Here, replicas store objects consisting of state; an object supports operations to
modify its state. A quorum system is defined by a collectionQ of quorums, each
a subset of replicas that satisfies an intersection property. The intersection prop-
erty guarantees that any two quorums have sufficient overlap to allow clients
to read the latest state written to objects.
Replicas in a quorum system do not usually all store the same state, because
clients of a quorum system interact with only a quorum and, therefore, not all
replicas execute the same sequence of operations or store the same objects. This
means that quorum systems support data independence.
1.2 Proactive Obfuscation
A simple way to improve attack tolerance on a replicated system would be to
obfuscate each replica differently, since servers running the different executa-
bles ought to share fewer vulnerabilities. However, this form of independence
erodes over time, because an adversary with access to an obfuscated executable
can analyze the obfuscated code and customize an attack. Eventually, the at-
tacker will have attacks for each replica.
Proactive obfuscation defends against this by introducing epochs; one server
is rebooted in each epoch, so that all n servers are rebooted after n epochs have
elapsed. The approaches to replica management used by our prototypes are
designed to tolerate at most some threshold t of compromised replicas out of
n total replicas. So, using proactive obfuscation with epoch length ∆ seconds
implies that an adversary is forced to compromise more than t replicas in n∆
seconds in order to subvert the service. And we can make the compromise
of more than t replicas ever more difficult by reducing ∆, although ∆ is ob-
viously bounded from below by the time needed to reobfuscate and reboot a
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single server replica.
Proactive obfuscation lowers the chances that all replicas can be compro-
mised by a single attack. This helps availability and integrity properties of a
service.4 But neither replication nor proactive obfuscation enhances the confi-
dentiality of data stored by the servers, because confidentiality can often be vio-
lated by the disclosure of a secret stored by a single replica; integrity and avail-
ability properties normally can only be violated by failures of multiple replicas.
For some applications, confidentiality can be enforced by storing data in en-
crypted form under a different key on each server. And cryptographic tech-
niques have been developed for performing certain computations on such en-
crypted data. Proactive obfuscation does not interfere with the use of these
techniques.
Neither replication nor proactive obfuscation defends against denial of ser-
vice (DoS) attacks, which decrease availability. Adversaries executing DoS at-
tacks rely on one of two strategies: saturating a resource, like a network, that
is not under the control of the replicas, or sending messages that saturate re-
sources at the replicas. This second strategy includes DoS attacks that cause
replicas to crash frequently and subsequently reboot.
Finally, note that proactive obfuscation is intended to augment, not replace,
techniques that reduce vulnerabilities in replica code. And proactive obfusca-
tion is attractive because extant techniques (e.g., safe languages or formal verifi-
cation) have proved difficult to retrofit on legacy systems. Network services, for
instance, are often written in C, which is neither a safe language nor necessarily
amenable to formal verification.5
4For this to hold, we assume that obfuscation itself does not compromise a replica.
5In principle, this property of C can make it difficult to perform obfuscation. But unlike
most formal methods, obfuscation does not usually require annotation or any significant code
analysis, so it is often easier to perform.
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The practicality of an approach like proactive obfuscation depends on the
cost of implementing the mechanisms to make it work. An additional contribu-
tion of this dissertation is to design these mechanisms and quantify their cost
for two approaches to replica management. To investigate the costs, we pro-
totyped two services: (i) a distributed firewall (based on the pf packet filter
[60] in OpenBSD [57]) and (ii) a distributed storage service. One service uses
the state machine approach and the other uses quorum systems. Moreover, by
building working prototypes, we have decreased the chances of overlooking
assumptions in our design or in the applicability of proactive obfuscation.
1.3 Authentication
Cryptographic authentication schemes are inspired by authentication schemes
used in real life. For instance, a physical signature on a document is often used
to prove that a given individual signed the document. But physical signatures
are relatively easy to forge and can be copied and pasted from one document
to another, since they do not depend on the document being signed. Moreover,
a single instance of a physical signature is of little use, since there is no way
to show that this signature was made by a given individual. For this reason,
banks normally keep a copy of a depositor’s signature to compare against fu-
ture signatures that authenticate withdrawal requests. And, in general, physical
signatures require setup: infrastructure and actions that bind signatures to indi-
viduals.
Analogous to physical signatures, a tag generated by a digital signature
scheme for a given message m using a given key proves to any receiver that
this signature was generated for m by a given server. The tag must be difficult
for an adversary to forge for a given message, even given tags on other mes-
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sages of its choice. Servers in a digital signature scheme take one of two roles:
signer and verifier, where the verifier receiving a tag τ has some way of deciding
which signer knows the key(s) used to generate τ . Here, too, there is a setup:
the actions taken to create this binding between servers and keys.
Keys shared between a group of servers are called secret keys. Since each
server in the group has the same key, authentication using secret keys is called
symmetric authentication (and symmetric authentication algorithms are called
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) [7]).
Secret-key setup involves generating and distributing keys among groups of
servers; normally, keys are shared between pairs of servers, so a set of n servers
must generate and share a total of
(
n
2
)
keys. In symmetric authentication, the
binding between a key and servers is known only to servers that know the key.
For example, if key k is shared by servers v and v′, then when v receives a
message m and a tag τ generated by a MAC using key k, server v knows that
only v or v′ could have generated τ for m. If v knows that it did not generate τ ,
then v can deduce that v′ generated τ . But if three servers v, v′, and v′′ all share
k, then when v receives m and τ that it did not generate, it knows only that one
of v′ or v′′ generated τ .
MACs do not provide transferability—the property that tags accepted by one
host and forwarded to another host will be accepted there too. Transferability is
essential in many applications of digital signature schemes (e.g., in distributed
systems [21, 81, 54]).
Asymmetric authentication (called one-way authentication when first proposed
by Diffie and Hellman [31] and now usually identified with digital signatures)
associates a server v with a public key that can be used to authenticate messages
from v. Each public key has an associated private key known only to the server
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and used by that server to generate tags.
Public-key setup normally involves a well-known trustworthy repository that
provides a binding from public keys to servers. This requirement is stronger
than what is required for secret-key setup, but it does provide transferability.
That is, if server v′ receives message m and tag τ from server v and checks τ
using v’s public key, then v′ knows that any other server v′′ will also checkm and
τ with v’s public key and come to the same conclusion about τ . Since each server
only has one key, a set of n servers only needs to set up n keys—considerably
fewer keys than for symmetric authentication.
1.4 Multi-Verifier Signatures
Digital signatures are relatively expensive to generate. Moreover, practical dig-
ital signature schemes rely on either strong number-theoretic assumptions [28,
13] or are proven secure only in the random oracle model [64]. In contrast, MACs
are orders of magnitude faster and can be based on pseudorandom functions.
MACs, however, rely on secret-key setup.
A natural question is whether the secret-key setup used for MACs can be
leveraged to get efficient, yet provably secure, digital signature schemes. We
answer this question in the affirmative in this dissertation by introducing multi-
verifier signatures, which generalize digital signatures to a secret-key setting
with a signer and multiple verifiers, each using different keys. We provide two
efficient MVS constructions. They are based only on the existence of pseudo-
random functions and do not assume random oracles:
• Atomic Signatures requires the signer to solve a system of linear equations.
As far as we know, Atomic Signatures constitutes the first practical and
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provably secure signature scheme based only on symmetric-key primi-
tives.
• Chain Signatures provides λ-limited transferability, the property that signa-
tures can be transferred at least λ − 1 times and still be accepted by re-
ceivers. Although λ-limited transferability is weaker than transferability,
it suffices in many settings (e.g., see systems [21, 54, 81, 61], where each
message is forwarded only a fixed number of times). Furthermore, for
values of λ used in practical protocols, Chain Signatures outperforms the
fastest implementations of digital signature schemes (even though these
digital signature schemes are only secure in the random oracle model [64]).
Our MVS constructions require an unusual secret-key setup—pairwise shared
keys distributed in such a way that the signer does not know which key cor-
responds to which verifier. This additional secrecy prevents the signer from
creating signatures that would be accepted by some hosts but not others. The
required secret-key setup is easily implemented, for example, in an operating
system (OS) or small distributed service. Processes in an OS already trust the
OS, so the OS can distribute shared keys when a process is created. Similarly, a
small distributed service (e.g., [21, 54, 81]) that is managed by a single adminis-
trator can distribute keys before the service begins executing. In these practical
settings, MVS schemes provide a speed advantage over common digital signa-
ture schemes.
Our multi-verifier signature schemes require each server to keep n bits of
state—one per server. Bit βvv′ is stored at server v
′ and tracks whether v′ believes
server v to be compromised. Server v′ decides that v is compromised if v′ re-
ceives a special return value ⊥ from the multi-verifier signature scheme while
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verifying a given message m and tag τ from v.6 Return value ⊥ signifies that,
with all but negligible probability, τ could only have been generated for m by
a compromised signer. Keeping state to track whether or not other servers are
compromised is a natural function in a distributed system, since servers nor-
mally do not interact with other servers that they deem to be compromised.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
Proactive obfuscation is presented in Chapter 2, along with mechanisms for its
implementation. Then, Chapter 3 gives an overview of the state machine ap-
proach to replica management, extends it with proactive obfuscation, and de-
scribes and evaluates a firewall prototype. Quorum systems are presented in
Chapter 4, along with an extension with proactive obfuscation and a descrip-
tion and evaluation of a storage-service prototype. The theory of multi-verifier
signatures is described in Chapter 5, and our two constructions are presented
and evaluated in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 offers some conclusions.
6Replicas could also keep a list of compromised signers; this list will requireO(t) bits instead
of n, so the list should be used when t = o(n).
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CHAPTER 2
PROACTIVE OBFUSCATION
Proactive obfuscation uses an obfuscator to produce obfuscated executables.
We abstract from the details of the obfuscator by defining two properties we
require it to implement.
(2.1) Obfuscation Independence. For t > 1, the amount of work an adver-
sary requires to compromise t obfuscated replicas is Ω(t) times the work
needed to compromise one replica.
(2.2) Bounded Adversary. The time needed for an adversary to compromise
t + 1 replicas is greater than the time needed to reobfuscate, reboot, and
recover n replicas.
Obfuscation Independence (2.1) implies that differently obfuscated executables
exhibit some measure of independence. Therefore, a single attack is unlikely
to compromise multiple replicas. Obfuscation techniques being advocated for
systems today attempt to approximate Obfuscation Independence (2.1). Given
enough time, however, an adversary might still be able to compromise t + 1
replicas. But Obfuscation Independence (2.1) and Bounded Adversary (2.2) to-
gether imply that periodically reobfuscating and rebooting replicas nevertheless
makes it harder for adversaries to maintain control over more than t compro-
mised replicas. In particular, by the time an adversary could have compromised
t + 1 obfuscated replicas, all n will have been reobfuscated and rebooted (with
the adversary evicted), so no more than t replicas are ever compromised.
It might seem that an adversary could invalidate Obfuscation Independence
(2.1) and Bounded Adversary (2.2) by performing attacks on replicas in paral-
lel. That is, the adversary sends separate attacks independently to each replica.
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Figure 2.1: Implementing proactive obfuscation
To prevent such parallel attacks, we employ an architecture that ensures any
input processed by one replica is, by design, processed by all. Attacks sent in
parallel to different replicas are now processed serially by all replicas. The dif-
ferently obfuscated replicas are likely to crash when they process most of these
attacks, so the rate at which an adversary can explore different possible attacks
is severely limited, and the parallelism does not really help the attacker. Further-
more, these crashes do not help the adversary violate Bounded Adversary (2.2),
since they slow down both recovery and attacks by the same amount.
2.1 Mechanisms to Support Proactive Obfuscation
The time needed to reobfuscate, reboot, and recover all n replicas in a repli-
cated system is determined by the amount of code at each replica and by the
costs of executing mechanisms for coordinating the replicas and performing re-
boot and recovery. Figure 2.1 depicts an implementation of a replicated service
and identifies 3 mechanisms needed for supporting proactive obfuscation: Reply
Synthesis, State Recovery, and Replica Refresh.
Clients send inputs to replicas. Each replica implements the same interface
as a centralized service, processes these inputs, and sends its outputs to clients.
To transform outputs from the many replicas into an output from the replicated
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service, clients employ an output synthesis function fγ , where γ specifies the min-
imum number of distinct replicas from which a reply is needed. In addition to
being from distinct replicas, the replies used by fγ must also be output simi-
lar—a property defined separately for each approach to replica management
and output synthesis function. Reply Synthesis is the mechanism we postulate to
implement this output synthesis function.
Some means of authentication must be available in order for Reply Synthesis
to distinguish outputs from distinct replicas; replica management also could
need authentication for doing inter-replica coordination. These authentication
requirements are summarized as follows.
(2.3) Authenticated Channels. Each replica has authenticated channels from
all other replicas and to all clients.
Replicas keep state that may change in response to processing client inputs.
The State Recovery mechanism enables a replica to recover state after rebooting,
so the replica can continue participating in the replicated service. Specifically,
recovering replicas receive states from multiple replicas and convert them into
a single state. Recovering replicas employ a state synthesis function gδ for this,
where δ specifies the minimum number of distinct replicas from which state
is needed. Analogous to output synthesis, the replies used by gδ must be state
similar—a property defined separately for each approach to replica management
and state synthesis function.
The Replica Refresh mechanism periodically reboots servers, informs replicas
of epoch changes, and provides freshly obfuscated executables to replicas. For
Replica Refresh to evict the adversary from a compromised replica, we require:
(2.4) Replica Reboot. Any replica, whether compromised or not, can be made
to reboot by Replica Refresh.
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(2.5) Executable Generation. Executables used by recovering replicas are kept
secret from other replicas and are generated by a correct host.
Replica Reboot (2.4) guarantees that no replica can be controlled indefinitely by
the adversary. Executable Generation (2.5) ensures that replicas reboot using
executables that have not been analyzed or modified by an adversary.
The number of replicas needed to implement proactive obfuscation depends,
in part, on the number of concurrently rebooting replicas. There must be enough
non-rebooting correct replicas to run State Recovery. To bound this number, we
assume an upper bound on the amount of state at each replica and make the
following assumptions about clock synchronization and message delays.
(2.6) Approximately Synchronized Clocks. The difference between clocks on
different correct hosts is bounded.
(2.7) Synchronous Processors. Differences in the rate of instruction execution
on different correct hosts are bounded.
(2.8) Timely Links. There is a bound b on the number of times a message must
be sent on a network before the message is received. For any message
that is received, there is a bound  on the amount of time it takes for this
message to be received.
Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6), Synchronous Processors (2.7), and
Timely Links (2.8) imply that the system implements the synchronous model [52].
Together, they are used to guarantee a bound on the time involved in running
Replica Refresh and subsequent State Recovery. Epoch length must be chosen to
exceed this bound so that replicas have enough time to recover before others
reboot. The epoch length determines the window of vulnerability for the service:
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Figure 2.2: The prototype architecture
the interval of time in which a compromise of t + 1 replicas leads to the service
being compromised.
2.2 Mechanism Implementation
Implementing proactive obfuscation requires instantiating each of the mecha-
nisms just described. Figure 2.2 depicts an architecture for an implementation.
Clients send inputs to replicas and receive outputs on lossy networks labeled
input network and output network, respectively, in Figure 2.2. Reply Synthesis is
performed by clients. State Recovery is performed by replicas using a lossy net-
work, labeled internal service network, that satisfies Timely Links (2.8). Replica
Refresh is implemented either by a host (called the Controller and assumed to be
correct) or by decentralized protocols.
If we design the Controller so it never attempts to receive messages, then the
Controller cannot be affected in any way by hosts in its environment. Because it
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cannot be affected by other hosts, the Controller cannot be attacked. The Con-
troller can still send messages on the reboot network connected to all replicas; so,
this network is used to provide boot code to replicas. The diode symbol in Fig-
ure 2.2 on the line from the Controller depicts the constraint that the Controller
never receives messages on the reboot network.1
Whether using the Controller or decentralized protocols, Replica Reboot
(2.4) is implemented by a reboot clock that consists of a timer for each replica.
The reboot clock uses a remote-control power strip in order to toggle power
to individual replicas when the timer goes off for that replica. Replicas are re-
booted in order mod n, one per epoch.
Epoch change can be signaled to replicas either by messages from the Con-
troller or by timeouts. In either case, for any epoch change, the elapsed time
between the first correct replica changing epochs and the last correct replica
changing epochs is bounded, due to Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6)
and Timely Links (2.8). Epochs are labeled with monotonically increasing epoch
numbers that are incremented at each epoch change. For epoch changes with
our decentralized protocols, we use timeouts because the reboot clock takes no
input and cannot send messages to replicas.
2.2.1 Reply Synthesis
To perform Reply Synthesis with output synthesis function fγ , clients must re-
ceive output-similar replies from γ distinct replicas. We have experimented
with two different implementations of Reply Synthesis.
In the first, each replica has its own private key, and clients authenticate
1There are circumstances in which the Controller can communicate with hosts that are
known not to be compromised. For example, see the centralized Controller implementation
in Section 2.2.3.
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digitally-signed individual responses from replicas; a replica changes private
keys only when recovering after a reboot. Clients thus need the corresponding
new public key for a recovering replica in order to authenticate future mes-
sages from that replica. So, the service provides a way for a rebooting replica to
acquire a certificate signed by the service for its new public key. A recovering
replica reestablishes authenticated channels with clients by acquiring such a cer-
tificate and sending this certificate2 on its first packet after reboot.3 This method
of Reply Synthesis and authentication requires clients to receive new keys in each
epoch.
In our second Reply Synthesis implementation, the entire service has a pub-
lic key that is known to all clients and replicas, and the corresponding private
key is shared (using secret sharing [72]) by the replicas. Each replica is given
a share of the private key and uses this share to compute partial signatures [29]
for messages. The secret sharing is refreshed on each epoch change, in an op-
eration called share refresh, but the underlying public/private key pair for the
service does not change. Consequently, clients do not need new public keys
after epoch changes, unlike in the public-key per-server Reply Synthesis imple-
mentation above. Recovering replicas acquire their shares by a share recovery
protocol.
Each replica includes a partial signature on responses it sends to clients.
Only by collecting more than some threshold number of partial signatures can
a client assemble a signature for the message. We use APSS, an asynchronous,
proactive, secret-sharing protocol [82] with an (n, t + 1) threshold cryptosys-
tem to compute partial signatures and perform assembly. Contributions from
t + 1 different partial signatures are necessary to assemble a valid signature,
2Certificates contain epoch numbers to prevent replay attacks.
3Our implementation also allows clients to request certificates from replicas if they receive a
packet containing a replica/epoch combination for which they have no certificate.
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so a contribution from at least one correct replica is needed. Reply Synthesis is
then implemented by checking assembled signatures using the public key for
the service.
In fact, an optimization of the second Reply Synthesis implementation is pos-
sible, in which a replica—not the client—assembles a signature from partial sig-
natures received from other replicas. This replica then sends the assembled sig-
nature with its output to the client. This optimization requires replicas to send
partial signatures to each other, which increases inter-replica communication for
each output, hence increases latency. But the optimization reduces the changes
required in client code that was designed to communicate with non-replicated
services.
2.2.2 State Recovery
Normally, each replica gets to the current state by receiving and processing in-
puts from clients. This, however, is not often possible after reboot, because the
inputs that led to the current state might not be available. Reboots occur period-
ically for proactive obfuscation and also occur due to crashes, especially those
caused by attacks.
To facilitate recovery after a crash, each replica writes its state to non-volatile
media after processing each input; a replica recovering from a crash (but not a
reboot for proactive obfuscation) reads this state back as the last step of recovery.
This allows a replica to acquire state without sending or receiving any messages.
So, replica crashes resemble periods of replica unavailability.4
Replicas rebooted for proactive obfuscation, however, cannot use their lo-
4This method of handling crashes only works for transient errors and for attacks that cause
replicas to crash without writing state to disk. The period of unavailability begins just before
receipt of the offending input. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of crashes caused as part of DoS
attacks.
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cally stored state for State Recovery, since this state might be corrupt and might
cause a replica reading it to be compromised or to crash—recall that one goal
of proactive obfuscation is to evict the adversary from a replica. The obvious
alternative to using local state is to obtain state from other correct replicas by
executing a recovery protocol. However, obfuscation may mean that replicas par-
ticipating in a recovery protocol use different internal state representations. Ob-
fuscated replicas are therefore assumed to implement marshaling and unmar-
shaling functions to convert their internal state representation to and from some
abstract representation that is the same for all replicas.
Before executing State Recovery, a recovering replica i establishes authenti-
cated channels to all replicas it communicates with. The recovery protocol then
proceeds as follows:
1. Replica i starts recording packets received from other replicas.
2. Replica i issues a state recovery request to all other replicas. The actions
taken by other replicas upon receiving this state recovery request depend
on the approach to replica management in use, but these actions must
guarantee that correct replicas eventually send state-similar replies to re-
plica i.
3. Upon receiving δ state-similar replies, replica i applies state synthesis func-
tion gδ.
4. Replica i replays all packets recorded due to step 1 as if they were received
for the first time and stops recording.
Notice that step 4 might cause the recovering replica to see messages corre-
sponding to earlier states. So, the replication protocol must guarantee that such
messages will not cause this replica to assume an incorrect state; most replica
management protocols provide this guarantee.
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To be useful, State Recovery must terminate in a bounded amount of time;
otherwise, a recovering replica from one epoch might still be recovering when
the next replica is rebooted, violating one of our assumptions about epochs.
To guarantee this property, we assume that the state at each replica is bounded.
Furthermore, the implementation of the state recovery request for each approach
to replica management must ensure that the operations it requires complete in
a bounded amount of time.
One problem that might keep steps 2 and 3 from completing in a bounded
amount of time is that other replicas processing the state recovery request might
crash an unbounded number of times due to attacks by an adversary. This could
slow down State Recovery by an arbitrary factor. To solve this problem, a replica
that has recovered its state after a crash does not perform any operations. In-
stead, it listens for for a bounded amount of time to see if there are any state
recovery requests from a recovering replica.5 If there are no such messages,
then the replica restarts execution of Input Coordination and Reply Synthesis and
continues as before. Otherwise, it processes the State Recovery messages from
the recovering replica before handling messages from clients or other replicas.
The goal of this crash-recovery protocol is to make sure that replicas crash
and recover at most once during each period of State Recovery. Then, Approx-
imately Synchronized Clocks (2.6), Synchronous Processors (2.7), and Timely
Links (2.8) together imply that steps 2 and 3 complete in a bounded amount of
time.
However, to achieve this goal, we must also ensure that replicas that recover
from a crash initially only process messages from the recovering replica, since a
message from a compromised replica might make this replica crash again. This
5The exact value for this bound depends on how frequently a recovering replica starts send-
ing state recovery requests. But Timely Links (2.8) and Synchronous Processors (2.7) imply that
there is a bound.
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can be achieved as long as there is a way for replicas recovering from a crash
to sort messages and process only those coming from a recovering replica. It
must be the case that this method for sorting replica messages cannot cause the
replica to crash again.6
Finally, we must guarantee that step 4 completes in a bounded amount of
time. That is, replicas must be able replay and process recorded packets while
continuing to receive and record packets, and this processing must terminate in
a bounded amount of time. Recorded packets must therefore be processed more
quickly than packets are received. This means there will be a maximum speed at
which a replicated system using proactive obfuscation can process inputs. This
maximum speed depends on how quickly a recovering replica can process its
recorded packets and must be enough slower so that step 4 can terminate in a
bounded amount of time.7
2.2.3 Replica Refresh
Replica Refresh involves 3 distinct functions: (i) reboot and epoch change notifi-
cation, (ii) executable reobfuscation, and (iii) key distribution for implementing
authenticated channels between replicas. We explored two different implemen-
tations of Replica Refresh. One is centralized, and the other is decentralized.
Centralized Controller Solution. A centralized implementation that uses a
Controller for Replica Refresh can be quite efficient. For instance, a centralized
implementation can provide epoch-change notification directly to replicas, can
6One way to achieve this property would be to have an additional network that allows ex-
actly one replica to send and all replicas to receive. On each epoch change, the switch for this
network is updated (by the Controller or the reboot clock) to allow only the next replica mod
n to send. Another way would be to have provably-correct signature checking code for the
replicas.
7In our implementations, this bound was not found to be a significant restriction.
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reobfuscate executables in parallel with replicas rebooting, and can generate
keys and sign their certificates instead of running a distributed key refresh pro-
tocol.
Reboot and Epoch Change. To reboot a replica, the Controller toggles a remote-
control power strip. Immediately after the reboot completes, the Controller uses
the reboot network to send a message to all replicas, informing them of the re-
boot and associated epoch change.
Executable Reobfuscation. The Controller itself obfuscates and compiles exe-
cutables of the operating system and application source code. By assumption,
this guarantees that executables are generated by a correct host, as required by
Executable Generation (2.5). Executables are transferred to recovering replicas
through the reboot network using a network boot protocol. To guarantee that no
other replicas learn information about the executable and to prevent other repli-
cas from providing boot code, we require that the reboot network implement a
separate confidential channel from the Controller to each replica. Replicas may
not send packets on these channels.
(2.9) Reboot Channels. The Controller can send confidential information to
each replica on the reboot network, no replicas can send any message on
the reboot network, except as determined by the Controller, and clients
cannot access the reboot network at all.
So, the reboot network is isolated and cannot be attacked. Therefore, any exe-
cutable received on the reboot network comes from the Controller.
A simple but expensive way to implement Reboot Channels (2.9) would be
to have pairwise channels between each replica and the Controller. A less costly
implementation involves using a single switch with ports that can be toggled on
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and off by the Controller. Then the Controller can communicate directly with
exactly one replica by turning off all other ports on the switch. SNMP-controlled
[20] modern switches allow such control of individual ports by a third party like
the Controller.
The Controller can perform bidirectional communication with a recovering
replica that has not yet taken any input from the other replicas, since our as-
sumptions implie that this replica cannot have been compromised yet. So, the
Controller employs PXE boot [45] to load an image on a recovering replica. This
works because Reboot Channels (2.9) implies that the Controller can temporar-
ily modify the network to allow the rebooting replica bidirectional communica-
tion with the Controller.
Key Distribution. The Controller performs key distribution to implement
authenticated channels by generating a new public/private RSA [64] key pair
for each recovering replica i and certifying the public key to all replicas at the
time i reboots. The new key pair along with public keys and certificates for
each replica in the current epoch are written into an executable for i.8 Reboot
Channels (2.9) guarantees that other replicas cannot observe the executable sent
from the Controller to a rebooting replica, so they cannot learn the new private
key for i.
Decentralized Protocols Solution. The centralized Controller provides a sim-
ple way to implement Replica Refresh but is a single point of failure. Decentral-
ized schemes tend to be more expensive but can avoid the single point of failure
of centralized schemes.
8The Controller could include in this executable new public keys for replicas to be rebooted
later. These keys are not included in order to deprive adversaries access to the keys as long as
possible.
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Reboot and Epoch Change. We have not explored decentralized replica reboot
mechanisms, because reboot depends on a remote-control power strip that is it-
self potentially a single point of failure. Decentralized epoch change notification
can be achieved, however, by using timeouts, as discussed at the beginning of
section 2.2.
Executable Reobfuscation. Replicas can each generate their own obfuscated
executables in order to satisfy Executable Generation (2.5). It suffices that each
replica be trusted to boot from correct (i.e., unmodified) code; this trust is justi-
fied if the actions of the replica boot code cannot be modified:
(2.10) Read-Only Boot Code. The semantics of boot code on replicas cannot be
modified by an adversary.
This assumption can be discharged if two conditions hold: (i) the BIOS is not
modifiable9, and (ii) the boot code is stored on a read-only medium. Our pro-
totypes assume (i) holds and discharge (ii) by employing a CD-ROM to store
an OpenBSD system that, once booted, uses source on the CD-ROM to build a
freshly obfuscated executable.10
After a newly obfuscated executable is built, it must be booted. This requires
a way for a running kernel to boot an executable on disk or else a way to force
a CPU to reboot from a different device after booting a CD-ROM (i.e., from
the disk instead of the CD-ROM). The former is not supported in OpenBSD
(although it is supported by kexec in Linux). The latter requires a way to switch
boot devices, but Read-Only Boot Code (2.10) implies the code on the CD-ROM
cannot change the BIOS in order to accomplish this switch.
9This, in turn, can be implemented using a secure co-processor like the Trusted Platform
Module [77].
10Our prototypes actually boot from a read-only floppy, which then copies an OpenBSD sys-
tem and source from a CD-ROM to the hard disk and runs it from there. We describe the imple-
mentation in terms of a single CD-ROM here for ease of exposition.
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In our prototypes, we resolved this dilemma by employing a timer. It forces
the server to switch between booting from the CD-ROM and from the hard disk,
as follows. The BIOS on each server is set to boot from a CD-ROM if any is
present and otherwise to boot from the hard disk. On reboot, the reboot clock
not only toggles power to the server but also begins providing power to the
server’s CD-ROM drive. The server boots, finds the CD-ROM (so boots from
that device), executes, and writes its newly obfuscated executable to its hard
drive. The timer then turns off power to the CD-ROM and toggles server power,
causing the processor to reboot again. The server now fails to find a function-
ing CD-ROM, so it boots from the hard disk, using the freshly obfuscated exe-
cutable.
Key Distribution. In the decentralized implementation for this function, a
recovering replica itself generates a new public/private key pair. It must then
establish and disseminate a certificate for this new public key. Key generation
can be performed by a rebooting replica locally if we assume that each replica
has a sufficient source of randomness. To establish and disseminate a certifi-
cate, we use a simplified version of a proactive key refresh protocol designed by
Canetti, Halevi, and Herzberg [18]. This protocol employs threshold cryptogra-
phy: each replica has shares of a private key for the service. A recovering replica
submits a key request for its freshly generated public key to other replicas; they
compute partial signatures for this key using their shares. These partial signa-
tures can be used to reassemble a signature for a certificate. For verification of
the reassembled signature on a certificate to work, we assume the public key of
the service is known to all hosts.
A recovering replica must know the current epoch before running the re-
covery protocol, since it needs authenticated channels with other replicas, and
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the certificates used to establish these channels are only valid for a given set of
epochs. A recovering replica learns the current epoch from its valid reassembled
certificate.
To prevent too many shares from leaking to mobile adversaries, shares of the
service key used to create partial signatures for submitted keys are refreshed by
APSS at each epoch change, using the share refresh protocol.11
To prevent more than one key from being signed per epoch, replicas use
Byzantine Paxos [51], a distributed agreement protocol, to decide on the key re-
quest to use for a given recovering replica; correct replicas produce partial sig-
natures in this epoch only for the key specified in this key request. Note that if
replicas are allowed to create partial signatures for any single key in each epoch,
and only t + 1 partial signatures are required for signature reassembly, then up
to n− t keys might be signed per epoch. This is because there are at most t com-
promised replicas and at least n− t correct replicas; the t compromised replicas
could generate n − t keys, submit each to a different correct replica, and them-
selves produce t partial signatures for each, since each compromised replica can
produce multiple different partial signatures. So, there would be t + 1 partial
signatures (hence a certificate) for n − t different keys. But if Byzantine Paxos
is used to decide which key to sign, then the set of correct replicas will sign at
most one key. Only one certificate can be produced for each epoch, since one
correct replica must contribute a partial signature to a reassembled signature.12
This key distribution scheme does not guarantee that a recovering replica
will succeed in getting a new key signed—only that some replica will. So a
11It might seem unnecessary to use APSS, an asynchronous protocol, since Replica Refresh
must complete in a bounded amount of time and operates under synchronous assumptions. But
using asynchronous protocols under synchronous assumptions provides the maximum practi-
cal defense if these synchronous assumptions are violated.
12Another solution would be to use an (n, dn+t+12 e) threshold cryptosystem, since then only
one key could be signed. But the implementation of APSS used in our prototypes does not
support this threshold efficiently.
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compromised replica might get a key signed in the place of a recovering correct
replica. However, if recovering replica i receives a certificate purporting to be
for the current epoch but using a different key than i requested, then i knows
that some compromised replica established the certificate in its place, and i can
alert a human operator. This operator can check and reboot compromised repli-
cas. However, i cannot convince other replicas in the service.
2.3 Mechanism Performance
Assumptions invariably bring vulnerabilities. Yet implementations having fewer
assumptions are typically more expensive. For instance, decentralized proto-
cols for Replica Refresh require more network communication (an expense) than
centralized protocols, but dependence on a single host in the centralized pro-
tocols brings a vulnerability. The trade-offs between different instantiations of
the mechanisms of section 2.2 mostly involve incurring higher CPU costs for
increased decentralization. Under high load, these CPU costs divert a replica’s
resources away from input handling. We use throughput and latency, two key
performance metrics for network services, to characterize these costs for each
mechanism.
2.3.1 Reply Synthesis
Implementing Reply Synthesis with individual authentication between replicas
and clients requires reestablishing keys with clients at reboot, but this cost is
infrequent and small. The major cost of individual authentication in our proto-
type arises in generating digital signatures for output packets.
The threshold cryptography implementation of Reply Synthesis computes par-
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tial signatures for each output packet. And partial signatures take even more
CPU time to generate than ordinary digital signatures. So, under high load, the
individual authentication scheme admits higher throughput and lower latency
than the threshold cryptography scheme.
Throughput can be improved in both of our Reply Synthesis implementations
by batching output—instead of signing each output packet, replicas opportunis-
tically produce a single signature for a batch of output packets up to a maximum
batch size, called the batching factor. This batching allows cryptographic compu-
tations (in particular, digital signatures) used in authentication to be performed
less frequently and thus reduces the CPU load on the replicas and the client.
2.3.2 State Recovery
The cost of State Recovery depends directly on how much state must be recov-
ered. Large state transfers consume network bandwidth and CPU time, both at
the sending and receiving replicas. So, when recovering replicas must recover
a large state under high load, State Recovery leads to significant degradation of
throughput and latency.
2.3.3 Replica Refresh
The performance characteristics of Replica Refresh differ significantly between
the centralized and decentralized implementations. Reboot and epoch change
notification make little difference to performance—epoch change notification
only takes a short amount of time, and reboot involves only the remote-control
power strip. Centralized Executable Reobfuscation is performed by the Con-
troller directly, and the resulting executable is transferred over the reboot net-
31
work, so this has little effect on performance. However, decentralized Exe-
cutable Reobfuscation significantly increases the window of vulnerability: re-
obfuscation cannot occur while a replica is rebooting, since replicas perform
their own reobfuscation. So, reboot and reobfuscation now must be executed
serially instead of in parallel.
Choosing between centralized and decentralized key distribution is also cru-
cial to performance. Decentralized key distribution uses APSS, which must per-
form share refresh at each epoch change. Our implementation of APSS borrows
code from CODEX [54]. And in the CODEX implementation of APSS, share re-
fresh requires significant CPU resources, so we should expect to see a drop in
throughput and an increase in latency during its execution. Further, a reboot-
ing replica must acquire shares during recovery, and this share recovery proto-
col requires non-trivial CPU resources; we thus should expect to see a second,
smaller, drop in throughput and increase in latency during replica recovery. The
key distribution protocol itself only involves signing a single key and perform-
ing a single round of Byzantine Paxos, so its contribution to performance is
negligible.
2.4 Related Work
Proactive obfuscation provides two functions critical to building robust systems
in the face of attack: proactively recovering state and proactively maintaining
independence. Prior work has focused on the former but largely ignored the
latter.
State Recovery. The goal of proactive state recovery for replicated systems is
to put replicas in a known good state, whether or not corruption has occurred
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or been detected. Software rejuvenation [44, 78] and Self-Cleansing Intrusion
Tolerance [43] both implement replicated systems that periodically take repli-
cas offline for this kind of state recovery. In both, replication masks individual
replica unavailability, resulting in a system that achieves higher reliability in the
face of crash failures as well as some attacks. However, neither defends against
attacks that exploit software bugs.
Microreboot [14] separates state from code and restarts application compo-
nents to recover from failures. Components can be restarted without reboot-
ing servers, so these restarts can be performed quickly. And the separation
of state and code allows restarted components to recover state transparently
and quickly. This work does not address the problem of handling compro-
mise caused by exploitable software bugs but could be used in conjunction with
proactive obfuscation to increase replica fault tolerance.
In systems that tolerate compromised servers, proactive state recovery be-
comes more complex, since replicas in these systems use distributed protocols
to manage state. BFT-PR [22] adds proactive state recovery to Practical Byzan-
tine Fault-Tolerance [21]. Proactive state recovery here is analogous to key re-
fresh in proactive secret sharing [42] (PSS) protocols; it is a means of defending
against replica compromise by limiting the window of vulnerability for attacks
on replica state, just as the window of vulnerability for keys is limited by PSS.
However, BFT-PR never changes the code used by its replicas; in fact, its state
recovery mechanism depends on replica code being unmodified. Recovery in
BFT-PR also relies on state written by replicas to disk—the BFT-PR implemen-
tation assumes implicitly that replicas will not crash or be compromised upon
reading state written by a compromised replica. We do not make this assump-
tion, since it rules out the possibility of denial of service attacks that cause repli-
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cas to crash on reading their state, as discussed above.
Further, public keys in BFT-PR are never changed (though symmetric keys
established using these public keys are proactively refreshed), because a secure
cryptographic co-processor is assumed. Our Replica Refresh provides a better de-
fense against repeat attacks, since attacks that compromise a replica in BFT-PR
can compromise this replica again after it has recovered. However, experiments
(see section 3.2.2.3 and section 4.2.2.2 in the following chapters) show that our
implementations of these aspects of Replica Refresh incur a non-trivial cost at
epoch change and recovery across different approaches to replica management,
and this may increase the time available for adversaries to compromise t + 1
replicas. Knowledge of these costs and benefits allows a system designer to
choose the appropriate mechanism for a given application.
Independence. Replica failure independence has been studied extensively in
connection with fault tolerance. In the N-version programming [3] approach
to building fault-tolerant systems, replica implementations were programmed
independently as a way to achieve independence. The DEDIX (the DEsign DI-
versity eXperiment) N-version system [3] consists of diverse replicas and a su-
pervisor program that runs these diverse replicas in parallel and performs coor-
dination of inputs, as well as Reply Synthesis; it can be implemented either using
a single server or in a distributed fashion. But even running independently-
designed replicas does not prevent an adversary from learning the different
vulnerabilities of these replicas and compromising them one by one over time.
Recent work on N-variant systems [27] uses multiple different copies of a
program to vote on output. The diverse variants of the program are generated
using obfuscators, but all are run by a trusted monitor (a potential high-leverage
target of attack) that computes the output from the answers given by these dif-
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ferent copies. The monitor compares responses and deems a variant compro-
mised if this variant produced a response that differs from the other variants.
However, variants are never reobfuscated, so variants that are compromised
can be compromised again if restarted automatically. And if variants are not
restarted automatically, then intervention by a human operator is necessary.
Similarly, TightLip [80] creates sandboxed replicas, called doppelgangers, of
processes in an operating system. The goal of TightLip is to detect leaks of data
designated sensitive—doppelgangers are spawned when a process tries to read
sensitive data and are given data identical to the original process except that
sensitive data is replaced by fabricated data that is not sensitive. The original
and the doppelganger are run concurrently; if their outputs are identical, then,
with high probability, the output of the original does not depend on the sensitive
data and can be output. TightLip shares with our work the goal of using mul-
tiple replicas of a program to achieve higher resilience to failure, but TightLip
seeks only to detect data leaks rather than handling compromised replicas.
It is rare to find multiple independent implementations of exactly the same
service, due to the cost of building each. BASE [65] addresses this by using dif-
ferent implementations and providing an abstraction layer to unify the differ-
ences and thereby facilitate communication and state recovery. However, repli-
cas in BASE are limited to pre-existing implementations. And these replicas can
be compromised immediately upon recovery if they have been compromised
before, since their code does not change during recovery.
The idea that replicas exhibiting some measure of independence could be
generated by running an obfuscator multiple times with different secret keys on
a single program was first published by Forrest et al. [36]. They discuss several
general techniques for obfuscation, from adding, deleting, and reordering code
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to memory and linking randomization. They implement a stack reordering ob-
fuscation and show how it disrupts buffer-overflow attacks. Many obfuscation
techniques have since been developed.
Address obfuscation [11, 59, 79] permutes the code and data segments of
a program as it is loaded into memory. Under this obfuscation, attacks that
rely on the absolute or relative locations of code or data in memory are not
likely to succeed, since these locations are unknown—attacks might reveal some
information about randomized locations, but code and data locations can be
rerandomized each time an executable is loaded.
Instruction-set randomization [47, 6, 5] transforms the instruction encoding
in a given instruction set—in one implementation, instructions are XOR’d with
a random key before being stored. These instructions must be XOR’d with the
same key to recover the original instruction stream. Therefore, injected instruc-
tions from an adversary are unlikely to decode into a useful attack. Similarly,
interpreted languages can be randomized with low overhead by modifying the
interpreter. But without specialized hardware, instruction-set randomization is
expensive for code run natively on a processor, since each instruction must be
translated before it is executed.
DieHard [10] performs randomization of the run-time heap; attacks that rely
on heap locations are unlikely to succeed under such a transformation. DieHard
can also run multiple replicas of an executable and require that all replicas pro-
duce the same output for that output to be taken as the output of the executable.
This kind of replication prevents many kinds of compromised replicas from pro-
viding incorrect output, since attacks are unlikely to affect differently random-
ized heaps in the same way.
Implementing proactive obfuscation sometimes changes the independence
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properties exhibited by our underlying approaches to replica management. For
example, quorum systems can provide a degree of data independence, since
replicas do not necessarily all store the same object states. This is because clients
of a quorum system interact only with a quorum rather than interacting with all
replicas, so different replicas receive different client messages, hence store dif-
ferent object states. However, our storage-service prototype exhibits little data
independence, because it employs a hub to receive input from clients and, there-
fore, all replicas tend to receive the same messages and store the same object
state. In short, our prototypes trade quorum system data independence to gain
greater resilience against parallel attacks on Obfuscation Independence (2.1)
and Bounded Adversary (2.2), as discussed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
STATE MACHINE REPLICA MANAGEMENT
In the state machine approach with state machine m, a state machine ensemble
SME(m) consists of n servers that each implement the same interface as m and
that accept client requests to execute commands. Each server runs a replica
of m and coordinates client commands so that each correct replica starts in the
same state, transitions through the same states, and generates the same outputs.
Notice that correct replicas in the state machine approach have the same state
and, therefore, the state machine approach does not have data independence.
Coordination of client commands to servers is not one of the mechanisms
identified in Figure 2.1. For a service that employs the state machine approach,
a client must employ some sort of Input Coordination mechanism to communi-
cate with all replicas in a state machine ensemble. This mechanism will involve
replicas running an agreement algorithm [50, 33] to decide which commands to
process and in what order. Agreement algorithms proceed in (potentially asyn-
chronous) rounds, where some command is chosen by the replicas in each round.
In most practical implementations, a command is proposed by a replica taking
the role of leader. The command that has been chosen is eventually learned by all
correct replicas.
Replicas maintain state needed by the agreement algorithm and maintain
state variables for their state machine. For instance, Byzantine Paxos requires
each replica to store a monotonically increasing sequence number that labels
the next round of agreement. In our prototype, replicas use sequence numbers
partitioned by epoch number; we represent the mapping from sequence number
to epoch number as a pair that we call an extended sequence number. Extended
sequence numbers are ordered lexicographically. Output produced by replicas
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and sent to clients consists of the output of the state machine along with the
extended sequence number.
The combination of the extended sequence number and state variables forms
the replica state. The replica state at a correct replica that has just executed the
command chosen for extended sequence number (e, s) is denoted σ(e,s). There
is only one possible value for σ(e,s), since all correct replicas serially execute the
same commands in the same order, due to Input Coordination, and we assume
that all replicas start in the same replica state.
Although use of an agreement algorithm causes the same sequence of com-
mands to be executed by each replica, client requests may be duplicated, ig-
nored, or reordered before the agreement algorithm is run. However, the net-
works over which clients communicate with the service provide only a best-
effort delivery guarantee, so it is reasonable to assume that clients would al-
ready employ mechanisms to accommodate such perturbed request streams.
3.1 A Firewall Prototype
To explore the costs and trade-offs of our mechanisms for proactive obfuscation,
we built a firewall prototype that treats pf as a state machine and uses the tech-
niques and mechanisms of section 2. We chose pf as the basis of our prototype
because it is a production-quality firewall used in many real networks. Im-
plementing our prototype requires choosing an agreement algorithm for Input
Coordination. We also must instantiate the output and state synthesis functions
and define the operations that replicas perform upon receiving a state recovery
request.
Input Coordination. Our firewall prototype uses Byzantine Paxos to imple-
ment Input Coordination. The number of replicas required to execute Byzan-
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tine Paxos while tolerating t compromised replicas is known to be 3t + 1 [21].
This number does not take into account rebooting replicas. However, a reboot-
ing replica does not exhibit arbitrary behavior—it simply resembles a crashed
replica. Lamport [49] shows that tolerating f crashed and t compromised repli-
cas in Byzantine Paxos requires 3t+ 2f + 1 total replicas. So, if k replicas might
be rebooting simultaneously, then we can set f = k, and we conclude that only
3t+2k+1 replicas are needed, which means that only 2 additional replicas must
be added to tolerate each rebooting one. In our prototypes, k = 1 holds, so we
employ 3t+ 2× 1 + 1 = 3t+ 3 replicas in total.
Normally, leaders in Byzantine Paxos change according to a leader recovery
protocol whenever a leader is believed by enough replicas to be crashed or com-
promised. This causes system delays when a compromised leader merely runs
slowly, because execution speed of the state machine ensemble depends on the
speed at which the leader chooses commands for agreement. To reduce these
delays, we use leader rotation [34]: the leader for sequence number j is replica j
mod n. Thus, leadership changes with each sequence number, rotating among
the replicas.
With leader rotation, the impact of a slow leader is limited, since timeouts
for changing to a new leader can be made very short. Replicas set a timer for
each sequence number i; on timeout, replicas expect replica (i + 1) mod n to be
the leader. Compromised leaders cause a delay for only as long as the allowed
time to select one next command and can only cause this delay for t out of every
n sequence numbers.1
1Leader rotation might seem inefficient, because switching leaders in Byzantine Paxos re-
quires executing the leader recovery protocol. But Byzantine Paxos allows a well-known leader
to propose a command for num without running leader recovery, provided it is the first to do
so. Since replica num mod n is expected by all correct replicas to be leader for sequence num-
ber num, it is a well-known leader and does not need to run leader recovery to run a round of
agreement for sequence number num.
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Leader rotation might also cause delays while replicas are rebooting if a
rebooting replica is selected as the next leader, so we extend the leader rota-
tion protocol to handle rebooting replicas. Specifically, since there is a bounded
period during which all correct replicas learn that a replica has rebooted, cor-
rect replicas can skip over rebooting replicas in leader rotation. This is imple-
mented by assigning the sequence numbers for a rebooting replica to the next
consecutive replica mod n. We call this leader adjustment; it allows Byzantine
Paxos to run without many executions of the leader recovery protocol, even
during reboots. During the interval in which some correct replicas have not
changed epochs, replicas might disagree about which replica should be leader.
But Byzantine Paxos works even in the face of such disagreement about lead-
ers.2
Our implementation of Byzantine Paxos is actually used to agree on hashes
of packets rather than full packet contents. Given this optimization, a leader
might propose a command for agreement even though not all replicas have re-
ceived a packet with contents that hash to this command. Each replica checks
locally for a matching packet when it receives a hash from a leader. If such a
packet has not been received, then a matching input packet is requested from
the leader.3
A replica might fall behind in the execution of Byzantine Paxos. Such repli-
cas need a way to obtain messages they missed, and State Recovery is a rather
expensive mechanism to invoke for this purpose. So, replicas send what we
call RepeatRequest messages for a given type of message and extended sequence
2The existence of a bound on the time needed for all correct replicas to learn about an epoch
change is thus just an optimization. Our implementation of Byzantine Paxos continues to oper-
ate correctly, albeit more slowly, even if there is no bound.
3Compromised leaders are still able to invent input packets to the prototype. But a compro-
mised leader could always have invented such input packets simply by having a compromised
client submit them as inputs.
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number. Upon receiving a RepeatRequest, a replica resends the requested mes-
sage if it has a copy.4
Synthesis Functions. The output synthesis and state synthesis functions in
our firewall prototype depend on having at most t replicas be compromised,
since then any value received from t+ 1 replicas must have been sent by at least
one correct replica.
There are two output synthesis functions, one for each implementation of
Reply Synthesis—in both, γ is set to t+ 1. Replies are considered to be output sim-
ilar for the individual authentication implementation if they contain identical
outputs. So, output synthesis using individual authentication returns any out-
put received in output-similar replies from t + 1 distinct replicas.5 Replies are
considered to be output similar for the threshold cryptography implementation
if they contain identical outputs and their partial signatures together reassemble
to give a correct signature on this output. So, output synthesis using threshold
cryptography also returns any output received in output-similar replies from
t+ 1 distinct replicas.
For either Reply Synthesis implementation, clients need only receive t + 1
output-similar replies. So, if at most r replicas are rebooting, and t are com-
promised, then it suffices for only 2t + r + 1 replicas to send replies to a client,
since then there will be at least 2t + r + 1 − t − r = t + 1 correct replicas that
reply. And replies from t + 1 correct replicas for the same extended sequence
4In our prototype, old messages are only kept for a small fixed number of recent sequence
numbers. In general, the amount of state to keep depends on how fast the state machine en-
semble processes commands. Since replicas can always execute State Recovery instead, the min-
imum number of messages to keep depends on how many messages are needed to run State
Recovery, as discussed below.
5Note that requiring the replies to be output similar means that t+1 replies suffice. Of course,
the client might need to receive up to 2t + 1 replies in total before it receives t + 1 replies that
are output similar.
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number are always output similar. In our prototype implementation, the leader
for a given extended sequence number and the 2t+r next replicas mod n are the
only replicas to send packets to the client for this extended sequence number.
For state synthesis, δ is also set to t + 1, and replies are defined to be state
similar if they contain identical replica states. So, state synthesis returns a replica
state if it has received this replica state in state-similar replies from t+ 1 distinct
replicas.
State Recovery Request. State Recovery must guarantee that each recovering
replica acquires some minimum state from which it can advance by executing
commands. Define the current minimum state to be a replica state σ(e,s) such that:
• there is some correct replica with replica state σ(e,s), and
• if some correct replica has replica state σ(e′,s′), then (e, s) ≤ (e′, s′).
Since all replicas begin in the same initial state, and rebooting puts a replica in
that initial state, we conclude that a current minimum state always exists.
Normally, the current minimum state obtained from executing State Recovery
will differ from the initial state. But even so, that state might not suffice for a
recovering replica to resume operation as part of the state machine ensemble.
The recovery protocol must also satisfy the following property, which guaran-
tees that replicas can always recover at least the current minimum state at the
time a recovery protocol starts.
(3.1) SME State Recovery. If σ(e,s) is the current minimum state at the time a
replica i starts the recovery protocol, then there is a time bound ∆ and
some (e′, s′) such that (e, s) ≤ (e′, s′) holds and i recovers σ(e′,s′) in ∆ sec-
onds.
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The state recovery request used in State Recovery requires a channel that sat-
isfies Timely Links (2.8), a bound T on the amount of time needed to contact all
replicas, and a bound η on the time needed to marshal and send state from one
replica to another. The protocol operates as follows.
1. The recovering replica contacts each replica with a state recovery request.
2. Each replica that receives this request performs two actions:
a. This replica sends its current state to the recovering replica, along
with a diff that allows the recovering replica to get the previous state
and the messages that convinced the replica to change to this state.
b. This replica also sends to the recovering replica all the messages that
it receives for the agreement protocol over the next T seconds.
3. After T + η seconds, the recovering replica uses the states, diffs, and mes-
sages it has received to recover.
For this algorithm to work, replicas must keep not only their current state, but
also a diff to get to their previous state (if any), along with all messages that they
have received and verified for the current round of agreement.6
A recovering replica using this state recovery request protocol always recov-
ers the state with the highest sequence number available at any correct replica
at the time the last replica is contacted in the protocol. And this state is always
recovered in a bounded amount of time. To state this property formally, we let s
6An optimization is for replicas to reply immediately with their replica state the first time
they receive a state recovery request from a recovering replica, instead of running the protocol.
If a recovering replica i does not receive t+ 1 identical replica states from these responses, then
i can send a second request; upon receiving the second request, replicas run the above protocol.
Our firewall prototype implements this optimization, and the system has never executed a sec-
ond request, because recovering replicas always got t + 1 identical replica states on their first
request in the experiments we ran. And this optimized version guarantees that all replicas still
acquire the current minimum state at the time the state recovery protocol starts.
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be the highest sequence number held by a correct replica at time T seconds after
the beginning of the state recovery protocol.
(3.2) SME Highest State Recovery. At time T+η seconds after the beginning of
state recovery request protocol, the recovering replica has received enough
information to recover to the state with sequence number s.
See Appendix A for a proof of this property. SME Highest State Recov-
ery (3.2) implies SME State Recovery (3.1), since s is guaranteed to be at least the
current minimum state at the time the state recovery protocol starts. And this
protocol succeeds at recovering a state for the recovering replica in a bounded
amount of time even when Byzantine Paxos operates asynchronously, as long as
replicas can always marshal representations of their state in a bounded amount
of time.7
The time needed to execute this protocol is bounded, given Timely Links (2.8),
Synchronous Processors (2.7), and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6)
along with the assumed bound on the amount of state stored by any correct
replica. So, this recovery protocol satisfies SME State Recovery (3.1). But, as
noted in section 2.2.2, for State Recovery to be able to complete in a bounded
amount of time, a recovering replica must also be able to replay its recorded
packets and catch up with the other replicas in the system in a bounded amount
of time.
The processing of replayed packets might require replicas to send messages
to request packets they missed while recording. So, after receiving a State Re-
covery Request and before determining that a recovering replica has finished
State Recovery, replicas must keep enough packets to bring recovering replicas
7For this protocol to work, it must also be the case that a recovering replica receiving mes-
sages from the other replicas for its state recovery request cannot be made to crash by these
messages.
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up to date using RepeatRequest messages. The number of packets stored de-
pends on q, the number of extended sequence numbers processed by replicas
during State Recovery. The value of q is bounded, since the firewall is assumed
to have a bounded maximum throughput, and SME State Recovery (3.1) guar-
antees that State Recovery completes in a bounded amount of time.
For RepeatRequest messages to guarantee that packet replay completes in a
bounded amount of time, the rate at which commands for extended sequence
numbers are learned through RepeatRequest messages must be faster than the
rate at which commands are handled by the firewall, hence recorded by the
recovering replica. This guarantees that the recovering replica eventually pro-
cesses all the commands it has recorded and can stop recording. So, the maxi-
mum throughput of the firewall must be chosen to take into account time needed
to learn a command for an extended sequence number through RepeatRequest
messages (this time is bounded, given Timely Links (2.8), Synchronous Proces-
sors (2.7) and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6)). In this case, there is a
bound b on the number of extended sequence numbers that a recovering replica
will need to learn through RepeatRequest messages after State Recovery. If repli-
cas store messages for at least b extended sequence numbers, then recovering
replicas will be able to catch up with other replicas in a bounded amount of
time using State Recovery.
3.2 Performance of the Firewall Prototype
The performance of the firewall prototype depends on how mechanisms are
implemented. To quantify this, we ran experiments on various different imple-
mentations for our firewall prototype. We consider:
• Input Coordination performed either by a variant of Byzantine Paxos that
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Table 3.1: The versions of our firewall prototype
Version name Input Reply Replica Refresh
Coordination Synthesis epoch reobf key
Replicated Byz Paxos indvdl auth none none none
Centralized Byz Paxos indvdl auth cntrl cntrl cntrl
Decentralized Byz Paxos indvdl auth cntrl cntrl dist
Reboot Clock Byz Paxos indvdl auth dist dist dist
Threshold Client Byz Paxos thresh crypto dist dist dist
does not support proactive obfuscation or by a variant of Byzantine Paxos
that does.
• Reply Synthesis either based on individual authentication or based on thresh-
old cryptography.
• Replica Refresh implemented either using a centralized Controller or using
decentralized protocols.
In all experiments, State Recovery employs the protocol of section 2.2.2 with state
recovery request and state synthesis as described in section 3.1. The Replicated
version provides Byzantine Paxos without accounting for rebooting replicas: it
does not perform proactive obfuscation or any form of proactive recovery. The
result is 5 different versions of our firewall prototype, listed in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup
Our implementations are written in C using OpenSSL [58]; we also use OpenSSL
for key generation. We take t = 1 and n = 6; all hosts are 3 GHz Pentium
4 machines with 1 GB of RAM running OpenBSD 4.0. We can justify setting
t = 1 provided Bounded Adversary (2.2) is satisfied; this requires that all n = 6
replicas be reobfuscated and rebooted before t+1 = 2 replicas are compromised.
The epoch length in our prototype is on the order of several minutes, so we
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believe this assumption to be reasonable. The Replicated version only needs
3t+ 1 hosts to run Byzantine Paxos; it has n = 4.
A host called the outside client is connected to the input network of the fire-
wall prototype. A host called the inside client is connected to the output network.
The OpenBSD kernel of the inside client is modified for Reply Synthesis so that a
packet passes through the inside client’s network stack only if γ = t+ 1 output-
similar packets have been received. This allows applications on the inside client
to run unmodified. Replicas are connected to the output network and input
network by hubs—all replicas use the same MAC and IP address and receive all
packets sent by the outside client and inside client.
For ease of implementation, mechanisms Input Coordination, Reply Synthesis,
and State Recovery execute in user space; we built a pseudo-device that transfers
packets from the kernel, as in Mogul’s firewall design [55]. The pseudo-device
allows programs running in user space to take and replace packets on the net-
work stack, similar to Linux netfilter [56].
The pf code provides a pseudo-device called pfsync [62] that marshals and
unmarshals an abstract state representation (pfsync was designed for synchro-
nizing a backup to a primary pf firewall). The output of pfsync is a data struc-
ture that contains information about the state of the firewall.
The prototype employs three obfuscation methods: (i) system call reordering
obfuscation [26] permutes the order of system call numbers and embeds them
into a larger space of identifiers, most of which do not map to valid system
calls; (ii) memory randomization is implemented by default in OpenBSD; and
(iii) Propolice [35] inserts and checks a random value after the return value of
functions to protect against stack-smashing attacks. However, any obfuscation
method that can be applied during compilation, linking, or loading could be
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used in our prototype. Recall, our interest is not in the details of the obfuscation
but rather in the details of the mechanisms needed to deploy obfuscation in an
effective way.
The time that must elapse between reboots bounds the window of vulnera-
bility for cryptographic keys used by each replica. This allows replicas in our
prototype to use 512-bit RSA keys, because the risk is small that an adversary
will compute a private key from a given 512-bit public key during the relatively
short window of vulnerability in which secrecy of the key matters—one replica
is rebooted each several minutes, so each key is refreshed on the order of once
per half hour.
We also use 512-bit RSA keys for the Replicated version even though it does
not perform proactive recovery and, therefore, should be using 1024-bit keys.
However, using 512-bit keys for the Replicated version allows direct perfor-
mance comparisons with the Centralized version, since the two versions then
differ only in their numbers of replicas.
Replicas batch input and output packets when possible, up to batch size 43—
this is the largest batch size possible for 1500-byte packets if output batches are
sent to clients as single packets, since the maximum length of an IP datagram is
64 kB.8 We set the batching factor to 43, because this value provided the highest
performance in our experiments.
Recall that commands for agreement are hashes of client inputs and not the
inputs themselves. So, batching input packets involves batching hashes. Repli-
cas also sign batched output packets for the client.
Finally, replicas in our prototype do not currently write their state to disk
after executing each command, because the cost of these disk I/O operations
8Implementing higher batching factors requires using or implementing a higher-level notion
of message fragmentation and reassembly.
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would obscure the costs we are trying to quantify.
3.2.2 Performance Measurements
To evaluate our different mechanism implementations for proactive obfusca-
tion, we measure throughput and latency. Each reported value is a mean of at
least 5 runs; error bars depict the sample standard deviation of the measure-
ments around this mean.
3.2.2.1 Input Coordination
Throughput. To quantify how throughput is affected by the Input Coordination
implementation, we performed experiments in which there are no compromised,
crashed, or rebooting replicas, so Replica Refresh and State Recovery can be dis-
abled without averse effect. We consider two prototype versions that differ only
in their implementation of the Input Coordination mechanism: the Replicated ver-
sion and the Centralized version. Both use RSA signatures for Reply Synthesis.
During each experiment, the outside client sends 1500 byte UDP packets
(the MTU on our network) to a particular port on the firewall; firewall rules
cause these packets to be forwarded to the inside client. Varying the timing
of input packet sends enables us to control bandwidth applied by the outside
client. Figure 3.1 shows throughput for each of the versions.9 The curve labeled
pf represents the performance of the pf firewall running on a single server;
it handles an applied load of up to at least 12.5 MB/s—considerably higher
bandwidths than we tested.
The Centralized version throughput reaches a maximum of about 3180 kB/s,
whereas the Replicated version reaches a maximum throughput of about 3450
9Discussion of the Threshold Client curve appears below in section 3.2.2.2.
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Figure 3.1: Overall throughput for the firewall prototype
kB/s. So, the Centralized version reaches about 92% of the throughput of the
Replicated version under high load. This suggests that the cost of adding proac-
tive obfuscation to an already-replicated system is not excessive.
The Replicated version and the Centralized version throughputs peak due
to CPU saturation. Some of the CPU costs result from the use of digital signa-
tures to sign packets both for Input Coordination and for Reply Synthesis. These
per-packet costs are amortized across multiple packets by batching, so these
costs can be reduced significantly. The other major cost, which cannot be re-
duced in our implementation, arises from copying packets between the kernel
and mechanism implementations running in user space. Multiple system calls
to our pseudo-device are performed for each packet received by the kernel. Re-
ducing this cost requires implementing the mechanisms for proactive obfusca-
tion in the kernel.
Throughput decreases for both the Replicated and the Centralized versions
after saturation. This decrease occurs because the higher applied load means
that replicas spend more time dropping packets. And packets in the firewall
prototype are copied into user space and deleted from the kernel before being
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handled. So, dropped packets still consume non-trivial CPU resources.
The choice of batching factor and the choice of timeout for leader recovery
affect throughput when a replica has crashed. To quantify this effect, we ran an
experiment similar to the one for Figure 3.1, but with one replica crashed. While
the replica was crashed, throughput in the Centralized version drops to 1133
± 10 kB/s.10 The decrease in throughput when one replica is crashed occurs
because the failed replica cannot act as leader when its turn comes, and therefore
replicas must wait for a timeout (chosen to be 200 ms in this version) each 6
sequence numbers, at which point the next consecutive replica runs the leader
recovery protocol and acts as leader for this sequence number.
Latency. Latency in the firewall prototype is also affected by the choice of
Input Coordination implementation. In the same experiment as used to produce
Figure 3.1, latency was measured at 39 ± 3 ms for the Centralized version,
whereas latency in the Replicated version was 28 ± 6 ms under the same cir-
cumstances. This difference is due to replicas in the Replicated version needing
to handle fewer replies from replicas per message round in the execution of Input
Coordination.
Unlike throughput, however, latency is not affected by the batching factor,
since latency depends only on the time needed to execute the agreement algo-
rithm.11 And batching is opportunistic, so replicas do not wait to fill batches.
This also keeps batching from increasing latency.
To understand the latency when one replica is crashed, we ran a different ex-
10Linear changes in the batching factor provide proportional changes in the throughput dur-
ing replica failure: the same experiment with a batching factor of 32 leads to a throughput of
873 ± 18 kB/s.
11Of course, larger batching factors cause replicas to transmit more data on the network for
each packet, and this increases the time to execute agreement. But this increase is negligible in
all cases we examined.
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periment where the outside client sent 1500-byte packets, but with one replica
crashed. With a crashed replica, latency increases to 342 ± 60 ms for the Cen-
tralized version. This increase is because packets normally handled by the failed
replica must wait for a timeout and leader recovery before being handled. This
slowdown reduces the throughput of the firewall, causing input-packet queues
to build up on replicas. Latency for each packet then increases to include the
time needed to process all packets ahead of it in the queue. And some pack-
ets in the queue have to wait for the timeout. In the Centralized version, the
timeout is set to 200 ms, so the latency during failure is higher, as would be
expected.
3.2.2.2 Reply Synthesis
Throughput. Throughput for different Reply Synthesis implementations is al-
ready given in Figure 3.1, because in an experiment where no Replica Refresh
occurs, any differences between the Centralized and Threshold Client versions
can be attributed solely to their different implementations of Reply Synthesis: the
Centralized version uses RSA signatures, whereas the Threshold Client version
uses threshold RSA signatures.
Figure 3.1 confirms the prediction of section 2.3.1: the Threshold Client ver-
sion exhibits significantly lower throughput, due to the high CPU costs of the
calculations required for generating partial signatures using the threshold cryp-
tosystem from in the CODEX implementation of APSS. Compare the maximum
throughput of 397 kB/s with 3180 kB/s measured for the Centralized version,
which does not use threshold cryptography.
Latency. Latency for the Threshold Client version (measured in the same ex-
periment as for throughput) is 413 ± 38 ms as compared with 39 ± 3 ms for
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the Centralized version. Again, this difference is due to high CPU overhead of
threshold RSA signatures.
3.2.2.3 Replica Refresh
We evaluate the three tasks of Replica Refresh separately for both the central-
ized and the decentralized implementations. Due to the high costs of threshold
cryptography, we use RSA signatures for Reply Synthesis throughout these ex-
periments. We set the outside client to send at 3300 kB/s, slightly above the
throughput saturation threshold.
We measured no differences in throughput or latency in our experiments for
the two different implementations of replica reboot and epoch-change notifica-
tion.
The time required to generate an obfuscated executable affects elapsed time
between reboots. Obfuscating and rebuilding a 22 MB executable (containing all
our kernel and user code) using the obfuscation methods employed by our pro-
totype takes about 13 minutes with CD-ROM-based executable generation at the
replicas and takes 2.5 minutes with a centralized Controller; reboot takes about 2
minutes in both. Both versions allow about 30 seconds for State Recovery, which
is more than sufficient in our experiments.
A Controller can perform reobfuscation for one replica while another replica
is rebooting, so reobfuscation and reboot can be overlapped. This means that
a new replica can be deployed approximately every 3 minutes. There are 6
replicas, so a given replica is obfuscated and rebooted every 18 minutes. In
comparison, with decentralized protocols, reobfuscation, reboot, and recovery
in sequence take about 15 minutes, so a given replica is obfuscated and rebooted
every 90 minutes.
54
The cost of using our decentralized protocols for generating executables af-
fects the Reboot Clock version: it has the same performance as the Decentralized
version, except for a longer window of vulnerability caused by the extra time
needed for CD-ROM-based executable generation.
Key distribution for Replica Refresh involves generating, signing, and dissem-
inating a new key for a recovering replica. In the decentralized implementation,
replicas must also refresh their shares of the private key for the service at each
epoch change and participate in a share recovery protocol for the recovering
replica after reboot. The costs of generating, signing, and disseminating a new
key are small in both versions, but the costs of share refresh and share recovery
are significant.
Throughput. To understand the throughput achieved during share refresh
and share recovery, we ran an experiment in which one replica is rebooted. We
measured throughput of two versions that differ only in how key distribution is
done: the Centralized version uses a centralized Controller while the Decentral-
ized version requires the rebooting replicas to generate their own keys and use
the key distribution protocol of section 2.2.3 to create and distribute a certificate
for this key.
Figure 3.2 shows throughput for these two versions in the firewall prototype
while the outside client applies a constant UDP load at 3300 kB/s. During the
first 50 seconds, all replicas process packets normally, but at the time marked
“epoch change”, one replica reboots and the epoch changes. In the Decentral-
ized version, non-rebooting replicas run the share refresh protocol at this point;
the high CPU overhead of this protocol in the CODEX implementation of APSS
causes throughput to drop to about 340 kB/s, which is about 11% of the max-
imum. In the Centralized version, replicas have no shares to refresh, and they
55
0 50 200 300
340
1900
2500
3000
epoch change
recovery
Time (s)
T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t(
kB
/s
)
Centralized
Decentralized
11%
100%
Figure 3.2: Two key distribution methods for the firewall prototype at an ap-
plied load of 3300 kB/s
perform leader adjustment to take the rebooting replica into account, so there is
no throughput drop.
At the point marked “recovery” in Figure 3.2, the recovering replica runs
the State Recovery mechanism in both versions. In the Decentralized version,
the recovering replica also runs its share recovery protocol. Throughput drops
more in the Decentralized version than the Centralized version due to the extra
CPU overhead of executing share recovery.
Latency. Latency increases during share refresh. The same experiment as for
measuring throughput shows that the Centralized version has a latency of 37 ±
2 ms after an epoch change, similar to its latency of 39 ± 3 ms when there are
no failures. But latency in the Decentralized version goes up to 2138 ± 985 ms
during the same interval. The high latency occurs because few packets can be
processed while APSS performs share refresh. Latency also increases slightly
during share recovery in the Decentralized version to 65 ± 26 ms.
56
3.2.2.4 State Recovery
State Recovery does not significantly degrade throughput, as shown in Figure
3.2 for the Centralized version at the point labeled “recovery”. The low cost of
state recovery is due to the small amount of state stored by our firewall for each
packet stream; each stream is represented by a structure that contains 240 bytes.
And the outside client uses multiple 75 kB/s packet streams to generate load
for the firewall. So, there are 44 streams at an applied load of 3300 kB/s. This
corresponds to 10560 bytes of state; recovery then requires each replica to send
8 packets with at most 1500 bytes each. The overhead of sending and receiving
8 packets from t + 1 = 2 replicas and updating the state of pf at the recovering
replica is small.
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CHAPTER 4
QUORUM SYSTEM REPLICA MANAGEMENT
Recall from Chapter 1 that a quorum system stores objects consisting of ob-
ject state; operations modify this object state. The replicas themselves store ob-
ject states but do not necessarily perform the operations. And a quorum system
Q consists of quorums, each a set of replicas. An intersection property guaran-
tees some minimum overlap between any pair of quorums.
Clients of a quorum system perform an operation on an object by reading
and computing an object state from a quorum of replicas, executing the opera-
tion using this object state, then writing the resulting object state back to a quo-
rum of replicas. We follow a common choice [53] for the semantics of concurrent
operations:
1. Reads that are not concurrent with any write generate the latest object
state written to a quorum, according to some serial order on the previous
writes.
2. Reads that are concurrent with writes either abort, which means they do
not generate an object state, or they return an object state that is at least as
recent as the last object state written to a quorum.
On abort, clients can retry the operation.
The object state stored by a replica is labeled by the client that wrote this
object state; this label is a totally ordered, monotonically increasing sequence
number and is kept as part of the object state. Replicas only store a new object
state for an object o if it is labeled with a higher sequence number than the object
state being stored by this replica for o.
An intersection property on quorums ensures that a client reading from a
quorum obtains the most recently written object state. For instance, when there
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are no crashed or compromised replicas, we could require that any two quo-
rums have a non-empty intersection; then any quorum from which a client reads
an object overlaps with any quorum to which a client writes that object. So, a
client always reads the latest object state written to a quorum when there are no
concurrent writes.
Byzantine quorum systems [53] are defined by a pair (Q,B); collection Q of
replica sets defines a set of quorums, as before, and collection B defines the
possible sets of compromised replicas. By assumption, in any execution of an
operation, only replicas in a some setB in Bmay be compromised. In a threshold
fail-prone system, at most some threshold t of replicas can be compromised, so
B consists of all replica sets of size less than or equal to t.
Our prototype implements a dissemination quorum system [53]; this is a Byzan-
tine quorum system where object state is self-verifying and, therefore, there is a
public verification function that succeeds for an object state only if this object state
has not been changed by a compromised replica. For instance, an object state
signed by a client with a digital signature is self-verifying, since signature ver-
ification succeeds only if the object state is unmodified from what the client
produced.
A dissemination quorum system with B as a threshold fail-prone system for
threshold t must satisfy the following properties [53]:
(4.1) Threshold DQS Correctness. ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : |Q1 ∩Q2| > t
(4.2) Threshold DQS Availability. ∀Q ∈ Q : n− t ≥ |Q|
Threshold DQS Correctness (4.1) and Threshold DQS Availability (4.2) are sat-
isfied if n = 3t + 1 holds and, for any quorum Q, |Q| = 2t + 1 holds, since then
∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : |Q1 ∩ Q2| = t + 1 > t and ∀Q ∈ Q : n − t = 2t + 1 = |Q| both
hold, as required.
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Given these properties, a client can read the latest object state by querying
and receiving responses from a quorum. Threshold DQS Availability (4.2) guar-
antees that some quorum is available to be queried. And Threshold DQS Cor-
rectness guarantees that any pair of quorums overlaps in at least t + 1 replicas,
hence overlaps in at least one correct replica. The latest object state is written
to a quorum, so any quorum that replies to a client contains at least one correct
replica that has stored this latest object state. To determine which object state to
perform an operation on, a client chooses the object state that it receives with the
highest sequence number. This works because object states are totally ordered
by sequence number and are self-verifying, so the client can choose the most
recently written state from only those replies containing object state on which
the verification function succeeds.
If object states were not self-verifying, then compromised replicas could in-
vent a new object state and provide more than one copy of it to clients—these
clients would not be able to decide which object state to use when performing
an operation. With object states required to be self-verifying, the worst that
compromised replicas can do is withhold an up-to-date object state.
Dissemination quorums guarantee that the latest object state is returned if
objects are not written by compromised clients. If compromised replicas knew
the signing key for a compromised client, then these replicas could sign an ob-
ject state with a higher sequence number than had been written. Correct clients
then would choose the object state created by the compromised replicas. And
this would prevent object states written by correct clients from ever being re-
ceived. One way to prevent such attacks is by allowing only one client per
object o to write object state for o but allowing any client to read it.1
1Allowing only a single client per object to write object state is reasonable for many applica-
tions. For instance, web pages are often updated by a single host and accessed by many.
60
Of course, this defense only preserves the semantics of quorum systems for
objects written by correct clients. An object that is written by a compromised
client might not satisfy these properties. For instance, a compromised client
might not write all a new object state to a complete quorum. So, one correct
client reading the object might get one version while a second correct client
might get a different version.
When at most r replicas in a threshold fail-prone system with threshold
t might be rebooted proactively, a quorum system must take these rebooting
replicas into account. Maintaining Threshold DQS Availability (4.2) requires
that there be a quorum that clients can contact even when t + r replicas are
unavailable. Formally, we can write this property as follows:
(4.3) Proactive Threshold DQS Availability. ∀Q ∈ Q : n− (t+ r) ≥ |Q|
Setting n = 3t+ 2r+ 1 and defining quorums to be any sets of size n− (t+ r) =
2t + r + 1 suffices to guarantee Proactive Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) (as
shown previously by Sousa et al. [74]). This follows because n − (t + r) = |Q|
holds, and this satisfies Proactive Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) directly.
Given that r replicas might be rebooting, hence unavailable, it might seem
that requiring only t + 1 replicas in quorum intersections would be insufficient
to guarantee that clients receive the most up-to-date object state. But Proactive
Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) guarantees that a quorum Qˆ of 2t+r+1 replicas
is always available, where Qˆ does not contain any rebooting replicas. By defini-
tion, an intersection between Qˆ and any other quorum consists only of replicas
that are not rebooting. So, an overlap of t + 1 replicas from Qˆ is sufficient to
guarantee that at least one correct replica replies with the most up-to-date object
state, as long as no writes are executing concurrently. So, Proactive Threshold
DQS Correctness (4.4) is the same as Threshold DQS Correctness (4.1):
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(4.4) Proactive Threshold DQS Correctness. ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : |Q1 ∩Q2| > t
The values of the quorum size (|Q| = 2t + r + 1) and the number of replicas
(n = 3t + 2r + 1) chosen above suffice to satisfy this property, since any two
replica sets of size 2t+ r+ 1 out of 3t+ 2r+ 1 replicas overlap in at least t+ 1 > t
replicas.
4.1 A Storage-Service Prototype
To confirm the generality of the various proactive obfuscation mechanisms we
implemented for the firewall prototype, we also implemented a storage-service
prototype using a dissemination quorum system over a threshold fail-prone
system with threshold t and 1 concurrently rebooting replica. The prototype
supports read and write operations on objects with self-verifying object state.
Object states stored by replicas are indexed by an object ID. The object state for
each object can only be written by a single client, so the object ID contains a
client ID. Clients sign object state with RSA signatures to make the object state
self-verifying; the client ID is the client’s public key.
The storage service supports two operations, which are implemented by the
replicas as follows. A query operation for a given object ID returns the latest
corresponding object state or an unknown-object message, which means that no
replica currently stores an object state for this object ID. An update operation is
used to store a new object state; a replica only performs an update when given
an object state having a higher sequence number than what it currently stores.
If a replica can apply an update, then it sends a confirmation to the client; the
confirmation contains the object ID and the sequence number from the updated
object state. Otherwise, it sends an error containing the object ID and the se-
quence number to the client.
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Adding proactive obfuscation to this service requires instantiating the out-
put synthesis and state synthesis functions as well as defining the action taken
by a replica on receiving a state recovery request.
Synthesis Functions. Both the output and state synthesis functions involve
receiving replies from a quorum.
For the individual authentication implementation of Reply Synthesis, the out-
put synthesis function operates as follows. Object states are defined to be out-
put similar if they have the same object ID. So, output synthesis for object states
returned by queries waits until it has received correctly-signed, output-similar
object states from a quorum. Then it returns the object state in that set with the
highest sequence number or an unknown-object message if all replies contain
unknown-object messages. Confirmations are defined to be output similar if
they have the same object ID and sequence number. So, for updates, the output
synthesis function returns a confirmation for an object ID and sequence num-
ber when it has received output-similar confirmations for this object ID and
sequence number from a quorum. Otherwise, it returns abort if no complete
quorum returned confirmations (so, some replies must have been errors instead
of confirmations). In both cases, γ is set to the quorum size.
The threshold cryptography implementation of Reply Synthesis is incompat-
ible with dissemination quorum systems. A client of a dissemination quorum
system must authenticate replies from a quorum of replicas, and different cor-
rect replicas in that quorum might send different object states in response to the
same query—dissemination quorum systems only guarantee that at least one
correct replica in a quorum returns object state will have the most up-to-date
sequence number. This weaker guarantee violates the assumption of the thresh-
old cryptography Reply Synthesis mechanism that at least t + 1 replicas send an
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identical value. So, we are restricted to using the individual authentication im-
plementation of Reply Synthesis in our storage-service prototype.2
For state synthesis, object states are defined to be state similar if they have
the same object ID. Unknown-object messages from replicas are state similar
with each other and with object states if they have the same object ID. We say
that sets containing object states and unknown-object messages are state similar
if, for any object state with a given object ID in one of the sets, each other set has
an object state or an unknown-object message with the same object ID. So, the
state synthesis function waits until it receives correctly-signed, state-similar sets
from a quorum and, for each object state o in at least one set, returns the object
state for o with the highest sequence number. This means that δ is also set to the
quorum size.
Since object states are self-verifying, they cannot be modified by replicas; this
means that all replicas must return object states sent by clients. Therefore, there
is no need for marshaling and unmarshaling an abstract state representation,
unlike in the firewall prototype.
State Recovery Request. A recovering replica sends a state recovery request
in the storage-service prototype to all replicas and waits until it has received
replies from a quorum; upon receiving a state recovery request, a correct replica
sends the object state for each object it has stored to the recovering replica. Since
object state is self-verifying, it does not need to be signed by the sending replica.
For each object state with object ID o that was received from one replica i but
not from another replica j, the recovering replica inserts an unknown-object
2Other implementations [53] of Byzantine quorum systems require more overlap between
quorums. In some, 2t + 1 replicas must appear in the intersection of any two quorums, hence
the intersection will include at least t+ 1 correct replicas that return the most up-to-date object
state. The threshold cryptography implementation of Reply Synthesis would work in such a
Byzantine quorum system, since the threshold for signature reassembly is t+ 1.
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message with object ID o in the reply from j.3 This makes the object IDs found
in each reply set the same, and, therefore, makes the replies received by the
recovering replica state similar.
A recovering replica must acquire enough state to replace any replica. To do
so, it must acquire the current object state for each object at the time it recov-
ers. We characterize this formally, defining s to be the current maximum sequence
number for an object o as follows:
• the correct replicas in some quorum have object state for o with sequence
number s, and
• if the correct replicas in any other quorum have object state for o with
sequence number s′, then s′ ≤ s.
The recovery protocol for quorum systems must then satisfy the following
property, which guarantees, for each object, that replicas recover an object state
with at least the current maximum sequence number at the time recovery starts.
(4.5) QS State Recovery. For each object o with current maximum sequence
number s at the time replica i starts the recovery protocol, there is a bound
∆ such that i recovers an object state for o with sequence number s′ such
that s′ ≥ s holds in ∆ seconds.
The State Recovery protocol of section 2.2.2, using the definition of the state
recovery request above, satisfies QS State Recovery (4.5). To see why, notice
that Proactive Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) guarantees that some quorum
is available even when one replica is rebooting. The recovery request from
3A replica replying to a state recovery request also sends a signed list of the object IDs that it
will send. This list allows the recovering replica to know which object states to expect. So, the
recovering replica knows when it has received all the object states from a quorum. At this time,
it can safely add unknown-object messages for each object state that was received from some,
but not all, replicas in the quorum. An added unknown-object message need not be signed,
since it is only used by the replica that creates it.
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a rebooting replica goes to a quorum, and Proactive Threshold DQS Correct-
ness (4.4) guarantees that, for each object o, this quorum intersects in at least
one correct replica with the quorum that had object state for o with the cur-
rent maximum sequence number for o at the time the recovery protocol started.
So, this correct replica answers with object state for o with a sequence number
that is at least the value of the current maximum sequence number for o when
the recovery protocol started. The state synthesis function will thus return an
object state with at least this sequence number. The recovering replica then
processes incoming operations that it has queued during execution of the State
Recovery protocol, so it recovers with an up-to-date state. Timely Links (2.8),
Synchronous Processors (2.7), and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6),
along with the assumed bound on state size, guarantee that this protocol termi-
nates in a bounded amount of time.
Recovering replicas in the storage-service prototype implement a simple op-
timization for State Recovery: since client inputs are signed and have a totally-
ordered sequence number, a recovering replica can process inputs that it re-
ceives while executing State Recovery instead of recording the inputs and pro-
cessing them after. If a recovering replica stores an object state with a higher
sequence number than the one it eventually recovers, then the older state is
dropped instead of being stored after recovery. This means that State Recovery
terminates for a recovering replica immediately once this replica receives δ state-
similar replies. And this optimization does not interfere with completing State
Recovery in a bounded amount of time, because there is an assumed maximum
rate for inputs received by the replicas, and there is a bound on the amount of
time needed to process any input, by Synchronous Processors (2.7) and Approx-
imately Synchronized Clocks (2.6).
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Table 4.1: The versions of our storage-service prototype
Version name Replica Refresh
epoch reobf key
Replicated none none none
Centralized cntrl cntrl cntrl
Decentralized cntrl cntrl dist
Reboot Clock dist dist dist
4.2 Performance of the Storage-Service Prototype
The performance of the storage-service prototype depends on the mechanism
implementations used for Reply Synthesis, State Recovery, and Replica Refresh.
Input Coordination is not needed for quorum systems, and the threshold cryptog-
raphy Reply Synthesis mechanism is not applicable. All versions of our prototype
use the State Recovery implementation from section 2.2.2 with the state recovery
request as described in section 4.1. Table 4.1 enumerates the salient character-
istics of the three versions of the prototype we analyzed. We also present a
Replicated version that does not perform any proactive recovery for replicas.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
To measure performance of the storage-service prototype, we use the same ex-
perimental setup as described in section 3.2.1, with t = 1 and n = 6; a quorum
is any set of 4 replicas. Since the Replicated version does not perform proactive
obfuscation or reboot replicas, it only needs to have n = 3t+ 1 = 4 replicas, and
it uses quorums consisting of 2t+ 1 = 3 replicas.
We implemented the storage-service server and client in C using OpenSSL.
Neither server nor client makes any assumptions about replication—the client
is designed to communicate with a single instance of the server. All replication
is handled by the mechanism implementations.
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There is a single client connected to both the input and output networks;
this client submits all operations to the prototype and receives all replies. With
no Input Coordination, there is no batching of input packets, but replicas sign
batched output for the client up to batch size 20—we describe our reasons for
selecting this batching size in section 4.2.2. Replicas do not currently write to
disk for crash recovery.
4.2.2 Performance Measurements
We measure throughput and latency. Each reported value is a mean of at least
5 runs; error bars depict the sample standard deviation of the measurements
around this mean.
4.2.2.1 Reply Synthesis
We performed experiments to quantify the performance of the individual au-
thentication implementation for Reply Synthesis. In our experiments, replicas
start with a set of 4-byte integer objects from the client. The client performs
queries, but not updates, on randomly chosen objects at a specified rate. This
workload allows us to characterize two things: an upper bound on the through-
put of the service and a lower bound on its latency, since the objects are as small
as possible, and queries do not incur CPU time on the client for signatures or
on the server for verification (whereas updates would). Update operations by
the client would increase the cryptographic load on the client and server, hence
slow both down.
Figure 4.1 graphs throughput for these experiments—throughput of the Cen-
tralized version peaks at 1360 queries/second at an applied load of 1550 que-
ries/second. After this point, throughput declines slightly as the applied load
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Figure 4.1: Overall throughput for the storage-service prototype
increases. This decline is due to the increasing cost of queries that must be
dropped because they cannot be handled. The “QU” curve shows the perfor-
mance of a single server and thus fixes the best possible case. This implemen-
tation of the single server does not generate extra signatures for the objects it
returns, since all objects are already signed. And clients check object signatures
in both cases.
The throughput of the server starts saturating at about 1800 queries/second,
and increases slightly with higher applied loads. Throughput saturation occurs
in both the QU and Centralized cases due to CPU saturation. The difference
in behavior at saturation is due, in part, to implementing the storage-service
prototype in user space instead of in the kernel—replicas copy packets from
the kernel and manage them there. The kernel never accumulates a significant
queue of packets in the experiments we ran, since it deletes packets once they
have been copied. In particular, even packets that are dropped are first copied
from the kernel to user space. So, high loads induce a significant CPU overhead
in the replicas. In the single server version, packet queues are managed by the
OpenBSD kernel, so dropping packets is significantly less costly—we expect to
see the same effect of decreasing throughput in the QU plot, but at much higher
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applied loads.
The Replicated version has exactly the same performance as the Centralized
version. This is because quorum systems do not use Input Coordination, so each
replica handles packets independently of all others. Thus, CPU saturation oc-
curs in the Replicated version at exactly the same number of queries per second
as in the Centralized version.
The latency of the storage-service prototype in these experiments is 21 ± 1
ms for applied load below the throughput saturation value. When the system is
saturated, latency of requests that are not dropped increases to 205 ± 3 ms. The
higher latency at saturation is due to bounded queues filling in the replica and
in the OpenBSD kernel, since the latency of a packet includes the time needed
to process all packets ahead of it in these queues. The queue implementations
in the firewall and storage-service prototypes are different, so these latency be-
haviors are incomparable.
CPU saturation occurs at applied loads above 1360 queries/second—the
maximum load a replica can handle. Given this bound, we perform our ex-
periments for Replica Refresh and State Recovery at an applied load of 1400 que-
ries/second, and thus show behavior at saturation. We allow servers to reach
a steady state in their processing of packets before starting our measurements.
This ensures that replicas are not measured in their startup transients, where
throughput and latency have not stabilized.
To select a suitable batching factor, we performed an experiment in which
a client applied a query load sufficient to saturate the service and varied the
batching factor. Figure 4.2 shows the results. Throughput reaches a plateau
at a maximum batching factor of 20. The batching factor achieved by replicas
can also be seen in Figure 4.2—it also reaches a peak at a maximum batching
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Figure 4.2: Batching factor and throughput for the storage-service prototype
under saturation
factor of 20 and declines slightly thereafter (the throughput decline is due to the
overhead of unfilled batches). So, we chose a batching factor of 20.
Unlike in the firewall prototype, throughput here is unaffected by the crash
of a single replica. Throughput in the firewall prototype decreases due to slow-
down in Input Coordination, but the storage-service prototype does not use Input
Coordination.
4.2.2.2 Replica Refresh
The only component of Replica Refresh that causes significant performance dif-
ferences in throughput and latency between prototype versions is share refresh
and share recovery. We do not show results for the Reboot Clock version, since
the only difference between the Reboot Clock version and the Decentralized
version is that the Reboot Clock version has a longer epoch length, hence longer
window of vulnerability.
Throughput. Query throughput measurements given in Figure 4.3 confirm
the results of section 3.2.2.3, which compares centralized and decentralized key
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Figure 4.3: Two key distribution methods for the storage-service prototype at
an applied load of 1400 queries/second
distribution for the firewall prototype. The experiment used to generate these
numbers is the same as for Reply Synthesis: a client sends random queries at a
specified rate to the storage-service prototype, which replies with the appropri-
ate object. We eliminate the costs of State Recovery by providing the appropriate
state directly to the recovering replica—this isolates the cost of key distribu-
tion. As in the firewall prototype, the CPU overhead of APSS recovery causes
a throughput drop at epoch change. Throughput decreases to about 36% (the
firewall prototype dropped to 11%) for the Decentralized version, whereas the
Centralized version continues at constant throughput for the whole experiment.
We also observe a slight drop in the Decentralized version at recovery due to the
share recovery protocol run for the rebooting replica. This drop is shorter in du-
ration than in the corresponding graph for the firewall prototype, since only
share recovery is executed rather than both State Recovery and share recovery.
The difference in throughput between the firewall and storage-service pro-
totypes during share refresh can be explained by differences in CPU utiliza-
tion. The storage-service prototype spends more of its CPU time in the kernel,
whereas the firewall prototype spends most of its CPU time in user space per-
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forming cryptographic operations for agreement. We believe that kernel-level
packet handling operations performed by the storage service mesh better with
the high CPU utilization of APSS than the cryptographic operations performed
by the firewall.
The same experiment run at 1300 queries/second (slightly below the satura-
tion threshold) exhibits a throughput decrease during share refresh from 1300
queries/second to 750 queries/second; this is 57%. Throughput remains higher
during share refresh in the non-saturated case than the saturated case, because
the storage service does not use the CPU as much and, therefore, does not com-
pete as much with APSS. Moreover, the higher load of queries in the saturated
case forces the storage service to spend more CPU resources dropping packets
than it must spend in the non-saturated case.
Latency. The same experiments as for Figure 4.3 lead to a similar graph for
latency. Latency in the Decentralized case for the storage-service prototype in-
creases to 646 ± 89 ms during share refresh, as opposed to 205 ± 3 ms for the
same interval in the Centralized case. This latency is lower than what was seen
in section 3.2.2.3 for the firewall prototype during share refresh. As for through-
put, we believe this is due to the kernel-level packet handling operations of the
storage-service prototype competing better with the high CPU costs of APSS in
user space. Latency also increases slightly during share recovery. The Decen-
tralized version has a latency of 233 ± 3 ms during share recovery, whereas the
Centralized version has a latency of 203 ± 1 ms.
4.2.2.3 State Recovery
The number of object states that must be recovered after a reboot in the storage-
service prototype significantly affects throughput and latency. The state of the
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storage service increases linearly in the number of object states stored (although
each object state in the prototype only contains a 4-byte integer, each also has
headers of length 24 bytes and a signature of length 64 bytes, so each object
contains 92 bytes). So, a storage-service state with 115 object states has 10580
bytes (which corresponds to a firewall state with about 44 packet streams, since
each stream has a state of size 240 bytes). This corresponds to an applied load
of 3300 kB/s, by the same calculation as in section 3.2.2.4. And, therefore, the
amount of state held by replicas in the firewall prototype under saturation is
held by replicas in the storage-service prototype when there are 115 object states.
However, we would typically expect a storage service to have many more
than 115 object states. To confirm the analysis of section 2.3.2 without using too
many object states, our storage-service prototype uses a simple implementation
of the state recovery request that does not batch object states for recovery, but
instead uses one round of communication for each object state from each replica.
The cost of recovery can be reduced by batching object states and preventing
identical object states from being sent multiple times. But this does not change
the linear relationship between recovery time and the number of object states.
Throughput. Figure 4.4 shows the effect of State Recovery on throughput when
different numbers of object states must be recovered. As before, in this exper-
iment, a single client sends queries to the service. The recovering replica must
then recover all objects from other replicas. We use only the Centralized version,
so that share recovery does not influence the measurements.
Figure 4.4 shows that throughput drops during State Recovery to about 470
queries/s for time proportional to the number of objects being recovered—there
is a linear relationship: each object adds about 260 ms to the recovery time. This
reduction in throughput is due to the CPU time replicas spend sending and
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Figure 4.5: Latency during recovery for the storage-service prototype
receiving recovery messages (instead of processing inputs from the client).
Latency. Figure 4.5 compares latency during recovery in the same experiments
used to generate Figure 4.4. In these experiments, we see that latency increases
to a maximum of about 600 ms and stays there until recovery completes—a
time directly proportional to the number of objects that need to be recovered, as
would be expected from the throughput. Like the decrease in throughput, this
increase in latency is due to the replicas spending CPU time processing packets
for recovery instead of processing queries from clients.
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CHAPTER 5
MULTI-VERIFIER SIGNATURES
Our constructions of MVS schemes rely on MACs, which take a message m and
a key k as input and output a tag that can be used to authenticatem given k. The
traditional model of MAC security [9] requires that it be hard for an adversary
A to generate a message m and tag τ that will be accepted by a receiver, even if
A has access to a MAC oracle (as long as A has not already requested that m be
signed by the oracle). We write Ar for an adversary A using randomness r.
We require the MAC to satisfy a stronger property (similar to Bellare, Gold-
reich, and Mityagin [8]), called Chosen Tag Attack (CTA) Unforgeability, which ad-
ditionally gives adversaries access to a verification oracle VF(m, τ, k) such that
VF(m, τ, k) =

∞ if MAC(m, k) = τ
0 otherwise.
If VF(m, τ, k) =∞ holds, then the tag is accepted by a receiver.
Let MACreq(A,m, k, r) be a predicate that is true if an adversaryAr requested
m from its MAC oracle using key k in a given execution. Then, for a given
security parameter d, we can define the following property for Probabilistic
Polynomial-Time (PPT) adversaries.
(5.1) CTA Unforgeability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there ex-
ists a negligible function  such that
Pr[k ← Gen(1d); r ← {0, 1}∞;
m, τ ← AMAC(·,k),VF(·,·,k)r (1d) :
¬MACreq(A,m, k, r) ∧ VF(m, τ, k) =∞] ≤ (d).
Pseudorandom functions (see [38] for an overview) can be used to construct
MACs satisfying CTA Unforgeability (5.1).
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5.1 Defining Multi-Verifier Signatures
We define an MVS scheme to be a triple (Gen, Sign, Ver) of algorithms that de-
pend on a set I of n verifiers; each verifier may use a different key when calling
Ver. And each server executes a verifier with a different key. These algorithms
operate as follows, where argument d is a security parameter and b specifies a
given number of bits.
• Gen(1d, 1n) is a PPT algorithm that outputs a vector k of keys for the signer
and a vector Kj of keys for each verifier j ∈ I . Key k in k or Kj (for any
j ∈ I) is an element of {0, 1}b.
• Sign(m,k) takes m ∈ {0, 1}b and produces1 a tag τ .
• For each j ∈ I , Ver(m, τ,Kj) produces a value that is either∞, 0, an ele-
ment ofN>0, or⊥.2 If Ver(m, τ,Kj) returns∞, then we say that τ is accepted
by j, and if Ver(m, τ,Kj) returns 0, then we say that τ is not accepted by j.
A return value λ ∈ N>0 means that τ is accepted by j, and also that there
is a lower bound λ − 1 on the number of times this tag can be transferred
and still cause verifiers at other correct receivers to return a value in N>0.
If Ver(m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥, then j sets a state variable vj to ⊥; verifier j
thereafter believes the signer to be compromised.
Note that the above description implies Ver is a stateful algorithm: whenever
Ver produces ⊥ for a message purporting to come from signer i, it decides that i
is compromised and remembers this fact. Thereafter, Ver will only return ⊥ for
message and tag pairs purporting to come from i.
1For simplicity of exposition, we define MVS schemes for b-bit messages only. These defini-
tions are easily extended to arbitrary-length messages. Our constructions are described for both
fixed-length and arbitrary-length messages.
2Assume that∞ satisfies only the following properties: ∞−∞ = 0, ∀a ∈ N : ∞ > a, and
∀a ∈ N : ∣∣∞− a∣∣ = ∣∣a−∞∣∣ =∞.
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Let λ be an element of N∞ , N>0∪{∞}, and let req(A,m,k, r) be a predicate
that is true if an adversary Ar requested m from its signing oracle using keys
k in a given execution. MVS schemes satisfy four properties: λ-Completeness,
Unforgeability, Non-Accusability, and Transferability.
λ-Completeness (5.2) stipulates that, for any Kj and any message m, a tag
τ generated by Sign(m,k) causes Ver(m, τ,Kj) to return a value that is greater
than or equal to λ. Note that ∞-Completeness thus requires Ver(m, τ,Kj) to
return ∞; the value ∞ means that a message can be transferred an arbitrary
number of times, just like digital signatures. Formally, we can state this property
as follows.
(5.2) λ-Completeness. There exists a negligible function  such that for any
message m and any j ∈ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n) : Ver(m, Sign(m,k),Kj) < λ] ≤ (d, n).
As with digital signature schemes, Unforgeability (5.3) requires that no ad-
versary A be able to generate a message m and tag τ that will be accepted by
any correct verifier ifA has not previously requested a tag form from its signing
oracle, even if A might have compromised any set I ′ of verifiers. Formally, we
can state this property as follows.
(5.3) Unforgeability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a
negligible function  such that for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n); r ← {0, 1}∞;
(m, τ)← ASign(·,k),{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′r (1d, 1n, {Ki}i∈I′) :
¬req(A,m,k, r) ∧ (∃j ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m, τ,Kj) ∈ N∞)] ≤ (d, n).
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Non-Accusability (5.4) requires that no adversary A be able to generate a
message and tag pair that causes any correct verifier to return ⊥ if the signer is
not compromised, even if A can request signatures on arbitrary messages and
has compromised an arbitrary subset of verifiers. Formally, we can state this
property as follows.
(5.4) Non-Accusability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists
a negligible function  such that for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m, τ)← ASign(·,k),{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ (1d, 1n, {Ki}i∈I′) :
(∃j ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m, τ,Kj) = ⊥)] ≤ (d, n).
Transferability (5.5) requires that even a compromised signer is unable to
create a tag on which any pair of correct verifiers return values that differ by
more than 1; this property implies that if verification of a message m and tag τ
at any correct verifier returns v, thenm and τ can be transferred between correct
verifiers at least v − 1 times. A tag that does not satisfy Transferability (5.5) is
said to be split.3
Our notion of Transferability (5.5) is slightly different than the notion of
Transferability guaranteed by standard digital signatures. In particular, a ver-
ifier j that returns a value in N∞ for a message m and tag τ is not guaranteed
that any non-compromised verifier j′ to which it passes m and τ will also return
a value in N∞; the other possibility is that j′ returns⊥—which means that j′ has
acquired proof that the signer is compromised.
3Verification algorithms for MVS schemes allow some verifiers to return ⊥ and conclude
nothing about the tag. Each tag divides the correct verifiers into two groups: those that accept
the tag and those that find the signer compromised. This specification is reminiscent of Cru-
sader’s Agreement [32], where the correct receivers are divided into those that agree on a single
value and those that know the sender to be compromised.
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Formally, we can state this property as follows.
(5.5) Transferability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a
negligible function  such that for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m, τ)← A{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ (1d, 1n,k, {Ki}i∈I′) :
(∃j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m, τ,Kj) 6= ⊥ ∧ Ver(m, τ,Kj′) 6= ⊥
∧ ∣∣Ver(m, τ,Kj)− Ver(m, τ,Kj′)∣∣ > 1)] ≤ (d, n).
An MVS scheme that satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2) for λ ∈ N>0 is called a
λ-MVS scheme; tags generated by this scheme can be transferred at least λ −
1 times. An MVS scheme that satisfies ∞-Completeness is called an ∞-MVS
scheme; tags generated by this scheme can be transferred an unlimited number
of times. A stronger version of Transferability (5.5), called Perfect Transferability,
would require that (d, n) = 0 in the definition of Transferability (5.5); Appendix
5.2 shows that∞-MVS schemes satisfying Perfect Transferability are essentially
traditional digital signature schemes.4
To gain confidence in our definitions, Appendix D provides a definition of
MVS schemes based on an ideal signature functionality (similar to Canetti’s def-
inition of signatures [16] in the Universal Composability (UC) framework) and
shows that a UC-secure implementation of this ideal functionality is equivalent
to our game-based definition.
4Boneh, Durfee, and Franklin [12] show a related lower bound: digital signatures are re-
quired for short collusion-resistant multicast MAC constructions.
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Strong Unforgeability
Similar to digital signature schemes, an MVS scheme can satisfy Strong Unforge-
ability, which requires that if A did not receive m and τ from its signing oracle,
then m and τ will not cause any verifier to return a value greater than 0 (leading
this verifier to accept the pair) or return ⊥ (leading this verifier to conclude that
the signer is compromised). Define predicate recv(A, (m, τ),k, r) to be true if
A, using randomness r, received m and τ from the signing oracle using keys k.
Formally, the property is written as follows:
(5.6) Strong Unforgeability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there
exists a negligible function  such that for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n); r ← {0, 1}∞;
(m, τ)← ASign(·,k),{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′r (1d, 1n, {Ki}i∈I′) :
¬recv(A, (m, τ),k, r) ∧ (∃j ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m, τ,Kj) 6= 0)] ≤ (d, n).
Note that Strong Unforgeability (5.6) implies both Unforgeability (5.3) and
Non-Accusability (5.4). An MVS scheme that satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6)
in addition to λ-Completeness (5.2) and Transferability (5.5) is called a Strong λ-
MVS scheme.
5.2 Impossibility of Avoiding Split Tags
Transferability (5.5) asserts that, except with negligible probability, even com-
promised signers cannot find split tags. But for traditional digital signatures, it
is impossible to have split tags, since all verifiers use the same function to check
tags. A natural question is whether such perfect transferability can be achieved
in our MVS setting.
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We can prove that an∞-MVS scheme must contain a digital signature scheme
to avoid split tags perfectly. Start with an ∞-MVS scheme (Gen, Sign,Ver) that
satisfies∞-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), and Non-Accusability (5.4).
Now strengthen Transferability (5.5) to the following.
(5.7) Perfect Transferability. For any PPT A and for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m, τ)← A{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ (1d, 1n,k, {Ki}i∈I′) :
(∃j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m, τ,Kj) 6= ⊥ ∧ Ver(m, τ,Kj′) 6= ⊥
∧ ∣∣Ver(m, τ,Kj)− Ver(m, τ,Kj′)∣∣ > 1)] = 0
Note that the only difference between the definition of Transferability (5.5)
(see page 80) and Perfect Transferability (5.7) is that (d, n) is set to 0 in the
definition of Perfect Transferability (5.7).
Perfect Transferability (5.7) implies that there are no split tags under any
choice of keys, because if a split tag existed, then an adversary that guessed
message and tag pairs at random would have some non-zero probability of
choosing it. Also note that we can remove the restriction on verifiers j and
j′ being non-compromised: if there is any pair of verifiers for which a split tag
can be created, then an adversary can choose not to compromise those verifiers
and guess the message and split tag with a non-zero probability. We can thus
rewrite Perfect Transferability (5.7) as follows:
∀d, n,∀k,{Ki}i∈I ∈ Range(Gen(1d, 1n),∀m, τ,∀j, j′ ∈ I :
(Ver(m, τ,Kj) 6= ⊥ ∧ Ver(m, τ,Kj′) 6= ⊥) =⇒∣∣Ver(m, τ,Kj)− Ver(m, τ,Kj′)∣∣ ≤ 1
To simplify the statement of Perfect Transferability (5.7) further, we must con-
sider a restricted class of∞-MVS schemes.
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Given any∞-MVS scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver), we can define a new∞-MVS
scheme Σ′ = (Gen, Sign,Ver′), in which the verifier only returns 0,∞, and ⊥. To
do so, Ver′(m, τ,Kj) calls Ver(m, τ,Kj) and gets a reply v. Then Ver′ returns v
if v is one of 0, ∞, or ⊥. Otherwise, Ver′ returns 0. Note that Ver′ satisfies ∞-
Completeness (5.2) if Ver does, since∞-Completeness for Σ guarantees that Ver
always returns∞ on message and tag pairs generated by Sign. And it is trivial to
see that Σ′ satisfies each of Unforgeability (5.3), Non-Accusability (5.4), Strong
Unforgeability (5.6), Perfect Transferability (5.7), and Transferability (5.5) if Σ
does. We call Σ′ a normalized∞-MVS scheme from Σ.
Since verifiers that do not return ⊥ in a normalized ∞-MVS scheme either
return 0 or∞, and |∞−0| > 1 holds, Perfect Transferability (5.7) can be rewritten
for normalized∞-MVS schemes as follows:
∀d, n,∀k,{Ki}i∈I ∈ Range(Gen(1d, 1n),∀m, τ,∀j, j′ ∈ I :
(Ver(m, τ,Kj) 6= ⊥ ∧ Ver(m, τ,Kj′) 6= ⊥) =⇒
Ver(m, τ,Kj) = Ver(m, τ,Kj′)
Perfect Transferability (5.7) interacts with Unforgeability (5.3), since verifiers
in a normalized∞-MVS scheme that satisfies Perfect Transferability (5.7) can all
simulate the actions of other verifiers perfectly; a tag that violates Unforgeabil-
ity (5.3) must do so for all verifiers at once.
For digital signature schemes, the property corresponding to Unforgeabil-
ity (5.3) is Chosen Message Attack (CMA) security [39]. A digital signature
scheme is secure under CMA if no adversary A can produce a message m and
tag τ that causes the verification algorithm to return∞, even if A can see tags
for messages of its choice. Naturally, as in Unforgeability (5.3), the adversary
cannot return a message it requested from its signing oracle.
The following theorem says that any normalized ∞-MVS scheme that sat-
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isfies Perfect Transferability (5.7) instead of Transferability (5.5) is effectively a
digital signature scheme secure under CMA [39].5 The intuition behind the the-
orem is that Perfect Transferability (5.7) effectively makes all verifiers use the
same algorithm: access to one verifier allows perfect simulation of the actions
of any other verifier.
Given a normalized ∞-MVS scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign, Ver) that satisfies ∞-
Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), Non-Accusability (5.4), and Perfect
Transferability (5.7), we can define a digital signature scheme ΣDj = (Gen
D,
SignD, VerD) as follows for any j in I . Let GenD(1d) call Gen(1d, 1n) to produce
public key K = Kj and secret key k = k. Then SignD(·, k) just calls Sign(·,k).
And VerD(·, ·, K) calls Ver(·, ·,Kj), getting response v. VerD returns v if v is 0
or ∞, and VerD returns 0 if v is ⊥, since all verifiers use the same verification
function in ΣDj , hence never disagree about its return value.
Theorem 1. If (Gen, Sign, Ver) is a normalized ∞-MVS scheme satisfying ∞-Com-
pleteness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), Non-Accusability (5.4), and Perfect Transferabil-
ity (5.7), then, for any j ∈ I , ΣDj is a digital signature secure under CMA.
Proof. By the contrapositive. Suppose that we are given a non-uniform PPT
adversary A that violates CMA security of ΣDj with non-negligible probability
.
We will construct a PPTB that violates Unforgeability (5.3) of the MVS scheme
for any I ′ ⊆ I such that j ∈ I ′ and ∃j′ ∈ I − I ′, as follows. B is given 1d, 1n,
{Ki}i∈I′ , and oracle access to Sign(·,k) = SignD(·, k) and {Ver(·, ·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ , so
in particular, B knows Kj . B proceeds as follows:
• B calls A(1d,Kj)
5Note that there is a normalized∞-MVS scheme for every∞-MVS scheme.
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– When A requests SignD(m, k), B calls the signing oracle Sign(m,k)
and returns its response.
– WhenA callsVerD(m, τ,K), thenA evaluates and returnsVer(m, τ,Kj).
• When A returns m and τ , B returns m and τ .
WhenA succeeds,m and τ satisfy Ver(m, τ,Kj) = VerD(m, τ,K) =∞. In this
case, Perfect Transferability (5.7) and Non-Accusability (5.4) together imply that
Ver(m, τ,Kj′) = ∞ with all but negligible probability: Non-Accusability (5.4)
implies that Ver(m, τ,Kj′) 6= ⊥ with all but negligible probability, and Per-
fect Transferability (5.7) (in its rewritten form for normalized∞-MVS schemes)
states that in this case, Ver(m, τ,Kj′) = Ver(m, τ,Kj) = ∞ always holds. This
violates Unforgeability (5.3). B has never requested m from its signing oracle,
because A is required by assumption never to request m of its signing oracle. B
succeeds with the same non-negligible probability  as A.
Thus, (Gen, Sign,Ver(·, ·,Kj)) is a digital signature secure under CMA if (Gen,
Sign, Ver) is a normalized ∞-MVS scheme that satisfies ∞-Completeness (5.2),
Unforgeability (5.3), Non-Accusability (5.4), and Perfect Transferability (5.7).
5.3 Implementing Agreement using Multi-Verifier Signatures
Multi-verifier signatures cannot be used directly in the place of digital signa-
tures in algorithms for implementing Byzantine agreement, because signature
verification on forwarded signed messages can sometimes return ⊥. Call such
a signed message a ⊥ message. A replica that receives a ⊥ message learns that
the signer is compromised but comes to no conclusion about whether or not the
message is correctly signed. To implement agreement using a particular proto-
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col P with multi-verifier signatures replacing digital signatures in the execution
of P , replica i takes the following actions when it receives a ⊥message.
1. Send a compromise claim message to all other replicas claiming that the
signer is compromised.
2. Stop handling all messages for protocol P and continue sending compro-
mise claim messages about the signer until it receives confirmation from
each replica j that j received the claim or until the compromised signer is
rebooted. This means that i acts like a crashed replica with respect to P .
Replica j believes replica j′ to be compromised once j has received t + 1 com-
promise claim messages about j′, since then j has received a compromise claim
message about j′ from at least one correct replica. We assume that there is a way
for a replica that is detected as compromised to be rebooted and made correct.
Note that this protocol implies that all correct replicas will eventually be-
lieve a compromised signer to be compromised once t + 1 replicas have re-
ceived a ⊥message from a given signer, as long as the network guarantees that
enough messages will eventually be received. So, an implementation of Byzan-
tine agreement can assume that no more than t replicas ever receive⊥messages
from each compromised replica. That is, at most t2 replicas will stop before some
compromised replica is discovered. So multi-verifier signatures can be used to
replace digital signatures by allowing for t2 extra replicas to crash.
Also, note that if more than t2 replicas receive ⊥ messages, then some com-
promised replica will eventually be detected as compromised. Once a compro-
mised replica is detected, it can be rebooted and replaced, and the replicas that
had stopped can start participating in the protocol again. But, during the time
that more than t2 replicas have stopped, the protocol might not be able to make
progress.
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This method for extending a protocol to use multi-verifier signatures can be
applied, for instance, to Byzantine Paxos. If t replicas can be compromised and
f replicas can crash, then Byzantine Paxos can be implemented with 3t+ 2f + 1
replicas [49]. So, Byzantine Paxos can be implemented with 3t+ 2t2 + 1 replicas
using multi-verifier signatures.
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CHAPTER 6
MULTI-VERIFIER SIGNATURE CONSTRUCTIONS
The definitions of Chapter 5 allow each verifier to use different keys. So,
multi-verifier signature schemes can employ a secret-key setup like the one used
for MACs. But two questions remain: Do any constructions of multi-verifier sig-
natures satisfy these definitions? And are such constructions faster to generate
and check than digital signatures?
To demonstrate the existence and practicality of constructions of multi-verifier
signatures, we present Atomic Signatures and Chain Signatures. We then com-
pare the performance of these two schemes to fast implementations of digital
signatures.
6.1 Atomic Signatures
Atomic Signatures is a Strong∞-MVS scheme in which a signer computes a tag
for a message m by using MACs to generate and solve a system of linear equa-
tions that depend on m. Unlike MACs and digital signature schemes, generation
algorithm GenAS for Atomic Signatures distributes disjoint, equal-sized sets of
random keys to each verifier; a verifier shares each key in each set with the
signer, but the signer does not know which keys it shares with which verifier.
More precisely, for n verifiers and security parameter d, generation algo-
rithmGenAS (1d, 1n) for Atomic Signatures produces dn keys k1, k2, . . . , kdn, where,
for each j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ dn, kj ∈ {0, 1}b is a key for a MAC. GenAS also
generates dn random vectors zj = 〈zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,dn〉 (one vector for each key
kj), where for each j and i such that 1 ≤ j ≤ dn and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, each en-
try zj,i is an element of {0, 1}b. GenAS then sets k to be a vector of key pairs
〈(k1, z1), (k2, z2), . . . , (kdn, zdn)〉. And GenAS creates n vectors K1,K2, . . . ,Kn
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that each contain a unique, randomly chosen set of d key pairs from k such that
Ki and Kj are disjoint for each distinct pair i and j of indices. Set k is called
the signing key pairs and the n vectorsK1,K2, . . . ,Kn are called the verifying key
pairs. We say that a verifier j owns each key k in Kj .
Signing algorithm SignAS (m,k) takes message m and signing key pairs k as
input1 and outputs a vector Ad(m) = A1, A2, . . ., Adn of subtags, obtained by
solving the following equation, where b-bit strings are treated as elements in
the finite field GF(2b),
MAC(m, k1)
MAC(m, k2)
...
MAC(m, kdn)

=

z1,1 z1,2 · · · z1,dn
z2,1 z2,2 · · · z2,dn
...
...
...
...
zdn,1 zdn,2 · · · zdn,dn


A1
A2
...
Adn

(6.1)
Recall that solving equation (6.1) corresponds to solving the dn instances (1 ≤
j ≤ dn) of the following equation simultaneously:
MAC(m, kj) =
dn∑
t=1
zj,tAt. (6.2)
Define predicate roweq(m,A, (kj, zj)) to be true exactly when equation (6.2) holds
for m, A, and (kj ,zj).
Verification algorithm VerAS(·, ·,Kj) keeps state vj to record that it has been
called with a message and tag that indicate the signer is compromised. Algo-
rithm VerAS (m, τ,Kj) operates as follows:
• If vj is set to ⊥, then VerAS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥.
• Otherwise, if roweq(m, τ, (k, z)) holds for all d pairs (k,z) inKj , then algo-
rithm VerAS (m, τ,Kj) returns∞.
1Atomic Signatures as described can sign arbitrary-length messages as long as the MAC can
generate tags for arbitrary-length messages.
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• If no roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) holds for any (k,z) in Kj , then VerAS (m, τ,Kj)
returns 0.
• Otherwise, there is some key pair (k,z) ∈Kj for which roweq(m, τ, (k,z))
holds, and a different key pair (k′, z′) ∈ Kj for which roweq(m, τ, (k′, z′))
does not hold. So, VerAS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥ and sets vj to ⊥.
This verification scheme is based on the idea that it is hard for an adversary
that does not know a key (k,z) in k to produce a message m and tag τ that will
cause roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) to hold. The intuition behind the proof is that the MAC
is hard to forge.
This scheme also relies on it being hard for an adversary that has not com-
promised the signer to produce a message and tag pair that causes any non-
compromised verifier to return ⊥. This property must hold even if the adver-
sary can see a polynomial number of messages and tags for messages of its
choice. The intuition behind the proof of this property is that it is hard to find
new solutions to under-determined equations over variables with randomly-
chosen, unknown coefficients (the pseudorandom MAC values and the random
rows of the matrix).
However, it is easy for a compromised signer to cause one verifier to return
⊥: the signer can create a new set of signing keys k′ by replacing one of the
keys in k with a random bit string. Then the signer uses k′ to generate and
solve equation (6.1). Some verifier j will then only find d− 1 satisfied instances
of roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) and will return ⊥. The only task that must be difficult for
a compromised signer is creating a message and tag pair that cause one non-
compromised verifier to return∞ and another to return 0.
The verification and signing algorithms for Atomic Signatures as described
above are expensive to compute: each verifier has d + d2n keys, and the signer
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must solve a matrix equation at cost O(d3n3) to generate a signature. Both of
these costs can be reduced.
One way to reduce the number of keys is for each verifier j to share 2d keys
with the signer instead of d+ d2n—instead of keys (k,z), a verifier shares a pair
(k1, k2), where keys k1 and k2 are elements of {0, 1}b. Key k1 is used to compute
MACs in the place of k in equation (6.1), and k2 is used to generate matrix row
elements zt = MAC(t, k2) for t in {1, 2, . . . , dn}; each verifier then only needs
2d keys: 2 for each of its d rows. The proofs follow in the same way as with
a randomly chosen matrix but with an extra hybrid step to go from random
matrix elements to matrix elements generated by a pseudorandom function.2
The cost of generating a signature can be reduced further. GenAS can produce
a prefactored matrix (using the LU factorization, for instance) for use by SignAS
on the right-hand side of equation (6.1). Factoring is cost-effective here, because
the matrix is independent of the message to be signed—factoring costs O(d3n3)
but only needs to be done once, and solutions to equation (6.1) can be found for
a factored matrix in time O(d2n2).
6.1.1 Properties of Atomic Signatures
Since a Strong∞-MVS scheme must satisfy∞-Completeness (5.2), Strong Un-
forgeability (5.6), and Transferability (5.5), we prove that Atomic Signatures is a
Strong∞-MVS by proving two lemmas. The first establishes that Atomic Signa-
tures satisfies∞-Completeness (5.2) and Strong Unforgeability (5.6); the second
that it satisfies Transferability (5.5).
Lemma 2. If the MAC is a pseudorandom function, then Atomic Signatures satisfies
2The adversary in this case is given oracle access to the MAC functions, so it can compute
signatures efficiently.
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∞-Completeness (5.2) and Strong Unforgeability (5.6).
Proof. ∞-Completeness. This follows from non-singularity of the matrix in
equation (6.1), since a non-singular matrix allows a solution Ad(m) to be found
for equation (6.1). Any solution satisfies ∞-Completeness (5.2) by definition,
since roweq(m,Ad(m), (kj, zj)) will hold for each row j. The probability of a ran-
dom matrix of size dn× dn over a finite field of size 2b being singular is known
[23] to be 1−∏dni=1(1− 1/2bi), which is negligible when d and n are polynomial
in b.
Strong Unforgeability. Lemmas 12–14 from Appendix B simplify the prob-
lem to the case where all but one verifier q is compromised, MAC(·, k) for row j is
replaced by a random function vj(·), and adversaries are allowed no verification
oracle queries.
For such an adversary to violate Strong Unforgeability (5.6), it must produce
a message m and tag τ ′ such that it has never received (m, τ ′) from the signing
oracle, and VerAS (m, τ ′,Kq) 6= 0 holds; this case occurs exactly when predicate
roweq(m, τ ′, (k,z)) holds for at least one pair (k,z) inKq. We consider two cases.
In Case 1, m has been received from the signing oracle, but with a different tag
τ . In Case 2, m has never been received from the signing oracle. Since the MAC
for a given row i is replaced with a random function vi, we write (vi, zi) in the
place of key information (ki, zi).
Case 1. Consider an adversary that makes a series of signing oracle queries
m1, m2, . . ., mp, receives responses τ1, τ2, . . ., τp and finally outputs a message
mw (where 1 ≤ w ≤ p) and tag τ ′ such that τ ′ 6= τw. Note that τ ′ must not
equal τw because A cannot return a message and tag pair that it received from
its signing oracle. We show that for any choices of m1, m2, . . ., mp, τ1, τ2, . . ., τp,
the probability that τ ′ is a valid tag for mw is negligible.
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We consider the case where the adversary violates Strong Unforgeability for
a particular messagemw and produces a tag τ ′ satisfying the equation formw for
a particular row i. We will then use the Union Bound to bound the probability
for any row and any message. Let (v, z) be the key information for row i. Recall
that messagem and tag τ induces an equation for key information (v,z): v(m) =∑dn
t=1 ztτt.
The probability that a tag τ ′ produced by an adversary satisfies the given
equation is bounded by the following conditional probability for any choice of
τ ′, τ1, τ2, . . ., τp where τ ′ 6= τw.
Pr
v,z
[
v(mw) =
dn∑
t=1
ztτ
′
t
∣∣∣ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p} : v(mj) = dn∑
t=1
ztτj,t
]
This is the probability that a given tag τ ′ violates Strong Unforgeability using
a given row with randomly chosen coefficients, constrained by the fact that τ1
through τp satisfy the equation for this row. And the definition of conditional
probability states that, for events A and B, Pr[A | B] = Pr[A ∧ B]/Pr[B]. For
the conditional probability above, event A is v(mw) =
∑dn
t=1 ztτ
′
t , and event
B is ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p} : v(mj) =
∑dn
t=1 ztτj,t. So, the probability can be split
into two components: (i) Prv,z[∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p} : v(mj) =
∑dn
t=1 ztτj,t] and (ii)
Prv,z[v(mw) =
∑dn
t=1 ztτ
′
t ∧ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p} : v(mj) =
∑dn
t=1 ztτj,t]. We will con-
sider these two components separately. For each component, we can consider
the values of τ ′ and τ1, τ2, . . ., τp as fixed and the (v,z) as variables.
Fixing any values for the dn variables z1, z2, . . ., zdn in component (i) induces
a single solution (namely v(mi) =
∑dn
t=1 ztτi,t) for the values of v(mi). This means
that there are 2bdn ways to choose the variables to satisfy the equations. And
there are, a priori, 2b(dn+p) ways to choose the values for dn + p variables. Since
the probability is over the random choice of variables, this probability can be
computed as the quotient: 2bdn/2b(dn+p) = 1/2−bp.
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In component (ii), each way of setting dn−1 of the variables leads to a unique
solution for the remaining p+ 1 variables. To see why, recall that vectors τ ′ and
τw must differ. So, they must differ in at least one of their dn entries; suppose,
without loss of generality, that they differ in position a. If we set the dn − 1
variables z1, z2, . . ., za−1, za+1, . . ., zdn to any value, then we are left with p equa-
tions of the form v(mi) = τi,aza + ci for i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and constants ci and
one equation v(mw) = τ ′aza + c′ for some constant c′. Subtracting the equation
v(mw) = τw,aza + cw from v(mw) = τ ′aza + c′ eliminates v(mw) and leaves an
equation that uniquely determines the value of za, since τ ′a − τw,a 6= 0. This
value for za then uniquely determines the values of v(m1), v(m2), . . ., v(mp),
by definition. So, there are 2b(dn−1) solutions in total. And, as before, there
are 2b(dn+p) ways to choose values for these variables. So, the probability is
2b(dn−1)/2b(dn+p) = 2−b(p+1).
We can use the definition of conditional probability and the two component
probabilities to compute the bound on an adversary violating Strong Unforge-
ability using a particular equation and a particular message: 2−b(p+1)/2−bp = 2−b.
The Union Bound over the d equations and p possible messages then gives a
general bound of pd/2b, which is negligible.
Case 2. Now, suppose that m was never received from the signing oracle,
and consider any pair m and τ generated by adversary A. Since A never re-
ceived m from the signing oracle, no function of the values vi(m) for row i has
been seen byA. So, the output ofA is independent of vi(m). Fix a key (vj, zj) in
the keys owned by verifier q and suppose, without loss of generality, that the zj
are all known to the adversary. For a given m, there is one choice of the value
of vj(m) such that vj(m) =
∑dn
t=1 zj,tτt holds and there are a total of 2
b ways to
choose the value of vj(m).
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Since the choice of τ is independent of vj(m), and vj is a random function,
the probability of τ satisfying the given row equation is 1/2b. The Union Bound
then gives the probability of (m, τ) violating Strong Unforgeability (5.6) for any
of the d row equations to be d/2b, which is negligible.
Then, Lemmas 12–14 give a polynomial increase in each bound to get back to
the general case. But a polynomial increase of a negligible function still leaves
it negligible. So, Atomic Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6).
Proving that Atomic Signatures satisfies Transferability (5.5) is more chal-
lenging. A compromised signer able to generate a split tag must have knowl-
edge about which verifier owns which keys. So, we devise a game over the
signing keys, called Idealized Random Keys, by which we show that no adversary
gets enough information to divide the signing keys into two disjoint sets, where
each set contains all the keys owned by some verifier. Then, given an adversary
that can violate Transferability (5.5), we produce a new adversary that can di-
vide the signing keys into two such disjoint sets. This shows that the security
of Idealized Random Keys reduces to Transferability (5.5) of Atomic Signatures.
And we also show that Idealized Random Keys is secure, which means that
Transferability (5.5) holds for Atomic Signatures.
6.1.2 Idealized Random Keys
Idealized Random Keys is a game between a requester and a set I of n checkers
that each own a set of keys. The requester can only perform ownership queries:
asking checkers about the ownership of keys. Checkers return ⊥ in response to
ownership queries about keys they own. The important property of Idealized
Random Keys, called Non-Separability, is that no adversary A can use owner-
ship queries to separate the set of keys into two disjoint subsets, each of which
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contains all the keys owned by some checker that has not already returned ⊥.
Formally, Idealized Random Keys consists of a pair (GenIR,CheckIR) of algo-
rithms that operate as follows:
• GenIR(1d, 1n) generates a vector k of dn keys uniformly at random and par-
titions them into n disjoint sets K1, K2, . . ., Kn of size d, each set owned
by one checker j ∈ I .
• Check algorithm CheckIR(·,Kj) keeps state sj to record whether the re-
quester has ever made an ownership query to j for an element of Kj .
When requester i makes an ownership query on a given key k ∈ k, check
algorithm CheckIR(k,Kj) operates as follows.
– if k ∈Kj or sj = ⊥, then CheckIR(k,Kj) returns ⊥ and sets sj to ⊥.
– Otherwise, CheckIR(k,Kj) returns 1.
This behavior corresponds to information adversaries can glean from attacks
on Atomic Signatures. For instance, a compromised signer j can create a tag τ
for any message m by solving equation (6.1) using correct keys for all rows but
one. Then j sends m and τ to a verifier j′. If j′ owns the keys for this row, then
j′ will return ⊥. This corresponds to a requester asking checker j′ about a key
in Kj′ . But if j′ does not own the keys for this row, then j′ will return∞; so, j
learns that j′ does not own the keys for this row. This corresponds to a requester
asking checker j′ about a key it does not own.
Non-Separability can be written formally as follows:
(6.1) Non-Separability. For all adversaries A, there is a negligible function 
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such that for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← GenIR(1d, 1n);
(K,K ′)← A{CheckIR(·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ (1d, 1n,k, {Ki}i∈I′) :
(∃j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ : sj 6= ⊥ ∧ sj′ 6= ⊥
∧Kj ⊆ K ∧Kj′ ⊆ K ′ ∧K ∩K ′ = ∅)] ≤ (d, n).
To show that Non-Separability holds for Idealized Random Keys, we first
consider the case n = 2, then provide a reduction from n = 2 to general n. These
proofs will also show how to choose d for a given n so that Idealized Random
Keys satisfies Non-Separability (6.1) with a given probability 0 > 0,
Lemma 3. Idealized Random Keys for 2 checkers satisfies Non-Separability (6.1) with
probability
(
2d
d
)−1
.
Proof. Consider a passive adversary B that never makes any ownership queries
to its CheckIR oracles but produces sets K and K ′ that violate Non-Separabili-
ty (6.1). Keys are distributed randomly, so B has no information about which
keys correspond to which checkers. Therefore, B’s output is independent of the
distribution of keys to checkers. There are
(
2d
d
)
choices for K and K ′, only one
of which violates Non-Separability (6.1). So, B’s probability of outputting this
K and K ′ is
(
2d
d
)−1
.
Now suppose that some adversaryA, potentially making ownership queries
to its CheckIR oracles, violates Non-Separability (6.1) with probability 0. When
A succeeds, no ownership queries to its oracles can have returned ⊥, since
there are only two checkers, j and j′, and neither sj nor sj′ can be ⊥ for Non-
Separability (6.1) to be violated. So, A’s ownership queries must always have
returned 1. This means that B can simulate these ownership queries by al-
ways returning 1. WheneverB’s simulation would be incorrect (because CheckIR
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should have returned ⊥), A would have received ⊥ and failed to violate Non-
Separability (6.1). So, B succeeds at least as often as A. Then, A’s success prob-
ability is also no better than
(
2d
d
)−1
, since this is an upper bound on any passive
adversary B.
Theorem 4. Idealized Random Keys for n checkers satisfies Non-Separability (6.1) with
probability
(
n
2
)
/
(
2d
d
)
.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose adversaryA violates Non-Separa-
bility (6.1) for n checkers for some I ′ ⊆ I with probability greater than (n
2
)
/
(
2d
d
)
.
We construct B that violates Non-Separability (6.1) for Idealized Random Keys
with 2 checkers with probability greater than
(
2d
d
)−1
, which contradicts Lemma
3.
B is given k as well as CheckIR oracles for its two checkers and proceeds to
construct keys for A and simulate A’s oracles:
1. B calls GenIR(1d, 1n) to get k′ and {Ki}i∈I .
2. B then chooses j and j′ uniformly at random from I − I ′ and forms k′′ =
(k′− (Kj ∪Kj′))∪k. This replaces the keys for j and j′ in k′ with the keys
in k. B assigns one of its CheckIR oracles to j and the other to j′.
3. B callsAwith 1d, 1n, k′′, and {Ki}i∈I′ and simulatesA’s ownership queries
as follows:
• if i 6= j and i 6= j′, then B has all the keys for Ki, so B can emulate
exactly the execution of CheckIR(·,Ki), including keeping state.
• If i = j or i = j′, then B forwards the ownership query on to B’s
oracle for i.
4. When A returns K and K ′, B returns K and K ′.
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If A succeeds, then there is some pair i, i′ ∈ I − I ′ such that Ki ⊆ K and
Ki′ ⊆ K ′ and K ∩K ′ = ∅. Since j and j′ were chosen uniformly at random, the
probability that the unordered pair (i, i′) is the same as the pair (j, j′) is
(
n
2
)−1,
so B succeeds with probability greater than (
n
2)/(
2d
d )
(n2)
=
(
2d
d
)−1
. This contradicts
Lemma 3.
So, contrary to the initial assumption, A must only be able to succeed with
probability less than or equal to
(
n
2
)
/
(
2d
d
)
.
Theorem 4 provides a way to determine the value of d for a given choice of
probability 0 of a compromised requester violating Non-Separability (6.1) for n
verifiers. Theorem 4 implies that 0 <
(
n
2
)
/
(
2d
d
)
. Since
(
2d
d
) ≥ 2d for d ≥ 0, this
can be simplified to 0 <
(
n
2
)
/2d. Thus, it suffices to set d to O
(
log
(
n2
0
))
.
6.1.3 Transferability of Atomic Signatures
Idealized Random Keys provides a framework for proving that Atomic Sig-
natures satisfies Transferability (5.5). We prove this in the form of a reduc-
tion, showing that Non-Separability (6.1) of Idealized Random Keys implies
Transferability (5.5) of Atomic Signatures. Since Theorem 4 shows that Non-
Separability (6.1) holds for Idealized Random Keys, it then follows that Trans-
ferability (5.5) holds for Atomic Signatures.
Lemma 5. If Idealized Random Keys satisfies Non-Separability (6.1), then Atomic Sig-
natures satisfies Transferability (5.5).
Proof. We prove the contrapositive by constructing an adversary B that violates
Non-Separability (6.1) of Idealized Random Keys using an adversary A that vi-
olates Transferability (5.5) of Atomic Signatures. B is given keys k for Idealized
Random Keys.
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For each key k ∈ k, B generates random values z = 〈z1, z2, . . . , zdn〉 to con-
struct a set of keys to pass toA for Atomic Signatures. B will respond to signing
and verification oracle queries forA; B knows signing keys k but does not know
which correct verifiers own which keys. Answering signing queries is easy for
B, since no knowledge of key ownership is required—B simply uses all signing
keys to generate a signature.
For verification queries on a message m and tag τ , B knows the signing
keys, so B can check to see if roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) holds for each (k, z) ∈ k. If
roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) holds for all (k,z) ∈ k, then B can return ∞; and if no in-
stance of roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) holds for any (k,z) ∈ k, then B can return 0.
But if some instances hold and others do not, then B does not know what to
return for a given verification query to verifier j, since B does not know which
instances use keys inKj . One way to solve this problem would be for B to make
ownership queries to CheckIR for keys for some instances—knowing which ver-
ifiers own which keys for more keys gives B a higher probability of answering
correctly. But if CheckIR(·,Kj) returns ⊥ on any such ownership query when
VerAS (m, τ,Kj) would not have returned ⊥, then sj gets set to ⊥, and vj is not
set to ⊥ in Atomic Signatures. In this case, B might not be able to violate Non-
Separability (6.1) using the message and tag that A returns to violate Transfer-
ability (5.5); for instance, A might return a message and tag that violate Trans-
ferability (5.5) for j and some other verifier. And such a j could not be used to
violate Non-Separability (6.1), since sj = ⊥ would hold. So, B needs to ensure
that if an ownership query to CheckIR(·,Kj) causes CheckIR(·,Kj) to return ⊥
in the course of simulating a call to VerAS(m, τ,Kj), then VerAS (m, τ,Kj) would
also have returned ⊥.
To gain more information about the values returned by VerAS , B proceeds as
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follows: B randomly generates n additional known key pairs (k∗1, z∗1), (k∗2, z∗2), . . .,
(k∗n, z
∗
n), and assigns (k∗j , z∗j ) to verifier j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. B adds these keys to
k, creating k′, and creates n state variables s1, s2, . . ., sn, initializing each to 1.
So, B will useA on security parameter d+ 1 to violate Non-Separability (6.1) on
security parameter d.3
1. B calls A(1d+1, 1n,k′, {Ki}i∈I′) and answers A’s queries VerAS (m, τ,Kj) as
follows:
(a) Initialization. Set S0 and S1 to ∅.
(b) Check sj . If sj = ⊥, then return ⊥.
(c) Key Discovery. For each key pair (k,z) in k, if roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) holds,
then add k to set S1; otherwise add k to set S0.
(d) Check Opposite Keys. If roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) holds, then iterate over
each key k in S0. Otherwise iterate over keys in S1. Use oracle
access to call CheckIR(k,Kj) on each such key k, and return ⊥ if
CheckIR(·,Kj) ever returns ⊥. Set sj to ⊥when returning ⊥.
(e) If roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) holds, then return∞. Otherwise, return 0.
2. When A returns m and τ , run Key Discovery as before to get S0 and S1.
Return K = S1 and K ′ = S0.
It remains to show that this algorithm correctly simulates the operation of
VerAS (m, τ,Kj). There are only three possible return values from the verifica-
tion oracle VerAS (m, τ,Kj): 0,∞, and ⊥. We consider each case in turn:
• VerAS (m, τ,Kj) = 0. In this case, the definition of VerAS states that, for all
key pairs (k,z) in Kj , roweq(m, τ, (k, z)) will not hold. So, all of j’s keys
3The security parameter is now d + 1 instead of d, because there are now dn + n = (d + 1)n
keys.
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will be placed in S0. Further, roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) will also fail to hold, so
Check Opposite Keys will iterate over S1. Thus, none of j’s keys will be
passed to CheckIR(·,Kj), so CheckIR(·,Kj) will not return ⊥, which means
the simulation will not return ⊥. Since roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) does not hold,
the simulation returns 0, as required.
• VerAS (m, τ,Kj) = ∞. In this case, the definition of VerAS states that, for
all key pairs (k, z) in Kj , roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) holds. So, all of j’s keys will
be placed in S1. Further, roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) must hold, so Check Op-
posite Keys will iterate over S0. Thus, none of j’s keys will be passed
to CheckIR(·,Kj), so CheckIR(·,Kj) will not return ⊥, which means that
the simulation will not return ⊥. Since roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) holds for all
(k,z) ∈Kj , the simulation returns∞, as required.
• VerAS (m, τ,Kj) = ⊥. The definition of VerAS provides two cases in which
a verifier might return ⊥.
First, it might be that vj 6= ⊥. In this case, the definition of VerAS states
that there must be some key pairs (kr, zr) and (kr′ , zr′) in Kj such that
roweq(m, τ, (kr, zr)) holds and roweq(m, τ, (kr′ , zr′)) does not hold. So, key
pair (kr, zr) is put in S1, and key pair (kr′ , zr′) is put in S0.
If roweq(m, τ, (k∗j , z∗j)) holds, then Check Opposite Keys will iterate over
S0, which contains kr′ , so CheckIR(kr′ ,Kj) will be called and will return
⊥. If not, then Check Opposite Keys will iterate over S1, which contains
kr, so CheckIR(kr,Kj) will be called and will return ⊥. Either way, the
simulation returns ⊥, as required. And in both cases, the simulation sets
sj to ⊥.
Second, it might be that vj = ⊥. By definition of VerAS , this means that
VerAS (·, ·,Kj) must have previously returned ⊥. This means that sj has
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already been set to ⊥, by induction. So, the simulation returns ⊥ in the
step Check sj , as required.
Thus, B simulates A’s oracle calls correctly. When A succeeds, the defini-
tion of Transferability (5.5) implies that there is some pair j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ such
that the values of m and τ returned by A satisfy VerAS (m, τ,Kj) = ∞ and
VerAS (m, τ,Kj′) = 0. Therefore, roweq(m, τ, (k,z)) must hold for every (k, z) ∈
Kj and for no (k,z) ∈ Kj′ , which means that Kj ⊆ S1 = K and Kj′ ⊆ S0 = K ′,
as required. And K ∩ K ′ = ∅ holds by definition. Values sj and sj′ are not set
to ⊥, since VerAS (·, ·,Kj) and VerAS (·, ·,Kj′) never returned ⊥. B succeeds with
the same non-negligible probability as A.
Note that the constructed adversary B in the proof of Lemma 5 needs the
known key pairs to simulate the operation of the verification function. But
known key pairs are not needed in the construction itself. This difference in
the use of known keys leads to the difference in security parameters between B
and A.
The following theorem uses the previous results to show that Atomic Signa-
tures is a Strong∞-MVS scheme.
Theorem 6. If the MAC is a pseudorandom function, then Atomic Signatures is a
Strong∞-MVS scheme.
Proof. Lemma 2 shows that Atomic Signatures satisfies ∞-Completeness (5.2)
and Strong Unforgeability (5.6) if the MAC is a pseudorandom function. And
Lemma 5 and Theorem 4 together imply that Atomic Signatures satisfies Trans-
ferability (5.5). So, Atomic Signatures is a Strong∞-MVS scheme.
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The reduction in Lemma 5 adds one key per verifier to the set of keys used
in Atomic Signatures. So, the value d = O
(
log
(
n2
0
))
computed in section 6.1.2
using the probability 0 of a compromised signer being able to create a split tag
gives a value of d that is 1 lower than the value needed for Atomic Signatures.
But this does not affect the asymptotic complexity of the scheme: Atomic Signa-
tures can be computed by generating a vector of dnMACs in time O(|m|dn) and
solving the factored matrix equation in timeO(n2d2) = O
(
n2 log2
(
n2
0
))
. So, the
total asymptotic complexity of generating a tag isO
(
|m|n log(n2
0
) + n2 log2
(
n2
0
))
.
6.2 Chain Signatures
Chain Signatures is a λ-MVS scheme that creates tags consisting of vectors of sub-
tags. Each subtag contains the output of a MAC on the concatenation of previous
subtags.
Key generation algorithm GenCS (1d, 1n) produces n known keys k1 = k∗1 , k∗2 ,
. . ., k∗n and dn unknown keys k2 = 〈k1, k2, . . . , kdn〉, where each key is an el-
ement of {0, 1}b. GenCS (1d, 1n) then sets k = (k1,k2) and creates n vectors
K1,K2, . . . ,Kn. A vector Kj contains k∗j as well as a set of d keys chosen uni-
formly at random from k2 such that vectors K1, K2, . . ., Kn are disjoint.
SignCS (m,λ,k) produces4 a vector Cλ,d(m) consisting of λ sections, each di-
vided into two components: we call component 1 the known-key component and
component 2 the unknown-key component. Component 1 contains n subtags,
and component 2 contains dn subtags, so each section contains (d + 1)n sub-
tags. We write Cλ,d(m)[r, c, j] for the jth subtag in the cth component of the
4The definition of MVS schemes does not allow signing algorithm Sign(·,k)CS to take three
parameters. To avoid this difficulty when Chain Signatures is considered as a λ-MVS scheme
for some λ ∈ N, we define SignCS (m,k) to mean SignCS (m,λ,k).
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mcomp 1 comp 2
section 1
MAC( , k)
section 2
MAC( , k′)
MAC( , k′′)
section λ
Figure 6.1: The structure of a signed message using Chain Signatures
rth section of the tag generated by Chain Signatures for m and λ.5 We use the
natural lexicographic ordering on triples (r, c, j) to index the subtags of Chain
Signatures.6 The value of a subtag is computed recursively as the MAC of the
concatenation of m with the subtags in all previous components:
Cλ,d(m)[r, c, j] , MAC(m ||
(t,t′,t′′)<(r,c,1)
Cλ,d(m)[t, t′, t′′],kc[j]) (6.3)
Subtag j in component c of section r is said to be supported if the value of
this subtag is identical to the MAC of the message and all previous components
under key kc[j]. Figure 6.1 shows the structure of a signed message using Chain
Signatures.
Verification algorithm VerCS(·, ·,Kj) keeps state vj to record whether it has
ever been called with a message and tag that indicate that the signer is com-
promised. When called with a message m and tag τ , the verification algorithm
checks all the subtags of j in τ to see if there is a supported subtag that follows a
non-supported subtag. If so, then verification concludes that the signer is com-
promised. And if not, then verification returns the value of the highest section
in which it found a supported subtag.
More precisely, the verification algorithm works as follows, where λ′ is the
5Note that we can compute the offset of Cλ,d(m)[r, c, j] in this tag as (d + 1)n(r − 1) + (c −
1)n+ j − 1.
6Note that sections, components, and subtags indexed by our triples are numbered starting
at 1 rather than the more customary value of 0.
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value of the highest section in which verification found a supported subtag for
j:
• If vj = ⊥, then return ⊥.
• Otherwise, if each known-key component below c contains exactly one
supported subtag for j, and each unknown-key component below c con-
tains d supported subtags for j, then return λ′.
• If no component contains supported subtags for j, then return 0.
• Otherwise, some component below c contains a non-supported subtag for
j, so return ⊥ and set vj to ⊥.
The alternation of known-key and unknown-key components in tags gener-
ated by Chain Signatures is critical to the security of the algorithm. If a sup-
ported subtag t in one component follows a non-supported subtag t′ in another
component, then there must be some pair of adjacent components c and c′ such
that c′ comes before c, there is a non-supported subtag in c′, and there is a sup-
ported subtag in c. Since known-key and unknown-key components alternate,
exactly one of c and c′ must be a known-key component. So, whenever verifica-
tion returns ⊥, there is a known-key component and an adjacent unknown-key
component that justify this return value.
A simpler—but wrong—version of Chain Signatures would not include any
known-key components. This would give a compromised signer an easy way to
violate Transferability (5.5). For example, suppose compromised signer i creates
a tag τ in which all subtags in the first λ − 1 sections are supported. However,
in section λ of tag τ , only one subtag is supported. The key for this subtag is
owned by some verifier, say j. So, verification at j will return λ, and all other
verifiers will return λ− 1. This reveals that j owns the key for this subtag. And
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i can perform this attack on each key to learn its attribution; i can create split
tags once it knows the attribution of enough keys.
This attack fails in Chain Signatures due to the known-key components.
Suppose that compromised signer i creates a tag τ in which all subtags in the
first λ − 1 sections are supported. The first component in section λ is a known-
key component. So, if i makes one of the subtags in the known-key component
supported and all other subtags in section λ non-supported, then j will return λ,
and all other verifiers will return λ−1. This reveals the attribution of j’s known
key. But the attribution of j’s known key is known, so the adversary does not
learn anything new about the keys.
Another variant on the same attack would be for the compromised signer
to make all the subtags in the known-key component supported. But then, no
matter which subtags are supported in the unknown-key component of section
λ, all verifiers will return λ, since all find a supported subtag in this section.
A more complex variant of this attack would be to make some subtags in the
known-key component supported and some non-supported. Also, at least one
subtag in the unknown-key component of section λ must be made supported
(otherwise, the adversary learns nothing, as discussed above). But now there is
some probability that there is a verifier j′ that has a non-supported tag in the
known-key component and a supported tag in the unknown-key component.
This verifier will return ⊥ on τ . So, if the adversary requests verification of τ
from a verifier j′, and j′ does not return⊥, then the adversary learns that j′ does
not own the key used for the subtag in the unknown-keys.
Attacks in which some verifiers might return ⊥ yield information to the ad-
versary, but they also risk revealing to verifiers that the signer is compromised.
If too many verifiers learn that the signer is compromised, then Transferabil-
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ity (5.5) cannot be violated, since violationsm and τ depend on verifiers j and j′
such that Ver(m, τ,Kj) 6= ⊥ and Ver(m, τ,Kj′) 6= ⊥. Our reduction below from
Idealized Random Keys shows how to choose a value of d such that, with high
probability, compromised signers never learn enough information to create split
tags without revealing themselves as compromised to too many verifiers.
Chain Signatures as described above is expensive to compute; generating a
tag costs O(dnλ(|m|+ dnλ)), since inputs to the MAC grow linearly in the length
of the tag. Figure E.2 in Appendix E gives an algorithm that reduces the cost
to O(|m| + dnλ log λ) using collision-resistant hash functions. Modified proofs
of λ-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), and Non-Accusability (5.4) follow
the description of this more efficient version.
A λ-MVS scheme must satisfy λ-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3),
Non-Accusability (5.4), and Transferability (5.5). We prove that Chain Signa-
tures is a λ-MVS scheme for λ ∈ N>0 using two lemmas. The first shows that
Chain Signatures satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), and Non-
Accusability (5.4); the second reduces Non-Separability (6.1) of Ideal Random
Keys to Transferability (5.5) of Chain Signatures. Then, Theorem 4, along with
the second lemma, implies that Chain Signatures satisfies Transferability (5.5).
Note that Chain Signatures does not satisfy Strong Unforgeability (5.6). Any
adversary that receives a tag τ for message m that causes verifier j to return
λ > 1 can produce a new tag τ ′ that causes verifier j to return λ − 1. All the
adversary needs to do is to remove the last section, since tags for earlier sections
do not depend on the last section. The previous λ−1 sections consist entirely of
supported subtags, so verifier j will return λ−1 for m and τ ′. But the adversary
never received τ ′ from its signing oracle, so m and τ ′ together violate Strong
Unforgeability (5.6).
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Lemma 7. For any λ ∈ N>0, if the MAC satisfies CTA Unforgeability (5.1), then
Chain Signatures satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), and Non-Accu-
sability (5.4).
Proof. λ-Completeness. This follows directly from the definition: all subtags
are supported by construction, so VerCS(m, SignCS(m,λ,k),Kj) = λ.
Unforgeability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that adversary A
violates Unforgeability (5.3) for some I ′ ⊆ I with probability 0. We construct
an adversary B that violates CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC (for some key
k′) with probability 0/n. B chooses a key k∗t uniformly at random from the n
known keys and generates a new instance of Chain Signatures by calling GenCS
and replacing calls to MAC(·, k∗t ) with (i) calls to B’s MAC oracle when signing
and (ii) B’s verification oracle when verifying. When A succeeds, returning m
and τ , the definition of Unforgeability (5.3) states that there is some j ∈ I − I ′
for which VerCS (m, τ,Kj) > 0. This means j must have (at least) a supported
subtag in component 1 of section 1.
B returns m as its message and τ [1, 1, t] as its tag. With probability 1/n, we
have t = j, since t was chosen uniformly at random and independently of j.
And MAC(m, k′) = τ [1, 1, t], because τ [1, 1, t] = τ [1, 1, j] is the only subtag for
j in component 1 of section 1, so it must be supported. The unique length of
inputs to MACs for each component implies the only component for which B
could have requested m from its MAC oracle is the very first. This request could
only have been made if A requested m from its signing oracle, which does not
occur by definition.
So, B never requested m from its MAC oracle, and B succeeds in violating
CTA Unforgeability (5.1) with probability 0/n.
Non-Accusability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose some adversaryA
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violates Non-Accusability (5.4) for some I ′ ⊆ I with probability 0. Similar to
the proof of Unforgeability (5.3), we construct a B that violates CTA Unforge-
ability (5.1) of the MAC by building a new instance of Chain Signatures and
calling A. Instead of choosing a key at random from the known keys, however,
B chooses a key kt from the union of the known keys and the unknown keys.
When A succeeds and returns m and τ , the definition of Non-Accusability (5.4)
states that there must be some j in I − I ′ such that VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥,
which means that there is some supported subtag for j that takes as input a
non-supported subtag for j in some component r.
With probability 1/((d + 1)n), key kt was used to compute this supported
subtag, since twas chosen uniformly at random and independently of the choice
of the non-supported subtag. In this case, B returns this supported subtag in
component r as tag τ ′ and the message m concatenated with all components
before component r as message m′. The length of m′ means that it could only
have been input to B’s MAC oracle in component r. But since it contains a non-
supported subtag, it never would have been input to a MAC in B’s simulation
of the signing oracle, since only concatenations of supported subtags are input
to the MAC oracle in B’s simulation, by construction. So, m′ has never been
requested from B’s MAC oracle.
Thus, m′ and τ ′ violate CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC with probability
0/((d+ 1)n), which is non-negligible.
To prove that Chain Signatures satisfies Transferability (5.5), we reduce from
Idealized Random Keys. This reduction relies on the following characteriza-
tion of tags: for each verifier j, message m, and tag pair τ , there is a highest
known-key component of τ containing a supported subtag; we call this known-
key component highSup(m, τ, j,k). And there is a lowest known-key component
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containing a non-supported subtag for j; we call this known-key component
lowNonSup(m, τ, j,k). Verification returns ⊥ when a supported subtag follows
a non-supported subtag for a given verifier. As argued in section 6.2, at least
one such pair of supported and non-supported subtags in this case always in-
volves a known-key component. The following lemma shows that these special
known-key components indicate when to return ⊥.
Lemma 8. For verifier j, if the state vj is not ⊥, then VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥ if
and only if there is at least one of the two following kinds of subtags in τ :
• a non-supported subtag for j in a component below highSup(m, τ, j,k)
• a supported subtag for j in a component above lowNonSup(m, τ, j,k)
Proof. The “if” direction trivially follows from the definition of VerCS : if a sup-
ported subtag for verifier j, message m, and tag τ follows a non-supported sub-
tag for j, then VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥.
We prove the “only if” direction by the contrapositive. Let λHS be the value
highSup(m, τ, j,k), and let λLN be the value lowNonSup(m, τ, j,k). Suppose that
all non-supported subtags for j are in λHS or higher components—in fact, all
non-supported tags for j must be in higher components, since there is only one
subtag for j in λHS , and this subtag is supported. Suppose further that all sup-
ported tags for j are in λLN or lower components—by the same argument as
for λHS , all supported subtags for j must actually be in lower components than
λLN .
We will show that VerCS (m, τ,Kj) cannot return ⊥. For the sake of contra-
diction, suppose that it does. Then, since vj is not ⊥, the definition of VerCS
states that there is a pair of keys k1 and k2 associated with j and components
rN and rS such that rN < rS holds, the subtag generated with k1 in compo-
nent rN is not supported, and the subtag generated with k2 in component rS is
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λHS < rN < rS < λLN
non-supported
rK
supported
Figure 6.2: Components used in the proof of Lemma 8
supported. This happens because the verification algorithm returns ⊥ only if a
non-supported subtag occurs in a lower component than a supported subtag.
By the argument above, rN > λHS and rS < λLN both hold. So, λHS < rN <
rS < λLN holds; see Figure 8 for a depiction of these components. This means
that there are at least two distinct components rN and rS between λHS and λLN ,
so one of the components between λHS and λLN , say rK , must be a known-key
component. Since rK < λLN holds, the definition of λLN requires that j’s subtag
in rK be supported. But, since rK > λHS holds, the definition of λHS requires
that j’s subtag in rK not be supported. This is a contradiction, since rK only has
one subtag for j, so VerCS (m, τ,Kj) cannot return ⊥.
It may seem like a more natural construction for Chain Signatures would
make the input to the MAC for each subtag be the concatenation of the message
and all previous subtags, instead of the message and all subtags in previous com-
ponents. But Lemma 8 no longer holds in this version of Chain Signatures. The
problem is that a non-supported subtag for some verifier j could be followed
by a supported subtag for j in the same unknown-key component. In this case,
there is no contradiction in the proof of Lemma 8. This means that the high-
est known-key component with a supported subtag and the lowest known-key
component with a non-supported subtag are not sufficient to simulate verifi-
cation in the simpler version of Chain Signatures; Lemma 8 is critical in the
reduction from Non-Separability (6.1) of Idealized Random Keys to Transfer-
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ability (5.5) of Chain Signatures.
We now proceed to show the following lemma.
Lemma 9. If Idealized Random Keys satisfies Non-Separability (6.1), then Chain Sig-
natures satisfies Transferability (5.5).
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: we construct an adversary B that violates
Non-Separability (6.1) of Idealized Random Keys using an adversary A that vi-
olates Transferability (5.5) of Chain Signatures. The reduction for Transferabil-
ity (5.5) of Atomic Signatures relies on known keys that are added for the proof.
For Chain Signatures, however, known keys are already part of the construction,
so they do not need to be added for the proof.
B is given k for Idealized Random Keys and generates n keys to serve as
the known keys for Chain Signatures. B then forms k′ consisting of k and these
known keys to pass to A.
Since B knows all the keys, B can check each subtag in each component to see
if it is supported. B divides the keys into two sets for each component c based
on whether or not the MAC using a key in c is supported; we call these sets
supported and non-supported, respectively. B then uses the known keys to decide
on which sets to call CheckIR(·,Kj) to simulate a given call to VerCS (m, τ,Kj),
as follows.
1. B finds lowNonSup(m, τ, j,k) and calls CheckIR(·,Kj) on all keys in all sup-
ported sets for higher components.
2. Similarly, B finds λ = highSup(m, τ, j,k) and calls CheckIR(·,Kj) on all
keys in all non-supported sets for lower components.
3. If any of the calls to CheckIR(·,Kj) return ⊥, then B returns ⊥,
4. Otherwise, B returns λ, since verification for j returns the value of the
highest section that contains a supported subtag for j.
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This strategy simulates VerCS (m, τ,Kj) perfectly. To see why, we consider
the possible return values of VerCS (m, τ,Kj). When VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns 0,
there are no supported subtags for j, so the simulation will also return 0.
When VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns λ > 0, there must be some supported subtag
for j in section λ, and no supported subtags in higher sections. And since ver-
ification did not return ⊥, all subtags for j in lower components must also be
supported. Since the known-key subtag for j is the first subtag for j in section
λ, it must also be supported; this means that the simulation will return λ.
By Lemma 8, the simulation is also correct when VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥.
Note that Lemma 8 implies that CheckIR(·,Kj) in B’s simulation will only return
⊥ when VerCS (·, ·,Kj) does, since the simulation calls CheckIR(·,Kj) only on
keys for subtags that match the description in the hypothesis of Lemma 8.
When A succeeds, returning a message m and tag τ , the definition of Trans-
ferability (5.5) implies that there is some pair j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ and a section λ′ such
that VerCS (m, τ,Kj) = λ′ and VerCS (m, τ,Kj′) < λ′ − 1. B finds j, j′, and λ′ by
simulating the verification function as before for each verifier. Then B returns
the supported subtags in the unknown-key component of section λ′−1 asK and
the non-supported subtags in the unknown-key component of section λ′ − 1 as
K ′. This strategy always succeeds, since a violation of Transferability (5.5) in
section λ′ for verifiers j and j′ means that the subtags for j must be supported
in the unknown-key component of section λ′− 1 and the subtags for j′ must not
be supported. Thus, B succeeds with the same probability as A.
Just as in the proof of Lemma 5 for Atomic Signatures, the adversary B in the
proof of Lemma 9 depends critically on the known keys in its simulation of the
verification oracle. But, unlike Atomic Signatures, the known keys are essential
to the construction of Chain Signatures, as shown in Lemma 8 and section 6.2.
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The following theorem uses the previous results to show that Chain Signa-
tures is a λ-MVS scheme.
Theorem 10. For any λ ∈ N>0, if the MAC satisfies CTA Unforgeability (5.1), then
Chain Signatures is a λ-MVS scheme.
Proof. Lemma 7 shows that Chain Signatures satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2), Un-
forgeability (5.3), and Non-Accusability (5.4) if the MAC satisfies CTA Unforge-
ability (5.1). Lemma 9 shows that Non-Separability (6.1) of Idealized Random
Keys implies Transferability (5.5) of Chain Signatures. Since Theorem 4 shows
that Non-Separability (6.1) of Idealized Random Keys holds, it follows that
Chain Signatures satisfies Transferability (5.5).
The reduction in Lemma 9 shows that the value of the security parameter d
is set to d+1 in order for Chain Signatures to have the same security as Idealized
Random Keys has for d. However, the asymptotic complexity of d is the same,
so the value d = O
(
log
(
n2
0
))
computed in section 6.1.2 using the probability
0 of a compromised signer being able to create a split tag is the same for Chain
Signatures as for Idealized Random Keys. This means that Chain Signatures can
be computed in time O(|m|+ dnλ log λ) = O
(
|m|+ nλ log
(
n2
0
)
log λ
)
.
6.3 Performance
We implemented Atomic Signatures (AS) and Chain Signatures (CS) in C using
OpenSSL 0.9.8e [58]. Using a hash function h, we compute a MAC for a mes-
sage m and key k by setting MAC(m, k) = h(h(m)||k), as suggested by Canetti
et al. [17] for cases where many MACs must be computed for the same mes-
sage. In our implementation, h is SHA-1 [70].7 All shared keys comprise 160
7Under the assumption that SHA-1 is pseudorandom, this MAC satisfies the properties re-
quired for our proof, according to Bellare et al. [8].
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bits, and the output of the MAC is also 160 bits, so parameter b = 160.8 We use
all optimizations described in the body of the dissertation and the appendices:
pseudorandom functions are used to generate a factored matrix for Atomic Sig-
natures, and hashing is used as in the pseudo-code of Figure E.1 in Appendix E
to reduce the running time of Chain Signatures. The probability 0 that a com-
promised signer will be able to create a split tag is set to 2−64, except where
otherwise stated. Parameter λ is considered up to λ = 3, since this is a common
value for protocols used in implementing distributed services.
All tests were run on a 2.13GHz Pentium M over Gentoo Linux kernel 2.6.22-
gentoo-r9. RSA and DSA measurements were made for OpenSSL by running
the commands openssl speed rsa and openssl speed dsa on this sys-
tem. Each value represents a mean over 1000 runs; the error gives the sample
standard deviation around this mean.
The performance of signature algorithms depends on three factors: the ex-
ecution time for generating and checking tags, the tag size, and the key infras-
tructure required. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the execution time for generating
and checking Chain Signatures. In Figure 6.3, for λ = 3, Chain Signatures can
generate tags faster than 1024-bit RSA for n ≤ 50 and faster than 2048-bit RSA
for all n < 100, which is more than sufficient for many applications. Figure 6.4
shows that checking Chain Signatures (for λ = 3 and  = 2−64) is faster than
2048-bit RSA for n < 75. Higher probabilities of split tags may be acceptable in
some contexts and lead to faster generation and checking of signatures.
Atomic Signatures costs O(d2n2), so tags that use many random keys are
8Atomic Signatures requires that an adversary only be able to violate Strong Unforgeabil-
ity (5.6) with a given probability ′0. The proof of Lemma 2 bounds ′0 by poly(d, n)/2b, but
the exact value of the polynomial factor poly(d, n) depends on Lemmas 12–14, which provide
asymptotic, rather than concrete, bounds. So, we instead choose b to satisfy ′0 < 1/2b, since the
polynomial factor will make only a small difference in the choice of b for small values of n and
d.
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Figure 6.3: Execution time for generating Chain Signatures ( = 2−64)
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Figure 6.4: Execution time for checking Chain Signatures ( = 2−64)
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Figure 6.5: Execution time to generate Atomic Signatures for 6 verifiers and
different probabilities of generating a split tag
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Figure 6.6: Execution time to check Atomic Signatures for 6 verifiers and differ-
ent probabilities of generating a split tag
more expensive to generate; the efficiency depends on the probability that a
signer can generate split tags. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show how generating and
checking times vary for 6 verifiers and different probabilities of creating a split
tag. Atomic Signatures can generate tags for 6 verifiers faster than 2048-bit RSA
for probabilities down to about 2−55. But checking tags generated by Atomic
Signatures is more expensive for probabilities below about 2−25.
Even though execution time for generating and checking tags based on the
schemes in this dissertation is sometimes lower than RSA and DSA, tag size for
our signature algorithms is significantly larger. Chain Signatures and Atomic
Signatures require significant space even for small n, since the size of the sig-
nature depends linearly on d. For instance, for 6 verifiers,  = 2−64, and λ = 3,
generating signatures takes about 581µs, which is fast, but the size of a tag is
13680 bytes. These sizes are acceptable in circumstances where signature trans-
fer time is negligible—for instance, between processes in operating systems, or
across local-area networks using Gigabit Ethernet switches.
Key-management infrastructure costs for Chain Signatures and Atomic Sig-
natures are also relatively high, since each verifier must store O(dn) keys. For
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instance, with n = 4 and  = 2−64, each verifier must share d = 36 keys with
the signer. And if n = 36 with the same value of , then d becomes 40. Rekey-
ing requires that signer i not learn with which verifier it shares a given key. If
the keys for a single verifier j were replaced without replacing keys for other
verifiers, then i would learn which of its keys correspond to j. Even if keys for
some subset of the verifiers were replaced, then signer i would gain some infor-
mation about which keys correspond to which verifiers. Thus, all keys must be
replaced simultaneously.
These performance results show that in some contexts, MVS schemes have
comparable, and sometimes even better, performance than digital signature
schemes. Unlike these schemes, however, MVS schemes are proven secure only
assuming the existence of pseudorandom functions, whereas these digital sig-
nature schemes are only known to be secure in the heuristic random oracle
model. The results of our experiments show that it is possible to have prov-
able security and efficiency for signature schemes.
6.4 Related Work
Many authentication schemes use symmetric message authentication codes and
try to achieve properties similar to digital signature schemes. But none is able
to handle an unbounded number of adaptive queries. We succeed by using
a unusual secret-key setup along with state kept by verifiers. Previous work
achieves different properties.
λ-Limited Transferability. Chaum and Roijakkers [25] were the first to sug-
gest constructing tags that could be transferred a finite number of times. Their
scheme allows signed messages to be transferred only once. Pfitzmann and
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Waidner [61] followed with a construction, called pseudosignatures, that is some-
what similar to Chain Signatures: it creates tags that can be transferred an ar-
bitrary fixed number of times. Both the work of Chaum and Roijakkers and
Pfitzmann and Waidner provide unconditional security.
Like MVS schemes, pseudosignatures depend on a secret-key setup; multi-
ple keys are shared between the signer and each verifier, and the signer cannot
attribute keys to verifiers. However, pseudosignature tag size is directly pro-
portional to the number of queries an adversary can submit to a verification or-
acle. Even if pseudosignatures were implemented with computationally-secure
MACs, they would only be able to tolerate a fixed number of verification queries.
Arbitrary Transferability with Unconditional Security. Many schemes have
been proposed for tags that are both unconditionally secure and can be trans-
ferred an arbitrary number of times. For instance, recent work [40, 73, 66] gen-
eralizes Multi-Receiver Authentication (MRA) codes (invented by Desmedt et
al. [30]) to unconditionally-secure polynomial codes that satisfy similar proper-
ties to Transferability. These constructions are called MRA3 codes. MRA3 codes
constrain the number of signing and verification oracle queries as well as the
number of possible signatures that a signer can create, since each signature leaks
information.
Johansson [46] proposes a different unconditionally-secure authentication
scheme; it is similar in form to Atomic Signatures: signers and verifiers each
have secret keys that are used to solve a matrix equation. But unlike Atomic Sig-
natures, each signature in Johansson’s scheme provides a set of linear equations
over the signer’s secret keys, so keys must be refreshed after a fixed number of
signatures.
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Computational Security. Other schemes similar to MVS have been designed
for particular protocols in the computational model. For instance, MACs are
sometimes considered shared-key signatures, despite not satisfying Transfer-
ability. And in some fault-tolerant distributed systems (e.g., Practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [21]), vectors of MACs are used to improve protocol
speed over digital signatures.
Srikanth and Toueg [75] implement a scheme called authenticated broadcast
that achieves transferable authentication using only MACs. Their solution relies
on extra communication between the servers in a distributed system to provide
transferability. Each round of an authenticated protocol is transformed into two
rounds of communication between the servers; the problem of transferable au-
thentication is solved by replicas providing online authentication of messages.
Authenticated broadcast achieves transferability, hence it has properties sim-
ilar to multi-verifier signatures. But authenticated broadcast also has two im-
portant additional requirements. First, there is a bound on the number of com-
promised replicas; authenticated broadcast assumes that at most t replicas are
compromised. By contrast, the correctness of multi-verifier signatures does not
depend on the number of compromised verifiers. Second, authenticated broad-
cast requires extra communication between the replicas to verify a signature. In
some contexts, there is already an assumed bound on the number of compro-
mised replicas, and the load on the system is not so high as to preclude extra
rounds of communication for signature verification. In such cases, authenti-
cated broadcast might provide a more efficient solution than multi-verifier sig-
natures.
In similar research, Aiyer et al. [1] present schemes in which servers use
MACs to generate tags having similar properties to digital signatures. Unlike
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digital signatures and MVS schemes, however, their construction relies on com-
munication between clients and servers to produce and verify signed messages.
And they also require that no more than 1/3 of the servers in the system be
compromised.
In a distributed setting where at most t signers may be compromised, Lam-
port [49] suggests (in a set of slides on Byzantine Paxos) collecting (λ + 1)t + 1
tags from different signers. A signer in the scheme creates λ vectors consisting
of n subtags each, where each subtag of each vector contains a MAC of all the
vectors before it, along with the message. This scheme does not provide adap-
tive security, since an adversary with oracle access to the signing functionality
can create a split tag by the following procedure. The adversary requests a tag
for m and receives τ . Then the adversary corrupts τ to τ ′ by overwriting some
subtags with random strings and requests a tag for m || τ ′, receiving a tag τ ′′.
The tag τ ′ || τ ′′ is split for m, since all subtags in τ ′′ are supported, but some
subtags in τ ′ are not supported.
Canetti et al. [17] propose a multicast MAC scheme that is closely related to
the schemes in this dissertation. In this scheme, a collection of keys is associated
with each verifier; keys are chosen randomly from a large set. Signers create a
tag for a message m by generating a MAC of m for each key they know. The
algorithm distributes keys at random with probability 1
t+1
if up to t verifiers
may collude to try to forge tags. Keys in this protocol may thus be shared by
more than one verifier.9 Canetti et al. show that given  > 0, having e(t+1) log(1

)
keys in total suffices to guarantee that tags can be forged only with probability
less than . However, these tags do not satisfy Transferability (5.5), since an
9The key distribution algorithms for Atomic Signatures and Chain Signatures are closely re-
lated to the algorithm by Canetti et al., but each key in Atomic Signatures and Chain Signatures
is only shared between a pair of servers, so compromised relays are forced to guess keys to forge
tags for messages.
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adversary can create a new tag from a correctly-signed tag by corrupting one
subtag. This new tag will be accepted by some verifiers and not by others.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
Replication improves reliability but can be expensive—only services that re-
quire high resilience to server failure ought to employ replication. Proactive
obfuscation adds to this expense but transforms a fault-tolerant service into an
attack-tolerant one. Not all services require this additional degree of resilience,
and we show in this dissertation what the additional costs are in implement-
ing proactive obfuscation. The costs are far from prohibitive. For instance, our
firewall prototype’s performance only differs from a replicated implementation
without proactive obfuscation by exhibiting 92% of the throughput.
Moreover, two significant costs in our prototypes can be further reduced.
First, our mechanisms for proactive obfuscation execute in user space—moving
these mechanisms to the kernel would avoid the cost of transferring packets
across the kernel-user boundary. Second, the cost of digital signatures for in-
dividual authentication could be significantly reduced by using MACs. This is
actually an optimization of our individual authentication Reply Synthesis imple-
mentation using digital signatures, and thus it is not fundamentally different
from the case we studied. The use of MACs does require replicas to set up
shared keys, and this cost would be added to the refresh and recovery costs
already present in our prototypes.
Multi-verifier signature schemes can also provide lower-cost authentication
than traditional digital signature schemes while guaranteeing similar proper-
ties, as shown in this dissertation. Achieving these properties in Atomic Sig-
natures and Chain Signatures requires implementing a specialized secret-key
setup. The setup encodes an asymmetric relationship between the signer and
verifiers, since verifiers know which keys are owned by which signers, but
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signers do not know which keys are owned by which verifiers. Asymmetry
in knowledge about keys is critical for achieving Transferability, both in digital
signature schemes and multi-verifier signature schemes.
We did not employ multi-verifier signatures in our prototypes for three rea-
sons.
1. The costs of using digital signatures in our prototypes are significantly re-
duced by using RSA keys of size 512 bits—this reduced key size is sensible,
given the rapid key refresh rate under proactive obfuscation.
2. Rekeying multi-verifier signatures requires executing the specialized key
distribution algorithm at each epoch change, which would incur signifi-
cant extra overhead.
3. Using multi-verifier signatures in our scheme requires adding more repli-
cas. Recall from section 3.1 that Byzantine Paxos requires 3t+ 2r+ 1 repli-
cas if t replicas might be compromised and r replicas might be rebooting.
As explained in section 5.3, using multi-verifier signatures for Byzantine
Paxos requires adding t2 extra replicas that might crash. So, the total num-
ber of replicas required for Byzantine Paxos using multi-verifier signatures
and proactive obfuscation is 3t+2(r+t2)+1. If only one replica may reboot
at a time, then this reduces to 3t+2×1+2t2+1 = 3t+2t2+3, which means
running 8 replicas in the case t = 1. This is more costly than the 6 replicas
already required for proactive obfuscation using digital signatures.
The attack tolerance of a service employing proactive obfuscation depends
fundamentally on what obfuscator(s) are in use. Our work, by design, has been
largely independent of this obfuscation choice. That said, Obfuscation Inde-
pendence (2.1) and Bounded Adversary (2.2) provide a basis for examining and
comparing obfuscation techniques. It is an open problem which obfuscation
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techniques satisfy these requirements. On the one hand, Shacham et al. [71]
shows that obfuscated executables are easily compromised if they are generated
by obfuscators not using enough randomness. On the other hand, Pucella and
Schneider [63] analyze the effectiveness of obfuscation in general as a defense
and show that it can be reduced to a form of dynamic type checking, which
bodes well for the general approach. They also present a theoretical framework
for obfuscation and analyze obfuscation for a particular C-like language. This
gives an upper bound on how good particular techniques might be.
Proactive obfuscation trades availability for integrity. In particular, an ob-
fuscated replica that is processing input that conveys an attack is likely to crash
(because the attack is unlikely to be well matched to the obfuscations that were
applied). However, this also has the effect of limiting the rate at which ad-
versaries can vet their attacks. And this, in turn, blunts adversary attempts at
automated attack generation as a way to overcome the short windows of vul-
nerability proactive obfuscation imposes.
Attacks on availability can violate our assumptions about synchronicity, since
we make strong assumptions about our servers and network communication in
Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6) and Timely Links (2.8). Synchronicity
is needed for State Recovery. To see why, recall that replicas are rebooted based
on timeouts in the reboot clock. So, no information flows from the replicas to
the reboot clock, and, therefore, there is no way to change the timing of reboots
based on the time needed for recovery. Thus, recovering replicas must recover
within a given amount of time, which gives rise to the strong assumptions on
synchronicity to ensure that State Recovery completes in a timely manner. The
alternative is to allow information to flow from the replicas to a device that
causes reboots. We do not use this implementation, since any device receiving
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information from replicas becomes subject to attacks conveyed by these inputs.
Other than for State Recovery, we use asynchronous protocols, like Byzan-
tine Paxos and APSS, to implement the mechanisms for proactive obfuscation.
This provides our system with the maximum resilience to attacks on availability,
given the synchronicity constraints on Replica Refresh and State Recovery; even
if these constraints fail to hold, our implementations of Byzantine Paxos and
APSS will continue to operate correctly.
DoS attacks reduce availability and are not affected by proactive obfuscation.
DoS attacks by clients overloading a resource must still be countered by block-
ing the offending requests or terminating their source(s). For DoS attacks by
servers overloading some resource, the usual defenses apply, such as per-server
resource limits and elimination of resource sharing.
However, DoS attacks that cause replicas to crash can keep correct replicas
from ever recovering without outside intervention. These attacks might lever-
age state written to disk and later read for recovery. Such an attack could work
as follows. A replica i receives a packet that exercises a flaw in i, eventually
(but not immediately) causing i to crash. Suppose i writes its state to disk be-
fore crashing, including that packet or the effect of its execution. After i crashes
and reboots, the state i reads from disk during recovery might cause i to crash
again. In this case, replica i will continue to reboot, read its state, and crash un-
til it is rebooted for proactive obfuscation. If too many replicas have crashed in
this manner, then State Recovery will no longer complete successfully, so replicas
will not recover. And the service will not be able to process input packets. This
attack must be resolved by intervention of a human operator.
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Secret-Based Defenses and Secret Erosion
Proactive obfuscation and multi-verifier signatures both involve secret-based
methods of defending against attacks. Proactive obfuscation uses secrets to ob-
fuscate replica code, increasing attack tolerance by making replica compromise
more difficult. Multi-verifier signatures uses secrets to randomly permute the
order of keys held by the signer, preventing even a compromised signer from
producing signatures that violate Transferability (5.5).
Under attack, however, secrets can erode over time. For example, an ad-
versary can eventually disentangle the obfuscation used by each replica in a
distributed service and mount a successful attack. So, proactive obfuscation pe-
riodically reobfuscates code and reboots replicas to bound the time available for
adversaries to perform reverse engineering on replicas and craft attacks. Sim-
ilarly, a compromised signer in a system employing multi-verifier signatures
can create tags that cause verifiers to reveal information about which verifiers
know which keys. So, verifiers in multi-verifier signatures attempt to detect
such attacks; on detection, they refuse further interaction by returning ⊥ to
the signer thereafter. This defense prevents compromised signers from ever
acquiring enough information to violate Transferability (5.5). Therefore, both
proactive obfuscation and multi-verifier signatures successfully prevent secret
erosion.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF SME HIGHEST STATE RECOVERY
To prove that the state recovery request protocol of Section 3.1 satisfies SME
Highest State Recovery (3.2), we use a lemma about Byzantine Paxos. To prove
this lemma, we will need the following fact about Byzantine Paxos: for a replica
in Byzantine Paxos to change to a state with sequence number s, it must receive
messages from 2t+ r+ 1 replicas that are in a state with sequence number s− 1.
Also, we assume that no more than r replicas can be in a state with a lower
sequence number than the one they had when they sent any messages that de-
termined the state with the currently highest sequence number held by any cor-
rect replica. This property is not difficult to guarantee: as long as State Recovery
operates correctly each time, any replicas that lose their state by rebooting will
be replaced by replicas that have a state with at least as high a sequence number
(by SME Highest State Recovery (3.2)). So, this property can be proved for the
first instance of State Recovery, then extended inductively to all later instances.
Lemma 11. At any point in time ω in the execution of Byzantine Paxos, there is a state
with sequence number s such that the t + 1 correct replicas with the highest numbered
state have states with sequence numbers either s or s− 1.
Proof. Consider the state with highest sequence number s held by any correct
replica. This replica entered this state upon receiving messages from 2t + r + 1
replicas that were in a state with sequence number s − 1. At most t of those
replicas are compromised at time ω, and at most r could be in states with lower
sequence numbers (by having rebooted and not yet recovered). So, there are at
least 2t + r + 1 − t − r = t + 1 correct replicas that are in states with sequence
numbers either s or s − 1. And this means that all of the t + 1 correct replicas
with the highest sequence numbers are in states with sequence numbers s or
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s − 1 (otherwise, the t + 1 replicas in states with sequence number s or s − 1
would have higher sequence numbers).
States sent by replicas in response to the state recovery request contain the
current state and a diff to get to the previous state. So, Lemma 11 implies that a
recovering replica receiving all the states and diffs for correct replicas at a given
point in time ω will receive t+ 1 copies of the state with sequence number s− 1,
where s is the highest sequence number at a correct replica at time ω. Note
that the recovering replica can wait to hear from all correct replicas, since the
network satisfies Timely Links (2.8). Furthermore, the recovering replica also
receives the messages that caused the correct replica in the state with sequence
number s to change to this state. So, the recovering replica will reach the state
with sequence number s, the highest sequence number at time ω.
It remains to show that a recovering replica receives all the state information
held by correct replicas at the point in time T seconds after the first replica is
contacted. To see why this holds, notice that all replicas are contacted by time
T , and all correct replicas then send their state at the time they are contacted,
as well as all state changes and all messages for the agreement protocol for the
next T seconds. Since all replicas have been contacted by time T , the recovering
replica will receive all the information for all states of correct replicas through
time T . Since η is the bound on the marshaling and transmission time, the re-
covering replica will receive this information by time T + η.
So, this shows that a recovering replica has received, by time T + η seconds
after the beginning of the state recovery request protocol, enough information to
recover to the state with the highest sequence number held by a correct replica at
time T seconds after the start of the state recovery request protocol. This proves
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that the state recovery request protocol of Section 3.1 satisfies SME Highest State
Recovery (3.2).
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APPENDIX B
LEMMAS FOR STRONG UNFORGEABILITY OF ATOMIC SIGNATURES
We prove several lemmas that together simplify the proof of Strong Unforge-
ability (5.6) of Atomic Signatures to the case where all but one verifier is com-
promised, no verifier queries are allowed for an adversary, and MAC(·, k) is re-
placed by a random function vk(·).
Lemma 12. If Atomic Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6) when all but one
verifier is compromised, then Atomic Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6).
Proof. SupposeA violates Strong Unforgeability (5.6) using an arbitrary set I ′ ⊆
I of compromised verifiers. We construct an adversary B that violates Strong
Unforgeability (5.6) when all but one verifier, say verifier j, is compromised. B
is given the keys for all verifiers but j and is given oracle access to a verification
oracle for j as well as a signing oracle. Bmaps its verifiers randomly to verifiers
in the simulation forA; this does not change the view ofA, since keys are chosen
uniformly at random. B runs A and simulates its oracle queries as follows.
1. B calls A(1d, 1n, {Ki}i∈I′).
2. When A makes a signing oracle query, B passes the query to its signing
oracle and returns its response.
3. When A makes a verification oracle query for verifier j′, B calls its verifi-
cation oracle if j′ = j, and otherwise uses its knowledge of the keys for j′
to perform verification for j′ and return the result.
4. When A returns m and τ , B checks that VerAS (m, τ,Kj) 6= 0. If so, then B
returns m and τ , and otherwise, B aborts.
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WhenA returns m, τ , there is some j′ ∈ I− I ′ such that VerAS (m, τ,Kj′) 6= 0,
and there a 1/n chance that j = j′, since the position of j in I− I ′ was chosen in-
dependently of the view ofA. So, B succeeds with probability /n ifA succeeds
with probability .
Lemma 13. If Atomic Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6) when no ver-
ifier queries are allowed to an adversary and all but one verifier is compromised, then
Atomic Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6) when all but one verifier is com-
promised.
Proof. Given an adversaryA that succeeds with non-negligible probability with
polynomial bound p(n) on its number of verification queries, we can construct
a new adversary B that succeeds with non-negligible probability without using
any verifier queries. Assume, without loss of generality, that A always makes a
verifier query for the pair m and τ that it outputs.1
B simulates verifier queries from A for a message-tag pair m, τ as follows: if
m has been requested already from the signing oracle, which returned τ , then
return ∞. If m has not been requested from the signing oracle, or the signing
oracle returned anything but τ , then return 0. B stores each verification query.
WhenA outputs m and τ , B chooses one of the stored verification queries m′, τ ′
uniformly at random, and outputs it.
A either uses more than one verification query (the final one) or it does not.
If it does not, then B succeeds every time A does, since B always chooses the
one query that Amade. And this is the value that A returned.
If A uses more than one verification query, then either some verification
queries (other than the last) that were not received from the signing oracle
1If this is not the case, then there is another adversary D that succeeds with the same proba-
bility as A but performs the extra query. D runs A, and when A returns m and τ , D queries m
and τ from the verification oracle before returning them.
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should have returned a value other than 0, or all verification queries (other than
the last) that were not received from the signing oracle should have returned 0.
If all except the last should return 0, then B succeeds only when it returns the
m and τ from the last query. A succeeds with non-negligible probability  and
makes at most p(n) queries, so B succeeds, in this case, with probability greater
than or equal to /p(n), which is non-negligible.
If some queries not received from the signing oracle should return a value
other than 0, then there is no guarantee about the success probability ofA, since
B no longer simulates all of the verification queries correctly. But there is still
a maximum bound of p(n) on the number of verification queries, and there is
at least one query that caused B to fail to simulate the verification queries cor-
rectly. The definition of B guarantees that this query violates Strong Unforge-
ability (5.6), since the query was not received from the signing oracle. This
means that the probability of B returning a query m and τ that violates Strong
Unforgeability (5.6) is at least 1/p(n), which is non-negligible.
So, B always succeeds in violating Strong Unforgeability (5.6) with non-
negligible probability.
For simplicity in stating the next lemmas, call the version of Atomic Sig-
natures in the hypothesis of Lemma 13 verifier-free Atomic Signatures, and call
Atomic Signatures when no verifier queries are allowed, all but one verifier is
compromised, and MAC(·, k) is replaced by a random function vk(·) verifier-free
random Atomic Signatures.
Lemma 14. If MAC is a pseudorandom function, then if verifier-free random Atomic
Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6), then verifier-free Atomic Signatures
satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6).
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that verifier-free random Atomic Signatures
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satisfies Strong Unforgeability (5.6), but verifier-free Atomic Signatures does
not. This means that there is an adversary A that succeeds with non-negligible
probability  when interacting with oracles that use MAC(·, k) to answer sign-
ing queries, and, by assumption, succeeds with only negligible probability ′
when interacting with oracles that use random functions vk(·) to answer sign-
ing queries.
Now construct a sequence of hybrids as follows: Hi uses vkj(·) instead of
MAC(·, kj) for keys kj such that 1 ≤ j ≤ i, then uses MAC(·, kj) for the remaining
keys kj such that i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ dn. Note that H0 is verifier-free Atomic Signatures,
and Hdn is verifier-free random Atomic Signatures.
A standard hybrid argument shows that there must be an i such that A suc-
ceeds with non-negligible probability on hybrid Hi and and succeeds with neg-
ligible probability on hybrid Hi+1. But then there exists a algorithm D that can
distinguish a random function from MAC, since the only difference between hy-
brids Hi and Hi+1 is that Hi uses MAC in its i + 1st position, whereas Hi+1 uses
a random function in this position.
D sets up an instance of the hybrid Atomic Signatures scheme using its or-
acle (which is either a pseudorandom or a random function) in the i + 1st po-
sition. Then D calls A on this instance and returns 1 if A succeeds and 0 if A
fails. Since A succeeds with non-negligible probability when there is a pseu-
dorandom function in the i + 1st position and succeeds only with negligible
probability when there is a random function in the i + 1st position, D succeeds
in distinguishing pseudorandom from random functions with non-negligible
probability. This contradicts the hypothesis that MAC is a pseudorandom func-
tion.
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APPENDIX C
CORRECT SIGNERS
The constructions of MVS schemes in this paper allow the signer to be com-
promised. But there are places where it is reasonable to make stronger assump-
tions. For instance, when it is sound to assume that the signer is not compro-
mised, we can simplify our constructions significantly. This assumption holds
in some common contexts: for example, in operating systems, the OS itself is
trusted by the processes and sometimes signs messages (e.g., capabilities) to
processes.
When the signer is not compromised, Transferability (5.5) can be weakened
to the following:
(C.1) Weak Transferability. For every non-uniform PPT adversaryA, there ex-
ists a negligible function  such that for any choice of I ′ ⊆ I ,
Pr[(k, {Ki}i∈I)← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m, τ)← ASign(·,k),{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ (1d, {Ki}i∈I′) :
(∃j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ : ∣∣Ver(m, τ,Kj)− Ver(m, τ,Kj′)∣∣ > 1)] ≤ (d, n).
Weak Transferability (C.1) implies that even an adversary that controls an arbi-
trary subset of verifiers and has signing and verification oracles (for the other
verifiers) cannot produce message and tag pair on which two correct verifiers
will produce values that differ by more than one. Notice that the adversary in
this case does not control the signer.
We call λ-MVS scheme that satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3),
and Weak Transferability (C.1) a Weak λ-MVS scheme.
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C.1 Known-Key Atomic Signatures
Known-Key Atomic Signatures (KA) is a Weak∞-MVS scheme based on Atomic
Signatures, and it only uses one key for each verifier. KA follows exactly the
algorithms for Atomic Signatures for the case d = 1. But this means that verifiers
can never return⊥, since either their single instance of equation (6.2) is satisfied
or it is not.
Theorem 15. If the MAC is a pseudorandom function, then Known-Key Atomic Sig-
natures is a Weak∞-MVS scheme.
Proof. ∞-Completeness. Same reasons as Atomic Signatures.
Strong Unforgeability. This follows from exactly the same proof as for
Atomic Signatures. The only difference is that the Union Bound does not in-
clude a factor of d, since each verifier only has 1 key rather than d.
Weak Transferability. We show that Strong Unforgeability (5.6) implies
Weak Transferability (C.1). As we have already shown that Known-Key Atomic
Signatures satisfies Strong Unforgeability, this implies that it also satisfies Weak
Transferability.
We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that there is an adversary A that can
violate Weak Transferability (C.1) with non-negligible probability . A uses ac-
cess to a signing oracle and verification oracles to produce a message m and
tag τ such that for some pair j, j′ ∈ I − I ′, it holds that |VerKA(m, τ,Kj) −
VerKA(m, τ,Kj′)| > 1. This means that one verifier must return∞ and the other
must return 0. Without loss of generality, assume that j returns∞ and j′ returns
0.
We now produce an adversary B that violates Strong Unforgeability (5.6).
B is given the same signing and verification oracles as A and must produce a
message and tag that it has never received from the signing oracle but causes
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some verifier j ∈ I − I ′ to produce a value that is not 0. B simply calls A,
simulates A’s oracle calls by passing them to B’s oracles, and returns the values
of m and τ returned by A.
Since verification for j returns∞, the values m and τ will suffice to violate
Strong Unforgeability (5.6) as long as m and τ were never received from B’s
signing oracle. But the same values of m and τ also cause j′ ∈ I − I ′ to return 0.
And∞-Completeness implies that no message and tag returned from the sign-
ing oracle ever causes a correct verifier to return 0. So,m and τ were not received
from the signing oracle, and B succeeds in violating Strong Unforgeability (5.6).
So, Strong Unforgeability (5.6) implies Weak Transferability (C.1).
And since we proved above that Known-Key Atomic Signatures satisfies
Strong Unforgeability (5.6), it follows that Known-Key Atomic Signatures also
satisfies Weak Transferability (C.1).
C.2 Known-Key Chain Signatures
Known-Key Chain Signatures (KC) is a Weak λ-MVS scheme obtained by simpli-
fying Chain Signatures—it does not use unknown-key components in tags. So,
each verifier shares exactly one key with the signer. Its algorithms operate as
follows
• GenKC(1n) simply sets up pairwise shared keys. The signer is given a vec-
tor k of keys, and each verifier j is given k[j].
• SignKC(m,λ,k) performs exactly the same operations as in Chain Signa-
tures, but only uses the known-key components. We index subtag j in
section r by a pair (r, j) with the natural lexicographic ordering. This sub-
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mCλ(m)
r nλ
MAC(·, kr)
MAC(·, knλ)
Figure C.1: The structure of Known-Key Chain Signatures
tag is computed for the tag Cλ(m) as follows.
Cλ(m)[r, j] , MAC(m ||
(t,t′)<(r,1)
Cλ,d(m)[t, t′],k[j]) (C.1)
• VerKC(m, τ,Kj) finds the highest section λ for which j’s subtag is sup-
ported, and returns λ. If there is no such section, then it returns 0. Verifi-
cation never returns ⊥, since the signer cannot be compromised.
Figure C.1 shows the structure of KC, where we write kp for k[p mod n]
Generating a signature requires nλ steps: the tag contains nλ subtags, and
each step produces one subtag by computing the MAC of a vector that is of size
at most |m|+ nλ. Thus the total cost of generating a tag is O(nλ(|m|+ nλ)). The
total cost can be significantly reduced, as explained in Appendix E.
Theorem 16. For any λ ∈ N>0, if the MAC satisfies CTA Unforgeability (5.1), then
KC is a Weak λ-MVS scheme.
Proof. λ-Completeness. This follows trivially from the definition of KC, just as
for Chain Signatures.
Unforgeability. The proof is the same as for Chain Signatures when the
adversary causes some verifier to return a value in N>0: an adversary B is con-
structed that violates CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC.
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Figure C.2: Execution time for generating Known-Key Chain Signatures and
Known-Key Atomic Signatures by correct signers
Weak Transferability. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Non-
Accusability (5.4) of Chain Signatures: if an adversary violates Weak Transfer-
ability (C.1), then by definition, some subtag will be supported that takes as
input a subtag that is not supported. The probability of success for our con-
structed adversary in this case, however, is 
n
rather than 
(d+1)n
, since the con-
structed adversary that violates CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC guesses a
key kt from a set of size n rather than size (d+ 1)n.
C.3 Performance
Our implementation of Known-Key Atomic Signatures and Known-Key Chain
Signatures uses the same libraries and hash function as our implementation of
Atomic Signatures and Chain Signatures.
Figures C.2 and C.3 show the execution time for generating and checking
Known-Key Chain Signatures and Known-Key Atomic Signatures compared to
RSA and DSA signatures when the signer is known not to be compromised.
In Figure C.2, Known-Key Atomic Signatures are faster to generate than
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Figure C.3: Execution time for checking Known-Key Chain Signatures and
Known-Key Atomic Signatures from correct signers
RSA signatures until the number of verifiers n is about 80. Further, Known-Key
Chain Signatures for λ = 1, 2, and 3 are much faster to generate than either DSA
or RSA signatures for all n < 100. Thus, when the signer is not compromised,
tags based on shared keys and that protect against compromised relays can be
created much more quickly than tags based on public keys. The time required
for checking Known-Key Atomic Signatures is shown in Figure C.3 to be faster
than RSA for all n less than 100. The time required for checking Known-Key
Chain Signatures is much smaller than RSA for all n < 100. DSA checking is not
given on the graph, since it requires nearly 3ms, and this is off the scale.
Signature size is significantly smaller than for Atomic Signatures and Chain
Signatures, as shown in Figure C.4.
The smaller size and faster signature generation time shown in the results
above suggest that Known-Key Chain Signatures and Known-Key Atomic Sig-
natures could be profitably applied in domains such as operating systems, where
there is already a trusted third party (the OS) managing interactions between
processes. For example, either scheme could be used for OS capabilities.
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APPENDIX D
UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE DEFINITIONS
To gain confidence in our game-based MVS definition, we present an ideal
functionality FC,βSIG (see Figure D.1) that generalizes the signature functionality
FSIG [16] by allowing verification of signatures to return ⊥, which signifies that
the signer is compromised, and by allowing verification to return positive val-
ues other than ∞ and 0. For setup in our secret-key setting, we rely on a key
distribution functionality FDC(Gen) that calls Gen for a given MVS scheme and
passes the keys that Gen outputs to the appropriate server.1 See Figure D.2 for
a description of FDC(Gen). We call FDC(Gen) the Dining Cryptographer’s Key
Distribution functionality, because a signer receiving keys from verifiers does
not know which keys are known to which verifiers, as in the Dining Cryptogra-
pher’s problem [24].
FC,βSIG follows the same structure as FSIG [16]. Key Generation requests sign-
ing and verification algorithms from an adversary; unlike FSIG, the verifica-
tion algorithms are not published, but rather are distributed to servers directly
by FC,βSIG . This change is required, because the verification functions for MVS
schemes are not a priori known to all verifiers. Signature Generation ensures
that it is only called by the designated signer S. It also checks that s outputs
a value that satisfies β-Completeness (5.2). Signature Verification for a given
server V associated with verifier j returns ⊥ if the state of verifier j is already
⊥. It also ensures that any message-tag pair for which it returns a value satisfies
Unforgeability (5.3), Non-Accusability (5.4), and Transferability (5.5) for every
recorded verifier. If any of these conditions are not satisfied, then FC,βSIG returns
1We do not describe how to define protocols that realize FDC(Gen), but it can be realized
as a setup assumption in many common settings. For example, a trusted third party could
implement FDC(Gen) for a small distributed service before the service began executing.
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Functionality FC,βSIG
Key Generation: Upon receiving a value (KeyGen, sid, n) from some
server S, verify that sid = (S, sid′) for some sid′. If not,
then ignore it. Otherwise, pass (KeyGen, sid, n) to the adver-
sary. Upon receiving (Algorithms, sid, s, {vi}ni=1) from the ad-
versary, where s is a PPT and each vi is a deterministic PPT,
pass (SigningAlgorithm, sid, s) to S, and, for each verifier i, pass
(VerificationAlgorithm, sid, S, vi) to i. Store (Signer, sid, s), and
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, store (Verifier, sid, vi, i, 1); the last element of
the Verifier tuple is called the state of verifier vi.
Signature Generation: Upon receiving (Sign, sid,m) from S, verify that
sid = (S, sid′) for some sid′. If not, then ignore it. Produce
σ , s(m). If vi(m,σ) ≥ β for each recorded vi, then output
(Signature, sid,m, σ) to S and record (sid,m, σ). Otherwise, out-
put an error to S.
Signature Verification: Upon receiving (Verify, sid,m, σ, v′) from veri-
fier j, if v′ 6= vj , then output (Verified, sid,m, v′(m,σ)) to j. Other-
wise, if vj has state ⊥, then return (Verified, sid,m,⊥).
If S is not compromised, and for some recorded, non-compromised
verifier v it holds that v(m,σ) ∈ N∞ and there is no entry (sid,m, σ),
or it holds that v(m,σ) = ⊥ and the state of v is not ⊥, then output
an error to V .
Further, if
∣∣vi(m,σ)−vi′(m,σ)∣∣ > 1 for any recorded pair of verifiers
vi, vi′ such that neither vi nor vi′ has state ⊥, vi(m,σ) 6= ⊥, and
vi′(m,σ) 6= ⊥, then output an error to V .
Otherwise, output (Verified, sid,m, v′(m,σ)) to V . If vj(m,σ) = ⊥,
then set the state of vj to ⊥.
Figure D.1: The generalized signature functionality FC,βSIG .
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Functionality FDC(Gen).
Setup: Upon receiving of the first (Setup, sid, n, d) from S such that
sid = (S, sid′) for some sid′, record (sid, n, d). Call Gen(1d, 1n) to get
Kj for each server j and k for the signer.
Then, pass (Key, sid,k) to S with k randomly permuted, and, for
each server j, pass (Key, sid,Kj) to j.
Figure D.2: The dining cryptographers key distribution functionality FDC(Gen)
an error.
We show that a UC-secure implementation ofFC,βSIG is equivalent to the game-
based definition. More precisely, we consider a protocol pi(Σ) (a simple general-
ization of Canetti’s protocol to realizeFSIG [16]) that responds to KeyGen, Sign,
and Verify by calling FDC(Gen), Sign and Ver, respectively, given a tuple of al-
gorithms Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver). Note that this theorem implies that MVS schemes
are secure under concurrent composition.
Theorem 17. Let Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver) and let λ be an element of N∞. Then pi(Σ) se-
curely realizes FC,λSIG in the FDC(Gen)-hybrid model if and only if Σ is a λ-MVS scheme.
Proof. This proof follows a similar proof by Canetti [16]. To prove the first direc-
tion of the implication, we assume that Σ violates one of λ-Completeness (5.2),
Transferability (5.5), Non-Accusability (5.4), or Unforgeability (5.3) and show
that pi(Σ) does not securely realize FC,λSIG.
To do so, we construct an environment Z and an adversary A such that for
all ideal process adversaries S, environment Z can tell whether it is interacting
with A and pi(Σ) or with S and the ideal process for FC,λSIG. Environment Z does
not communicate with A, so we leave A unspecified. There are four cases, cor-
responding to the four ways in which Σ can fail to satisfy the λ-MVS definition.
1. Assume that Σ does not satisfy λ-Completeness (5.2). Thus there exists an
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m such that there exists a j in I such that, for infinitely many values of d,
Pr[k, {Ki}i∈I ← Gen(1d, 1n) : Ver(m, Sign(m,k),Kj) < λ] > (d)
First Z writes 1 to its output tape. Then Z chooses party V (corresponding
to verifier j) and S, sets sid = (S, 0), and calls S with (KeyGen, sid, n). Z
sends (Sign, sid,m, λ) and receives σ. Z then sends (Verify, sid,m, σ) to
V . With non-negligible probability, V returns a value that is less than λ. In
this case, Z overwrites its output tape with a 0. Note that when this adver-
sary runs against FC,λSIG, Z always returns 1, since λ-Completeness (5.2) is
enforced in the ideal functionality (and, in case of a λ-Completeness (5.2)
error, FC,λSIG returns an error to S, so Z never receives a tag to send to V ).
2. Assume that Σ does not satisfy Transferability (5.5). Then there exists a
non-uniform PPT G such that there exists an I ′ ⊆ I such that for infinitely
many d,
Pr[k, {Ki}i∈I ← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m,σ)← G{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I−I′ (1d, 1n,k, {Ki}i∈I′) :
∃j, j′ ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m,σ,Kj) 6= ⊥ ∧ Ver(m,σ,Kj′) 6= ⊥
∧ ∣∣Ver(m,σ,Kj)− Ver(m,σ,Kj′)∣∣ > 1] > (d).
To distinguish between interactions, Z writes 1 to its output tape, runs
a copy of G, and proceeds as before to send a (KeyGen, sid, n) request to
some S ∈ I ′ to set up keys. Z compromises parties in I ′ and gets the
signing key and associated verification keys to pass toG. Z then simulates
request (m′, σ′) from G to verification oracle Ver(·, ·,Kj) of G by passing
(Verify, sid,m′, σ′) to V associated with j and returning its response to G.
When G outputs a pair (m,σ), Z requests verification from each server in
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I− I ′ and checks their responses to see if Transferability (5.5) holds. If not,
then Z outputs 0.
Note that when Z interacts with pi(Σ), G succeeds with non-negligible
probability, so Z outputs 0. But, when interacting with the ideal process
and S, Z never outputs 0, since FC,λSIG outputs an error for message and
tag pairs that violate Transferability (5.5), so Z receives no responses to
compare.
3. Assume that Σ does not satisfy Non-Accusability (5.4). Then there exists a
non-uniform PPT G such that there exists an I ′ ⊆ I such that, for infinitely
many d,
Pr[k, {Ki}i∈I ← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m,σ)← GSign(·,k),{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈I (1d, 1n, {Ki}i∈I) :
∃j ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m,σ,Kj) = ⊥] ≥ (d).
Z proceeds as for Transferability (5.5) to write 1 to its output tape, run G,
and simulate its oracles. Instead of compromising the signer, however, Z
simulates G’s oracle calls to sign message m′ by requesting that signer S
sign m′. Then, when G outputs (m,σ), Z sends (m,σ) to all verifiers and
outputs 0 if any of them return⊥ (unless a verifier had already returned⊥
before. In this case, Z outputs 0 and halts). As for Transferability (5.5), Z
outputs 0 with non-negligible probability when running over pi(Σ), since
G succeeds with non-negligible probability, but always outputs 1 when
running over FC,λSIG, since FC,λSIG outputs an error when m and τ violates
Non-Accusability (5.4), so no verifier ever returns ⊥ to Z .
4. Assume that Σ does not satisfy Unforgeability (5.3). Then there exists a
non-uniform PPT G such that there exists an I ′ ⊆ I such that, for infinitely
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many d,
Pr[k, {Ki}i∈I ← Gen(1d, 1n);
(m,σ)← GSign(·,k),{Ver(·,·,Ki)}i∈Ir (1d, 1n, {Ki}i∈I) :
¬req(G,m,k, r) ∧ ∃j ∈ I − I ′ : Ver(m,σ,Kj) ∈ N∞] ≥ (d).
Z proceeds as for Transferability (5.5) to write 1 to its output tape, run G,
and simulate its oracles. Instead of compromising the signer, however, Z
simulates G’s oracle calls to sign message m′ by requesting that signer S
sign m′. Then, when G outputs (m,σ), Z halts if m was already requested
of the signing oracle. Otherwise, Z sends (m,σ) to all verifiers and out-
puts 0 if any of them return a value in N∞. As for Transferability (5.5), Z
outputs 0 with non-negligible probability when running over pi(Σ), since
G succeeds with non-negligible probability, but always outputs 1 when
running over FC,λSIG. And with non-negligible probability, Z never halts
prematurely, since when G succeeds, m was not requested from the sign-
ing oracle (by definition).
For the reverse implication, consider security against the dummy adversary
D that acts as a pass-through for Z (security against the dummy adversary is
shown in [15] to be equivalent to security against arbitrary adversaries; the intu-
ition in this case is that the environment can simulate any adversary). Assume
that pi(Σ) does not securely realize FC,λSIG in the FDC(Gen)-hybrid model. This
means that there exists an environment Z that can distinguish interacting with
D and pi(Σ) from interacting with any S and FC,λSIG with non-negligible proba-
bility . Since Z can distinguish its interaction for any ideal-process adversary,
we define a particular ideal-process adversary S that only generates keys for
FC,λSIG and responds to compromise requests from Z . To generate keys, S calls
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Gen(1d, 1n) to get k and {Ki}i∈I and returns Sign(·,k) and {Ver(·, ·,Ki)}i∈I to
FC,λSIG. S simply acts as a pass-through between FC,λSIG and Z for compromise re-
quests.
Now assume that Σ satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2), Transferability (5.5), and
Non-Accusability (5.4). We will show that Σ does not satisfy Unforgeability (5.3)
by constructing a forger G that runs Z and indistinguishably simulates its in-
teraction with pi(Σ) and D. We choose randomly a verifier j in I to be non-
compromised, and we build a forger given this j. G is given a signing oracle,
a verification oracle for VerKj , and verification keys for all other n− 1 verifiers.
When Z requests a compromise of server i, G aborts if i is the signer or is j.
Otherwise, G returns the keys and state of i. G replies to requests from Z as
follows.
WhenZ requests (KeyGen, sid, n), G sends toZ the keys for any servers com-
promised by Z (this simulates the output of FDC(Gen) as seen by Z). When Z
requests (Sign, sid,m), G returns the result of requesting a signature for m from
its signing oracle. When Z requests (Verify, sid,m, σ, v′) for some server i, if v′
is not vi, then G simply returns a Verified response using v′. Otherwise, if
i 6= j, then G uses its verification keys for i to compute Ver(m,σ,Ki), and re-
turns the result (keeping state as necessary for returning ⊥). G also requests m
from j’s verification oracle, and returns m and σ if the value returned from the
oracle is in N∞. There is only a negligible probability of the oracle returning ⊥,
since Non-Accusability (5.4), so G aborts if the oracle returns ⊥.
If i = j in the request from Z , then G requests that its verification oracle
check (m,σ), and returns the result. If the result is greater than 0, then G returns
(m,σ). Otherwise, G continues.
Note that the output of G and the output of D with pi(Σ) are indistinguish-
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able toZ , sinceG is effectively running a centralized version of pi(Σ), andD sim-
ply relays requests from Z . Further, since S instantiates FC,λSIG with the protocols
in Σ, and these protocols satisfy λ-Completeness (5.2), Non-Accusability (5.4),
and Transferability (5.5), the only way the output of pi(Σ) and D could differ
from the output of S and FC,λSIG is in the case where Z produces a message that
has not been signed but causes some non-compromised verifier to return a value
in N∞.
So, Z must create an (m,σ) that violates Unforgeability (5.3) for some server
j′ with non-negligible probability. And we assume, without loss of generality,
that Z always passes this forgery to the verification function. Since such a mes-
sage will only allow Z to distinguish the ideal from the real case if the signer
and j′ are not compromised, a request from Z for such a pair (m,σ) must occur
before Z requests to compromise the signer or verifier j′.
Finally, since j was chosen uniformly at random and independently of Z ,
and Z’s view is independent of which j was chosen, the probability that j = j′
is 1
n
, so the success probability of G is 
n
, which is non-negligible if  is non-
negligible.
Note that the same methods used in Canetti and Rabin [19] to generalize
FSIG to multiple instances of the signature functionality that all share the same
state applies to FC,λSIG essentially without modification, so the JUC (Universal
Composability with Joint State) Theorem can be applied to FC,λSIG as well. This
means that MVS schemes can be composed securely even when the same key is
used to sign more than one message and verifiers keep state between messages.
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APPENDIX E
EFFICIENT CHAIN SIGNATURES
To make Chain Signatures and Known-Key Chain Signatures more efficient,
we employ a different implementation that uses a family of collision-resistant
hash functions to keep the size of the input to the MAC constant. The algorithm
for generating tags using Known-Key Chain Signatures is presented in Figure
E.1. There, h is chosen from H , a family of collision-resistant hash functions,
operator || is concatenation as before, and we define x || y = x if y = NULL. To
generate a tag, a signer follows the same algorithm as before, except that the
input to the MAC in a given section is now the section number, along with the
hash of the concatenation of two values: (1) the input to the previous section,
and (2) the hash of the previous section.
To check a subtag in section p, a verifier must use each subtag in each section
that precedes section p and build up wp(m), the input to the MACs in section p.
Verifiers follow the algorithm in Figure E.1 to build upwp(m) and use it compute
the MACs corresponding to the subtags they are checking.
To calculate the time needed to compute a tag, we assume that both the hash
and the MAC execute in time linear in the length of their input. We also assume
that both the hash and the MAC produce a constant-size output.
The loop over p in Figure E.1 has λ iterations, and each iteration involves a
hash of a value of constant length, followed by a loop with n iterations and a
hash computation over data of size O(n). Since p has size log λ and wp(m) has
constant size, the loop over p′ takes time O(n log λ). There is also an initial cost
of time O(|m|) to compute w1(m). So, the total time to generate Known-Key
Chain Signatures is O(|m|+ λ+ nλ log λ+ n) = O(|m|+ nλ log λ).
This more efficient algorithm for Known-Key Chain Signatures is general-
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w0(m) := m;
v0(m) := NULL;
for p := 1 to λ
wp(m) := h(wp−1(m) || vp−1(m));
for p′ := 1 to n
Cλ(m)[p, p′] := MAC(p || wp(m), kp);
vp(m) := h(
n
||
t=1
Cλ(m)[p, t])
Figure E.1: The hashing version of Known-Key Chain Signatures
w′0(m) := m;
v′0(m) := NULL
for p := 1 to λ
wp(m) := h(w
′
p−1(m) || v′p−1(m))
for p′ := 1 to n
Cλ,d(m)[p, 1, p′] := MAC(2(p− 1)||wp(m),k0[p′])
vp := h(
n
||
t=1
Cλ,d(m)[p, 1, t])
w′p(m) := h(wp(m)||vp(m))
for p′ := 1 to dn
Cλ,d(m)[p, 2, p′] := MAC((2(p− 1) + 1)||w′p(m),k1[p′])
v′p(m) := h(
dn
||
t=1
Cλ,d(m)[p, 2, t])
Figure E.2: The hashing version of Chain Signatures
ized to Chain Signatures in Figure E.2. Similar to Known-Key Chain Signatures,
the input to the MAC for a given component is a number indexing the compo-
nent, along with the hash of the concatenation of two values: (1) the input to the
previous component, and (2) the hash of the previous component.
We can calculate the running time of the algorithm of Figure E.2 as follows.
The loop over p has λ iterations. And each iteration has a hash over data of
constant size, followed by a loop with n iterations (each performing a MAC of
data of size O(log λ)), and a hash of data of size O(n). Then there is a hash of
data of constant size, a loop with dn iterations (each performing a MAC of data
of size O(log λ)), and a hash of data of length O(dn). And, as before, there is an
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initial cost of O(|m|) to compute w1(m). So, the time needed to compute Chain
Signatures using the algorithm of Figure E.2 is O(|m|+λ(n log λ+n+ dn log λ+
dn)) = O(|m|+ dnλ log λ).
To use the algorithms of Figures E.1 and E.2 in Known-Key Chain Signa-
tures and Chain Signatures, we must modify the proofs of Unforgeability (5.3)
and Non-Accusability (5.4) for Chain Signatures, and Weak Transferability (C.1)
for Known-Key Chain Signatures, since arguments based on unique input sizes
to the MACs of each section no longer work. Instead, the unique prefix p along
with the length of p || wp(m) in the computation MAC(p || wp(m), kp) in the al-
gorithm guarantees that the signing oracle would only have performed a given
computation for a subtag in the pth section.
In these new versions of Chain Signatures and Known-Key Chain Signa-
tures, we say that a subtag is supported if it is identical to the MAC of the hash
value using wp or w′p defined recursively in Figures E.1 and E.2 over all previ-
ous components and the message. So, a verifier can determine if its subtags are
supported by computing the hashes of previous components and the message
and computing the MAC of this value.
Lemma 18. If MAC satisfies CTA Unforgeability (5.1) and H is a family of collision-
resistant hash functions, then Chain Signatures using the algorithm described in Fig-
ure E.2 satisfies λ-Completeness (5.2), Unforgeability (5.3), and Non-Accusability (5.4).
Proof. λ-Completeness. As before, λ-Completeness follows by construction:
signing and verification use the same algorithms to generate and check tags,
so VerCS(m, SignCS(m,λ,k),Kj) = λ for any λ and any choice of j.
Unforgeability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that adversary A
violates Unforgeability (5.3) for some I ′ ⊆ I with probability . We construct an
adversary B that attempts to violates CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC (for
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some key k′) and collision-resistance of the family H . B is given MAC and VF
oracles and is given oracle access to a hash function h chosen randomly from H .
B chooses a key k∗t uniformly at random from the n known keys and gener-
ates a new instance of Chain Signatures by calling GenCS and replacing calls to
MAC(·, k∗t ) with calls to B’s MAC oracle when signing and B’s verification oracle
when verifying. B uses h as its hash function in the execution of signing and
verification. When A succeeds, returning m and τ , the definition of Unforge-
ability (5.3) states that there is some j ∈ I − I ′ for which VerCS (m, τ,Kj) > 0).
This means j must have (at least) a supported subtag in component 1 of section
1.
B returns 0||h(m) as its message and τ [1, 1, t] as its tag. With probability 1/n,
it holds that t = j, since t was chosen uniformly at random and independently
of j. And MAC(0||h(m), k′) = τ [1, 1, t] in this case, because τ [1, 1, t] = τ [1, 1, j] is
the only subtag for j in component 1 of section 1, so it must be supported. The
prefix 0 in the MAC computation guarantees that this MAC could only have been
computed for the first component of the first section. There are two possible
cases.
In the first case, A requested some m′ 6= m from its signing oracle such that
h(m) = h(m′). Then 0||h(m) = 0||h(m′), so this message was requested of the
MAC oracle, and CTA Unforgeability (5.1) is not violated. But m′ and m are
a collision for the hash function, so B returns m and m′ and violates collision
resistance of H .
In the second case, A did not request any m′ such that h(m) = h(m′), so
B never requested 0||h(m) from its MAC oracle, since A never requested m, by
assumption. So, B succeeds in violating CTA Unforgeability (5.1).
So, either B violates CTA Unforgeability (5.1) or returns a collision. And at
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least one case must occur with non-negligible probability if A succeeds with
non-negligible probability. So, B succeeds with non-negligible probability and
Chain Signatures satisfies Unforgeability (5.3).
Non-Accusability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that some adver-
sary A violates Non-Accusability (5.4) for some I ′ ⊆ I with probability . Simi-
lar to the proof of Unforgeability (5.3), we construct a B that attempts to violates
CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC and collision resistance of the family H by
building a new instance of Chain Signatures and calling A. Instead of choosing
a key at random from the known keys, however, B chooses a key kt from the
union of the known keys and the unknown keys. WhenA succeeds and returns
m and τ , the definition of Non-Accusability (5.4) states that there must be some
j in I − I ′ such that VerCS (m, τ,Kj) returns ⊥, which means that there is some
supported subtag for j in a component r that takes as input a non-supported
subtag for j. Without loss of generality, let the component for the non-supported
subtag for j immediately precede the component for the supported subtag for
j. And let this be the lowest position in the tag at which a supported subtag in
one component follows a non-supported subtag in the previous component.
There is a 1/((d + 1)n) probability that kt is the key used to compute this
supported subtag, since t was chosen uniformly at random and independently
of choice of the non-supported subtag. Suppose that the non-supported subtag
for t is in component 2 of section r − 1, followed by a supported subtag for t
in component 1 of section r (the same argument applies for a non-supported
subtag in component 1 of some section r followed by a supported subtag in
component 2 of section r, but the indices differ accordingly). B returns as a
message m′ the input for the supported subtag in component 1 of section r:
2(r − 1)||h(w′r−1(m)||v′′r−1(m)), where w′r−1(m) is the normal computed value
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for component 2 of section r − 1 in the signing algorithm of Figure E.2, and
v′′r−1(m) = h(
dn
||
p=1
τ [r − 1, 2, p]). This is the normal algorithm for computing the v′
value in the pseudo-code, but v′′ contains a non-supported subtag for j from τ .
B returns as its tag τ ′ the corresponding supported subtag for j in component 1
of section r.
By the definition of Non-Accusability (5.4), when A succeeds, the MAC of
the message returned by B is the value of the tag returned by B. So, the only
question is whether or not this message was requested from the MAC oracle
already.
Since the message starts with 2(r − 1), it could only be requested from the
MAC oracle in an execution of the signing algorithm for component 1 of section
r. There are two possible cases.
In the first case, A requested an m′′ signed such that the execution of the
signing algorithm leads to a hash collision with v′′r−1(m) or h(w′r−1(m)||v′′r−1(m)).
B can find either collision by computing these values for all messages submitted
to the signing oracle. This violates collision resistance of h.
In the second case, no such m′′ was requested, so the message returned by B
would never have been input to a MAC in B’s simulation of the signing oracle.
To see why, notice that v′′r−1(m) is the output of a hash that takes as input a non-
supported MAC. This cannot occur in the normal computation of the signing
oracle. So, if no message was requested that leads to the same value of v′′r−1(m)
or h(w′r−1(m)||v′′r−1(m)), then m′ was never requested of the signing oracle. And
this means that the message and tag returned by B violated CTA Unforgeabil-
ity (5.1) of the MAC.
Thus, either m′ and τ ′ violate CTA Unforgeability (5.1) of the MAC with non-
negligible probability or a collision is found with non-negligible probability. So,
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B succeeds with non-negligible probability, and Chain Signatures satisfies Non-
Accusability (5.4).
As before, Weak Transferability (C.1) of Known-Key Chain Signatures fol-
lows from a parallel argument to Non-Accusability (5.4) of Chain Signatures,
but with a success probability of /n instead of /(d+ 1)n.
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